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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the non-functional factors explaining the growth and 
variation of delegation to independent agencies. The literature argues that 
delegation is more likely in sectors subject to market opening, like 
telecommunications or energy. The functional reasons for the creation of 
independent agencies such as credibility, complexity or expertise, explain the 
growing incidence of delegation to independent agencies. However, there are still 
wide variations in the level of independence given to independent agencies. The 
literature has identified a number of the non-functional factors which may 
explain the variations in the levels of independence. The non-functional factors 
are concerned with the role of political traditions; isomorphism, specifically the 
role of the European Union, and blame-shifting.  
 
This thesis examines the delegation process in the UK, Ireland and the 
Netherlands. It examines Telecommunications as a sector subject to market 
opening but specifically examines the delegation of radio spectrum management. 
Radio spectrum is a key operational responsibility of Telecommunications 
regulatory agencies however it has been delegated through different institutional 
solutions. An examination of radio spectrum delegation will help to explain the 
 vii 
 
 
non-functional factors for delegation and offer a better understanding of the 
delegation process. 
 
This dissertation highlights the importance of the non-functional factors in the 
decision to delegate. Radio spectrum management is not delegated, without 
constraints on the agent, in cases where policy actors believe they need to retain 
control over the financial rewards of radio spectrum licences. The review of the 
delegation process also highlights that the non-functional factors differ at a 
national level. In some cases blame shifting is a factor, in others it is not. Political 
traditions can act both for and against delegation depending on the political 
culture. The importance of the European Union is reinforced in these case studies 
and is considered a key driver behind the creation of independent agencies. 
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KPN         Koninklijke PTT Nederland (Dutch Telecommunications company 
formerly state run company) 
RDR         Radio Communications Division, part of Dutch department of water 
and national resources) 
NRA         National Regulatory Authority 
NMa         Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (Dutch competition authority) 
ODTR      Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation (Ireland) 
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Telecommunications Regulatory Authority) 
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VVD         Volkspartij voor Vrijheid (People’s Party for Freedom and 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The growth of independent regulatory agencies, particularly in the European 
Union (EU), has been an institutional innovation over the past two decades. In 
sectors where former state utilities have been privatised and markets opened to 
competition, such as energy and telecommunications, all EU countries have 
created independent regulatory agencies. The growth of these quasi-autonomous 
agencies extends to other sectors, with independent agencies created for food 
safety and pharmaceuticals. There are also independent agencies dealing with 
competition issues and financial services.  
 
The literature on delegation to independent agencies has focused on why these 
independent agencies are created. The reasons put forward in the literature are 
both functional and non-functional. Functional theories focus on the principal-
agent literature and indicate that delegation is functional in areas of policy 
complexity (Pollack M., 2002).  Where there is a need for credibility (Gilardi, 
2005), it is a strategy for policy makers to delegate. Credibility theories argue that 
governments will wish to enhance the credibility of their policies by delegating 
decision making to an independent regulatory agency thereby reducing political 
uncertainty via a change of government in the future. Levy and Spiller (1994) 
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have argued that credibility is the most plausible explanation for the creation of 
independent regulatory agencies, where the sector has been recently opened to 
competition. Minimising policy uncertainty through credibility is important, 
particularly for those wishing to invest in newly opened markets (North & 
Weingast, 1989). There are other factors that explain the delegation of authority 
to independent regulatory agencies. Governments will delegate unpopular 
decisions to independent agencies to shift blame (Fiorina, 1977), or through a 
process of institutional isomorphism (Majone 1996). Thatcher (2002) argues that 
the decision to delegate may be influenced by state traditions or through political 
leadership.  
 
Gilardi (2003a) has concluded that credibility theories explain to a large extent 
the political actor’s decision to create independent regulatory agencies. Once 
created the agencies exhibit variations in the level of formal independence. 
Gilardi (2003a) shows that the level of independence is not influenced by a 
country or a sector. This variation needs to be explained in more detail to 
understand the motivations of political actors in creating independent agencies. 
Gilardi (2001) argues that some of the variations in the level of independence are 
explained by the level of veto players in a country. He also concurs with Levy 
and Spiller (1994) who argue that the level of independence is higher in 
economic sectors recently subject to market opening. Non-functional factors also 
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impact the level of formal independence such as political leadership or tradition, 
blame shifting or isomorphism. McNamara (2002) posits that formal or informal 
pressures from organisations where member states may have a legal dependence, 
for example, member state obligations to the European Union, can result in a 
coercive form of isomorphism.  
 
The combination of factors which influence the creation of an independent 
agency and the level of independence is therefore still unclear. It is also unclear 
what influences policy actors when they decide on the operational remit of an 
agency. The operational remit needs to be distinguished from the formal or 
organisational independence as the operational remit is concerned with the actual 
responsibilities delegated by policy actors. For example, an agency can be 
established through legislation with organisational independence from the policy 
actor. However, to ensure the agent does not significantly deviate from the 
preferences of the policy actor, the remit of the agency is limited through the use 
of ex-ante and ex-post controls.  
 
The literature has focused on research using broad data sets and covering several 
sectors. This research has concentrated on testing hypotheses using measures of 
formal independence to test the relevance of policy complexity, veto players and 
credibility (Elgie, 2005; Majone 1994; Epstein & O' Halloran, 1999; Gilardi, 
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2002b; Levy & Spiller, 1996), Thatcher (2002b). Others have examined non-
functional reasons, in many cases using individual country experience, for 
example the experience of the United Kingdom (UK), to support their arguments.    
 
This thesis will deepen our understanding of delegation by examining 
systematically the creation of independent agencies and charting the evolution of 
agencies, assessing whether independence has materially changed in the period 
following the creation of the agency. The case studies will give a concentrated 
examination of the creation of the independent agency. The case-studies will 
allow a comparative analysis of detailed primary sources such as interviews with 
political actors, examination of legislation and reports which informed the 
decisions of political actors prior to the creation of an independent agency. The 
case-studies selected will concentrate on economic sectors which have been 
subject to market opening. Using only these examples, the case-studies will 
control for credibility as an explanation for the creation of the independent 
agency. By controlling for credibility, the case studies will therefore try to 
explain why the levels of independence differ in these countries. The cases will 
be selected from the telecommunications sector where delegation to independent 
agencies is most extensive and where market opening has occurred. The sector 
also has the same EU legislative framework.  
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The thesis will concentrate on the non-functional factors evident in the creation 
and evolution of the independent agency in telecommunications. However, it will 
also examine the variation in independence which occurs where political actors 
create independent agencies but constrain the independence of the agency 
through limitations on the operational remit of the agency. The thesis will do this 
by assessing the extent of delegation of a key operational responsibility of an 
independent telecommunications agency, the management of radio spectrum. As 
a national resource radio spectrum has historically been managed by the state, 
however, due to market opening this resource is capable of delegation to an 
independent agency.  
 
Radio spectrum is the range of frequency wavelengths which, through advances 
in technology, is now the basis of communications services, including the 
development of mobile telephony. The allocation and licensing of this resource 
should, as part of the functioning of the market, be delegated to independent 
telecommunications agencies. Radio spectrum responsibilities are accepted as a 
key operational activity of independent telecommunications agencies. Along with 
responsibilities for numbering, licensing and interconnection, radio spectrum is 
accepted as a competence of the independent telecom agency in promoting 
market opening. However, when examining the types of activities normally 
delegated to independent agencies as part of their operational remit, there are 
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high levels of variation in the delegation of radio spectrum management across 
the EU.  In some cases, the management of radio spectrum has been delegated to 
the independent agencies, in some countries there is co-responsibility for radio 
spectrum management and in a small number of countries radio spectrum has not 
been delegated and is retained within the Ministry.  
 
The examination of the experience of delegation in the telecommunications 
sector will therefore concentrate on the non-functional reasons and contribute to 
the literature on the non-functional reasons for delegation. The examination of 
radio spectrum management will allow an examination of the delegation of an 
operational function and offer reasons, based on the cases examined, as to why 
this operational activity has not been delegated. 
 
Chapter 1 discusses the delegation of powers to independent regulatory agencies 
and identifies the factors evident in the literature for the creation of regulatory 
agencies. The broad range of factors both functional and non-functional is 
examined. In chapter 2, radio spectrum is introduced and the key responsibilities 
within radio spectrum management, which could be delegated to agencies, are 
examined. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) has identified key responsibilities which for typical telecommunications 
agencies should be delegated. These responsibilities include licensing and 
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management of numbering. They also include radio spectrum allocation and 
management. The OECD has found that key responsibilities are in general 
delegated to an independent agency, however with radio spectrum the level of 
delegation differs from country to country.  
 
In chapter 3 the methodology that underpins the study is discussed. The need to 
examine case studies of delegation for one sector within the EU allows for a 
systematic consideration of the factors discussed in chapter 1. Such a detailed 
analytical examination of the decision to create an agency requires a detailed 
narrative discussion of the process. The narrative is presented chronologically to 
ensure that the key decisions are examined in sequence, to allow consideration of 
the factors raised in the literature and to assess their importance in each case.  
 
The consideration of the decision making process allows a review of primary 
sources such as reports, Parliamentary debates and primary legislation. In 
addition, in all cases the key decision makers, both politicians and the officials 
who drafted legislation have been interviewed. Interviews can be unreliable, 
particularly if the events being discussed are in the recent past and recollections 
may be conditioned by recent events. A broad range of interviewees, not only 
politicians, but Government officials were interviewed to give sufficient depth to 
the evidence and to ensure no individual bias in the conclusions. 
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The case studies follow in chapters 4, 5 and 6. The countries selected for analysis 
were firstly differentiated by a comparison of the level of independence given to 
each agency and secondly by the approach to radio spectrum responsibilities in 
each country. The cases selected were Ireland, UK and the Netherlands.  In 
Ireland the telecommunications agency has one of the highest levels of functional 
independence measured by a number of sources. A number of studies (Edwards, 
2004; Gilardi, 2001; Cukierman, Webb, & Neyapti, 1992; Tenbucken & 
Schneider, 2004) have also measured independence in terms of operational 
independence.  The Irish telecommunications agency has a high degree of 
independence in allocating and licensing radio spectrum. The UK, in the studies 
measuring formal independence, is neither measured with high or low 
independence; however its management of radio spectrum has evolved from a 
non-independent executive agency in 1990, to the inclusion of radio spectrum 
management responsibilities within a converged independent agency. Finally, the 
case of the Netherlands is important to examine as it has decided not to delegate 
radio spectrum responsibilities. The Dutch telecommunications agency’s 
operational remit is limited despite being institutionally independent and studies 
measuring formal independence show the Netherlands telecommunications 
agency has low formal independence. 
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Research to date has focused mainly on broad datasets, mainly to differentiate the 
experience of delegation across sectors. Research on the non-functional factors 
has also been based on broad data sets. The empirical evidence presented through 
comparative detailed country studies will give an understanding of the factors 
which led to the creation of independent agencies and the evolution of the 
delegation process. The case studies will also examine the factors which impact 
on the operational remit of the agencies. The focus on radio spectrum 
management, as a key operational responsibility of independent 
telecommunications agencies, will answer the question why governments have, 
in a number of instances, not delegated this function consistently to independent 
agencies.  
 
The core argument of this thesis is that policy actors in delegating responsibilities 
to independent agencies are making complex decisions which are influenced not 
only by national circumstances but by transnational pressures from the European 
Union. The creation of independent agencies, particularly in economic sectors 
subject to market opening, is motivated by concerns around credibility. However, 
the level of independence given to independent agencies is influenced by the non-
functional factors. These factors are reflected in the operational remit of the 
agency and constraints placed on agency independence. Policy actors will not 
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delegate in cases where policy actors believe they need to retain control over the 
financial rewards of market opening.   
 11 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As independent agencies have emerged across Europe, the scholarly literature has 
focused on why, at this time, this institutional model is being widely used by 
policy actors. This chapter will discuss the literature on the growth of 
independent agencies. Specifically, it will examine why governments delegate 
authority to independent agencies. It will also examine the literature on why the 
level of independence given to these agencies varies. The variation is not only 
cross national but also within the same sector.  Independent agencies for the 
purposes of this thesis can be defined as governmental agencies that:  
 
‘(a) Possess and exercise some grant of specialised public authority, 
separate from that of other agencies, but  
(b) Are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by 
elected officials’ (Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 1)   
 
The literature on delegation and the growth of independent agencies has been 
developed using established public administration frameworks. Public 
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Administration theory is the study of political decision making which is a broad 
complex area encapsulating public policy, politics and administration. 
Frederickson and Smith (2003) note that although public administration has been 
practised for thousands of years, the development of theories in the field has been 
relatively recent. Public administration theory can be approached using 
frameworks developed in other disciplines such as economics and organisational 
theory.  Frederickson and Smith (2003) identified eight approaches to Public 
Administration theory which they argue encapsulate the key theoretical 
compartments which underpin Public Administration theory. The 8 approaches to 
public administration theory highlight theories such as bureaucracy and 
institutional networks; rational choice theories which draw on economic theories 
to explain public policy decisions and New Public Administration theories which 
seek to apply to public administration theories on organisational design and 
leadership. 
 
The approaches to public administration theory identified by Frederickson and 
Smith are not sealed and impermeable. Rather a number of concepts emerge, all 
of which are important to the understanding of delegation. Key concepts such as 
the principal-agent problem, new public management and institutionalism 
reoccur in the public administration approaches. Bendor, Glazer and Hammond 
(2001) argue that delegation theory is linked with a range of formal and informal 
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models, particularly models which focus on non-cooperative game theory. Such 
models draw on principal-agent relationships and the rational choice approaches 
referred to by Frederickson and Smith. These theories specifically influence 
delegation through our approaches to explaining why delegation occurs. 
Functional reasons like credibility draw on the rational choice and principal-agent 
frameworks which argue that public administration is driven by rational 
individuals seeking the most efficient or functional solution in decision-making. 
Non-functional reasons for delegation focus on institutional theories which focus 
on the mimic effects of isomerism, for example, to example the growth of 
institutional models. 
   
Delegation does not happen in a void: governments have a number of choices at 
the point of delegation and can retain competence over agencies by drafting 
legislation which retains control. Alternatively, governments can delegate 
statutory authority to independent agencies by delegating statutory powers 
previously in the remit of government, to agencies independent of influence from 
government. A definition of delegation offered by Thatcher and Sweet Stone:  
 
‘an authoritative decision, formalised as a matter of public law, that 
transfers policy making authority away from established, representative 
organs (those that are directly elected, or are managed directly by elected 
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politicians), to an independent institution, whether public or private’ 
(Thatcher & Stone Sweet, 2002, p. 2) 
 
Although governments have delegated authority to independent agencies for 
some time, the number of independent agencies, and the number of sectors 
subject to supervision by independent agencies, has increased exponentially. The 
growth of independent agencies has led to studies which have focused on the 
‘rise of the regulatory state’ (Majone, 1994). Although a number of countries 
have created independent agencies throughout the last century, the literature 
examining the issue of delegation was initially based on American studies which 
examined the relationship between the US Congress and US regulatory agencies, 
many of which have been in existence for some time (Pollack M. , 2002). The 
European experience of delegation has been more recent, and the literature has 
focused on the reasons why governments delegate, and additionally the issues of 
institutional design and the levels of formal independence (Pollack M., 2002). 
Recent research on the growth of independent agencies in Europe has focused on 
the differing levels of formal independence given to agencies, and the reasons 
why, at the point of delegation, some governments choose to differ in terms of 
the levels in formal independence (Gilardi, 2002b).  
 
The debate has focused on a range of issues which could explain why delegation 
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occurs and equally why there is variation in the levels of independence. There are 
functional theories like credibility, which encompass issues like time-
inconsistency, expertise and the role of veto players. There is also the factor of 
political uncertainty, which influences the decision by political actors to delegate. 
There are also non-functional reasons. These are more difficult to quantify. 
Examples of the non-functional reasons include political leadership, political 
traditions and isomorphism. Gilardi (2002b) has attempted to quantify the 
significance of the hypothesis that credibility alone explains the reason why 
governments delegate. He concluded that credibility alone cannot fully explain 
delegation but does explain, to a large extent, the reason for delegation. 
Therefore, along with credibility, the non-functional factors may more fully 
explain the reasons for delegation.  
 
The degree of delegation is also significant. Gilardi (2003a) has shown that 
independence differs both across sectors and across countries. Cuikermann, 
Webb, and Neyapti (1992) argue that the level of independence given to central 
banks differs across a range of countries. The OECD (2000) shows, in terms of 
delegation in the telecommunications sector that the level of independence, 
including the operational remit of agencies, differs across countries. Functional 
factors, therefore, offer a starting point for analysing delegation (Thatcher, 
2002a). Thatcher argues that contextual, non-functional factors offer a more 
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complete explanation for the reasons to delegate. Thatcher particularly examines 
three factors: 
  
 policy learning and institutional isomorphism;  
 state traditions and structures in regulation;  
 political leadership and the broader institutional context in West 
European countries.  
 
Where credibility and functional factors will be present in each decision to 
delegate, the level of independence and institutional design will differ in specific 
cases. For example, Moran (2001) has argued, in relation to the UK, that the rise 
of the regulatory state is a mix of exhaustion with old methods of intervention 
coupled with the new pressures from supranational agencies like the European 
Commission. He highlights that there are new pressures as a result of scandals, 
the rise of the ‘risk society’ and a growing role for ‘audit’ to counter the 
externalities in economic and social areas. 
 
This chapter will look at the reasons offered in the literature as to why policy 
actors choose to delegate specific degrees of responsibility to independent 
agencies. It will firstly examine the functional reasons centred on the principal-
agent theories and detail the attempts to measure this factor as a primary 
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motivation for delegation. Secondly, this chapter will examine the non-functional 
reasons for delegation. These theories suggest that rational choice functional 
explanations of delegation are not sufficient to understand the diffusion of 
independent agencies and the relative levels of independence afforded to 
independent agencies. Thatcher (2002b) makes the point that many of the 
pressures for changes and the advantages of delegation have been present in most 
countries for some time, but the growth of independent agencies and the large 
degree of delegation has occurred only recently. If one accepts credibility as a 
driving force why has credibility become more important in recent decades? The 
next section looks at credibility and the functional explanations of delegation.  
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CREDIBILITY & FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF DELEGATION  
 
The study of the reasons why governments delegate to independent agencies has 
been examined using rational choice theories where the decision to delegate 
derives from the government’s need to credibly commit to particular policies 
(Gilardi, 2002b; Majone, 1994; Thatcher, 2002a; Elgie & McMenamin, 2005). It 
is also argued that there is need to credibly commit where governments have 
faced increasing pressures from technical or market requirements, particularly in 
the area of market opening (Levy & Spiller, 1996). 
 
Gilardi (2002b) argues that the credibility hypothesis is theoretically well 
founded but empirically untested.  Majone (1997) defines the hypothesis as: 
 
‘Political sovereigns are willing to delegate important powers to 
independent experts in order to increase the credibility of their policy 
commitments’ (Majone, 1997, pp. 139-140) 
 
The literature on the functional factors which influence delegation decisions and 
the creation of independent agencies is influenced by the principal-agent models. 
These models emerged initially in the economic literature and have been applied 
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in the political literature in terms of its applicability to political agencies. 
  
The literature emerges in part from the New Public Management (NPM) 
literature which was used by governments since the 1980s to modernize the 
public sector.  The NPM hypothesis is based on the view that a more market-
oriented public sector would result in greater cost-efficiency for governments. 
The basis of NPM was economic theory based on the self-interested rational 
individual. The optimal organisational structure for the public service was 
therefore more decentralized with efficiency realised through delegation to 
agencies. The rational choice models which have emerged offer a framework to 
help understand delegation. Specifically, using non-cooperative game theory, 
again drawn from the economic literature, theorists can develop formal models 
based on the behaviour of principals and agents.  
 
A key aspect of the principal-agency theory is the issue of transaction costs. 
Pollack (2002) argues that there are three aspects of the political environment that 
influence the transaction costs of policy making, particularly the decision to 
create an agency. 1 
                                                 
1 Transaction costs have been broadly defined as any costs that are due to human relationships (or their absence) 
rather than physical or technological costs of production. Economists then ask which kinds of relationships 
(firms, markets, franchises, etc.) minimize the transaction costs of producing and distributing a particular good 
or service. The transaction cost considered in the cost related to creating an institution and the costs dictate 
whether the transaction should be undertaken. 
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Firstly, the transaction costs relate to the maintenance of policy-relevant 
information. This argument is straightforward as it argues that policy makers face 
demands for policy-related information or expertise. Policy complexity and the 
need for expertise is a functional reason for delegation. Epstein and O'Halloran 
(1999) argue that the degree of core executive control will be less extensive in 
areas that are more complex or technical. They argue: 
 
 
'where the policy area is complex, making the link between policies and 
outcomes more uncertain, legislators will prefer bureaucratic policy 
making’ (Epstein & O' Halloran, 1999, p. 84) 
 
The degree of agency discretion should, in theory, increase as the issue area 
becomes more complex.  For example, Shipan (2005) argues that increasing 
complexity and the increasing need for expertise led the Irish government to 
create the Irish Environmental Protection Agency. Majone (2004) posits that the 
increasing numbers of European directives have added complexity to some 
former government activities and that this complexity requires delegation to 
experts. Expertise is also linked with credibility as a motivation to create 
independent agencies. Sometimes a lack of public confidence in the status quo 
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and a belief that an expert agency can add some credibility to the decision 
making process and remove somewhat difficult and complex decisions from 
political interference, is a driver of delegation.  
 
The second reason suggested by Pollack argues that principals will see a need to 
credibly commit to policy objectives. Pollack (2002) posits that: 
  
‘we should expect legislative principals to delegate powers, not (only) in 
issue areas marked by relative uncertainty, but also in issue areas where 
legislators find themselves unable to commit credibility to a particular 
line of policy’ (Pollack M. , 2002, p. 208/9) 
 
Credibility explains delegation as a political actor’s attempt to overcome political 
uncertainty and time inconsistency in decision making. Political uncertainty 
arises because, unlike economic actors who, in democratic countries, are 
guaranteed their property rights, the long-term property rights of political actors, 
by the very nature of democracy, are not guaranteed. Political actors can have 
policies reversed or amended by subsequent events and governments. Delegation 
is designed to stop political actors from doing this. Political actors will therefore 
be interested to secure their property rights. The uncertainty of political property 
rights is then much more likely to play a key role in the design of political 
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agencies in these situations. For example, the policy of liberalisation and 
delegation of key responsibilities for that sector to an independent agency is more 
difficult for a new government to reverse. Equally, the delegation of 
responsibility for fiscal management of the economy to an independent central 
bank is a difficult decision for subsequent governments to reverse even if it was 
their preference.  
 
Gilardi (2007) continues specifically in relation to the formal independence of 
independent agencies: 
 
’formal independence of regulatory agencies increases as the risk for a 
government of being replaced by a coalition with different preferences 
(replacement risk) increases, while that of central banks decreases as 
replacement risk increases’ (Gilardi, 2007, p. 306) 
 
Time inconsistency in policy making is a further factor supporting the view that 
political actors will need to credibly commit to ensure policy objectives are 
protected. The risk inherent with time inconsistency is that policies are mitigated 
by the role of veto players. The seminal article on time inconsistency is Kydland 
and Prescott (1977). Time inconsistency exists in political decision making 
because the policy preference today, t, may be the sub optimal policy option at, 
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t+1. It is important therefore in terms of commitment to policy options, and the 
credibility of those commitments, for governments to delegate. Gilardi (2002b) 
notes: 
 
‘there is a potential conflict between policy-makers discretion and               
policy optimality, which on the contrary, can be enhanced by the capacity 
of policymakers to credibility commit themselves i.e. bind themselves to a 
fixed and pre-announced course of action’ (Gilardi, 2002b, pp. 874-875) 
 
Gilardi’s hypothesis goes on to make a clear link between the risk of time 
inconsistency and the role of veto players in the decision to delegate authority. 
Gilardi argues:  
 
‘policy stability is a function of the number of veto players, their distance 
and their cohesion’ (Gilardi, 2002b, p. 877) 
 
Veto players have the capacity to influence policy change (Tsebelis, 2000).  Veto 
players represent political and commercial interests in a state. Their relative 
strength or weakness has an influence on government policy. The impact of veto 
players is based on the assumption that more veto players will induce more 
discretion to agencies - the presence of a large number of veto players reduces the 
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incentives to control bureaucracies because each player has the opportunity to 
influence the process at some stage. Gilardi (2002b) argues that more veto 
players should lead to less delegation. He argues that veto players are ‘functional 
equivalents of delegation’. His view is supported by Stasavage (2000) who 
argues that governments with low checks and balances and fewer veto players 
need to address the issue of time inconsistent policy making and will do so by 
credibly committing to policies via delegation.  
 
Moser (2000) argues, however, that veto players have a positive impact on the 
level of independence. In looking at the decision to create independent central 
banks, Moser concludes that those systems characterised by ‘stronger horizontal 
and vertical checks and balances’ are better capable of credibly providing 
independent central banks. Gilardi (2007) has highlighted the differences 
between independent agencies like central banks and similar independent 
agencies represented as sectoral regulators. Specifically in relation to the role of 
veto payers, Gilardi (2007) argues: 
 
 ‘Central banks tend to be more independent in countries characterised by 
many veto players while the reverse is true for regulatory agencies’ 
(Gilardi, 2007, p. 306)  
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The role of veto players is therefore unclear and according to Gilardi depends 
very much on the sector being reviewed. It is reasonable to conclude therefore 
that there is a significant link between veto players and delegation. Any 
functional approach which aims to assess the factors that influenced the creation 
of independent agencies would need to consider the impact of veto players in any 
empirical case study analysis. 
 
The third and final factor discussed by Pollack concerns the political uncertainty 
created by principals with conflicting preferences. Huber, Shipan and Pfahler 
(2001) highlight the variables that influence a principal’s decision to delegate. 
These involve divided government, divided legislature, the professionalism of the 
legislature and the availability of a post hoc legislative veto. Furthermore, Huber, 
Shipan and Pfahler (2001) show that legislators are more likely to limit 
bureaucratic discretion when the government is divided, or when the legislature is 
more professionalised, and when the legislature does not have easily available 
options for non-statutory controls. Huber and Shipan (2002) focus on 
'corporatism' as one of the key determinants of the degree of bureaucratic 
discretion. They argue that there is a link between cabinet stability or tenure and 
the degree of bureaucratic autonomy.  Epstein and O’Halloran (1999) show, that 
as conflict increases the benefits of granting autonomy to independent agencies 
increases.  In addition, portfolio volatility between ministers and political parties 
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can be an influence on particular policy areas subject to delegation.  
 
There is a further area of potential conflict. There can be uncertainty in the 
conflicting preferences of principals but similar uncertainty exists in the 
conflicting preferences of principals and agents. A key assumption in credibility 
theories is that policy actors will not be able to influence the preferences and the 
actions of independent agencies. Policy actors, however, designing independent 
agencies may wish to maintain some oversight on the preferences of the agency 
and may wish to ensure that the policy preferences of the government are 
understood and followed by the independent agencies. To be credible, principals 
need to ensure their preferences are not necessarily aligned to agents. The ‘ally 
principle’ in the principal-agent theories argues that principals will delegate to 
agents with similar goals. According to Gilardi (2007):  
 
‘The peculiarity of credibility problems is that their solution requires 
delegation arrangements that are counter-intuitive from a principal-agent 
perspective, namely an infringement of the ‘ally principle’, which 
postulates that the principals delegate to agents with similar goals. 
Delegation can increase the time-consistency and credibility of the policy 
choices of decision-makers who are subject to preference reversals but 
only if the agent is not prone to the same kind of behaviour and the 
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principal has not the opportunity to influence his or her decision’ 
(Gilardi, 2007, p. 304/5)     
 
Principal-agent theory argues that principals will try and avoid moral hazard i.e. 
the risk that the preferences of the principal are not followed by the agent. By 
designing agencies which include either ex-ante or ex-post controls on the 
agency, principals ensure accountability and protect against the hazard that the 
agent will not follow the principal’s preferences. Agencies therefore may have 
ex-ante controls written into legislation in terms of remit, policies or funding. The 
legislator may impose ex-post controls, for example, the requirement to report 
annually on activities of the agent or to issue a report on activities to the Minister. 
The balance between ex-ante and ex-post controls may in some scenarios limit 
the independence of the agency. The balance of these controls is important when 
one considers the differing levels of independence given to agencies. These ex-
post and ex-ante controls also serve to diminish the political uncertainty referred 
to above when the risk of a change in government may change the preferences of 
the principals (Moe, 1990). Typically, when ex-ante controls are weak, ex-post 
controls are needed to compensate. Gilardi (2007) however highlights that 
principal-agent relationships are better understood if one considers the 
institutional context of the delegation. He shows that there are contradictions 
inherent in the principal-agent theories. These are evident in the role of veto 
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players, political uncertainty and credibility and can be explained if one 
considers, for example, the motivations of policy actors in delegating to 
independent central banks as opposed to independent regulatory agencies. 
According to Gilardi (2007): 
 
‘Delegation to independent regulators is most extensive when political 
uncertainty is high, while the opposite is true for delegation to central 
banks, which are most independent when political uncertainty is small’ 
(Gilardi, 2007, p. 320)   
 
Gilardi (2003a) also assesses whether the level of delegation differs if the sector 
is either social or economic. Gilardi concludes that the economic nature of 
regulation and the interaction with national institutional features like veto players 
explain a good deal of the cross-national and cross-sectoral variation in agency 
independence. Gilardi’s thesis that delegation is more likely in economic rather 
than a social sector is essentially based on the view that investors require 
government to credibly commit to market opening polices. However, Gilardi 
argues that for social regulation, where consumers rather than investors are the 
main target of policies, credibility is less of a motivation for policy actors to 
delegate. Majone (1993) agrees in terms of European policy making. He posits 
that social and economic regulation has a different emphasis: 
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‘Social regulation is still far from possessing the same political and 
institutional significance as competition policy, for example, but it no 
longer occupies a peripheral position in European policy-making’ 
(Majone, 1993, p. 166) 
 
Shipan (2005) argues that credibility is seen to be an important issue in the 
creation of a number of regulatory agencies not dependent on investor sentiment, 
notably in environmental protection. 
 
Gilardi (2002b) discusses a further issue related to credibility - linked to the idea 
of complexity - in that delegation is more likely in sectors which have been 
subject to market opening.  Gilardi links market opening to credibility as 
governments will wish to credibly commit to policies which ensure necessary 
investment in recently opened markets. According to Gilardi: 
 
‘Governments have incentives to delegate regulation to an independent 
authority because they need to credibly persuade investors that the 
market functioning will not be biased by the nationalisation legacy, 
typically in favour of the formerly state-controlled monopolist. 
Governments must then be able to credibly commit to an investor-friendly 
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course of action’ (Gilardi, 2002b, p. 877) 
 
North and Weingast (1989) make a similar link between investment and 
credibility: 
 
‘For economic growth to occur the sovereign or government must not 
merely establish the relevant set of rights, but must make a credible 
commitment to them’ (North and Weingast, 1989, p. 803) 
  
North and Weingast (1989) argue that economic actors need incentives in the 
same way political actors do. The comparative advantage a state or government 
has over economic actors can lead to issues of enforcement and compliance with 
agreements. This ex-post concern can be addressed through devising institutional 
constitutions which minimise the risk. North and Weingast argue that this view 
implies: 
 
‘the development of free markets must be accompanied by some credible 
restrictions on the countries ability to manipulate economic rules to the 
advantage of itself and its constituents. Successful economic performance, 
therefore, must be accompanied by agencies that limit economic 
intervention and allow private rights and markets to prevail in large 
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segments of the economy’ (North & Weingast, 1989, p. 808) 
 
The issue of private investment and the link with independent agencies is tied 
closely to the role of veto players, policy uncertainty and policy stability. 
Stasavage (2002) develops this issue of political uncertainty and private 
investment. Stasavage argues: 
 
‘While having multiple veto points increases the likelihood of policy 
stability, governments in systems without multiple veto points can 
establish credibility for their economic policies through other means’ 
(Stasavage, 2002, p. 44) 
 
Other functional factors which may explain the spread of independent regulatory 
agencies have been examined in the literature. Gilardi (2003b) has attempted to 
test both spurious and symbolic diffusion of independent agencies as a means of 
trying to explain the growth in the numbers of independent agencies. In spurious 
diffusion political actors are responding to concomitant functional pressures to 
create the same institutional model. Political actors in creating independent 
agencies are responding to functional pressures in terms of credible commitments 
and resolving political uncertainly. The political actors are therefore acting 
independently of each other. In symbolic diffusion the political actors are 
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influenced by each other.  Gilardi (2003b) concludes: 
 
‘Interdependent diffusion, in the form of symbolic diffusion, has driven the 
spread of IRAs in Western Europe, but only in part: spurious diffusion, in 
the form of credible commitments and political uncertainty has played an 
important role too’ (Gilardi, 2003b, p. 19) 
 
Gilardi used diffusion models to test a number of hypotheses and concluded that 
privatisation and liberalisation had a significantly positive impact on the 
likelihood that an independent regulatory agency would be created. This 
conclusion is consistent with the work cited above testing the credibility 
hypothesis and the view that market opening was an influence in the creation of 
independent agencies. The creation of an independent agency was more likely in 
competition and financial markets than in other regulatory domains. The reasons 
cited for this stem from the credibility hypothesis: 
 
      ‘economic regulation, where credibility problems are more acute than in 
social regulation and it is this incentive to delegate regulatory 
competence to IRAs are higher, is positively associated to the creation of 
IRAs after controlling for the impact of the number of existing IRAs’ 
(Gilardi, 2003b, p. 12) 
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The functional reasons which explain delegation are based primarily on 
credibility theories. They explain to a large extent the reason to delegate and the 
various levels of independence evident across sectors and countries. However, it 
does not explain why there has been an increase, particularly in the past decades, 
in the adoption of this form of decision making to solve particular problems. 
There are also anomalies in various countries between the absolute levels of 
delegation across all sectors and variations between what can be called social and 
economic regulators. In some cases, using Gilardi’s analysis, there are social 
regulators with higher absolute formal independence than economic regulators. It 
is also important to note that the quantitative analysis undertaken to date to test 
credibility theories have concentrated on measuring independence at the 
institutional level and not examining the operational remit of agencies which 
would give a deeper insight into the independence given to agencies. This is 
particularly important when considering the balance of ex-ante and ex-post 
controls the principal places on the independent agent. 
 
The functional approach to explaining delegation is based on rational choice 
models which, as discussed above, assume rational actors will make utility 
maximising decisions. Rational choice models assume utility maximising 
decisions by policy actors under conditions of uncertainty. Given an array of 
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options the policy actor will choose the decision which gives him the greatest 
welfare. The rational choice model is based on the individual as opposed to 
groups or institutions. Rational choice has been seen as one model under the 
umbrella of ‘new institutionalism’ which offers reasons for the growth of 
delegation. Gilardi (2004) describes three models of institutionalism, one of 
which is rational choice, another is sociological institutionalism and the third is 
historical institutionalism. Millar (2003) argues that institutionalism offers an 
approach to the policy process which puts weight on the institutional context of a 
decision, specifically the influence factors such as culture, social norms and 
conventions have on the political decision. Sociological institutionalism, for 
example, argues that delegation to independent agencies occurs because the 
institutional solution is taken for granted as the most appropriate organisational 
form to deal with delegation. Historical institutionalism focuses on the effect of 
path dependent processes as arrangements to mediate functional pressures where 
radical change occurs, particularly when the mechanisms sustaining institutions 
weaken. 
 
Sociological institutionalism has been discussed briefly above in terms of 
spurious or symbolic diffusion of agencies as an explanation of the growth of 
independent agencies. Sociological institutionalism argues that policy actors will 
act interdependently when deciding to create an independent agency. Policy 
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actors are therefore reacting to other policy actor’s organisational forms in 
creating independent agencies. As, Gilardi (2003b) above argued, the diffusion of 
independent agencies is symbolic and this driver is at the heart of sociological 
institutionalism. Gilardi (2004) argues that the empirical evidence for the 
sociological institutional hypotheses is strong enough to justify further research.  
 
Historical institutionalism is focused on the historical context and specifically the 
path dependent processes which may limit the opportunities of political actors to 
consider other institutional solutions. Historical institutionalism depends on 
critical junctures which lead to the adoption of an institutional path such as 
independent agencies. Thatcher (2002c) and Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002) 
argue there are contextual national factors which mediate against the functional 
factors discussed above under rational choice models. The factors referred to are 
policy learning, isomorphism, political leadership, state traditions and structures, 
and broader state reform processes. This approach argues that reform is mediated 
within existing national institutions and is therefore reliant on path dependent 
arguments.  
 
It is clear that the three institutionalism models have clear claims in relation to 
explaining the rise of independent agencies. Rational choice functional factors go 
some way to explaining the rise of independent agencies as a solution to 
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increasing functional pressures on policy actors, specifically in the economic 
sectors subject to market opening. There are, however, other factors influencing 
the decision to delegate and influencing the levels of formal independence given 
to agencies. These non-functional factors are more difficult to measure but are 
important to understand. Gilardi (2004) argues: 
 
‘it appears clear from this comparison that there is no best theory. 
Rather than being a relativistic conclusion, this observation highlights 
the weaknesses that each theory has to overcome if it wants to supply 
a good explanation of institutional change in regulation’ (Gilardi, 
2004, p85) 
  
The non-functional factors raised in the sociological and historical 
institutionalism models therefore need to be examined in more detail to gain a 
better understanding of the growth of independent agencies but also the level of 
independence which varies cross country and cross nationally. 
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NON-FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF DELEGATION 
This section of the chapter will examine the non-functional factors argued as 
reasons for delegation to independent agencies. Gilardi’s quantitative work has 
tried to measure the impact of functional factors on the level of independence. 
Gilardi concedes, ‘credibility hypothesis cannot explain all the variation we 
observe in agency independence’ (Gilardi, 2002b, p. 889). Therefore, other 
factors must be at work.  
 
There are a number of non-functional reasons which may impact on the decision 
to delegate. Among these factors are the impact of policy learning and 
institutional isomorphism. It is argued that policy makers are also influenced by 
state tradition and national leadership in solving problems via the creation of 
independent agencies. It is difficult to construct a quantitative analysis of these 
factors and in many cases they are based on an historical view of institutionalism 
in a given country or group of countries. 
 
Thatcher (2002b) argues that the political problems being addressed in sectors 
that have created independent agencies have been present for some time. Why 
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before the 1980s had the institutional solution of independent agencies not been 
pursued? The presence of independent agencies, particularly in the United States, 
as an institutional solution to these problems, has been an option for policy actors 
for some time. In Germany in the 1950s a very powerful Cartel Office and 
independent central bank was formed long before the other sectors had 
independent agencies. In France, the expression ‘Autorité administrative 
indépendante’ was first introduced in 1978. It is not sufficient just to argue that 
policy actors, responding to issues of credibility, will then create an agency and 
delegate responsibility. There are a number of other issues, which need to be 
considered in the analysis of the decision to delegate to an independent agency. 
The situation in Germany has already been cited, yet in recent decades Germany 
has been slow to create independent agencies and has existing restrictions on 
creating federal agencies because of constitutional arrangements with various 
German regions. Gilardi (2003a) comments on the situation of Italy where there 
is a high level of independence and coherence which is surprising given Italy’s 
lack of tradition of independent agencies. Therefore, a more qualitative discourse 
is required to offer a fuller understanding of the motivation of policy makers in 
creating independent agencies at this point in time. 
 
The increasing importance of European directives and European supranational 
agencies as a factor in the decision to delegate is important to consider, 
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specifically in the sectors where independent agencies have been created. Sectors 
like telecommunications are typified by an increasing number of European 
directives and policy initiatives from the European Commission. The European 
Commission, for example, suggest that governments following market opening 
should not be directly influencing the market and should therefore create an 
independent agency for this purpose. The EU would appear to recommend 
independent agencies possibly for functional reasons related to credibility. 
Individual member states transposing directives may feel obliged to create an 
independent agency either because the directive leaves little choice to the 
member states or because a large number of other member states adopt the policy 
of creating independent agencies and member states copy the institutional model. 
The activities of the European Commission contribute to the debate that 
institutional isomorphism is an explanation for what Majone (1994) argues is the 
‘rise of the regulatory state’. Shipan (2005), Majone (1994) and others have 
highlighted the growth and importance of EU directives and the EU generally as 
a contributory factor in the growth of independent regulatory agencies.  
 
Majone (1994) argues that administrative regulation has accelerated in the past 
two decades. This acceleration comes from a perception that there exists a 
mismatch between existing institutional capacity at national level and the 
growing complexity of policy problems: 
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‘policing financial markets in an increasingly interdependent world 
economy; controlling the risks of new products and new technologies; 
protecting the health and economic interests of consumers without 
impeding the free flow of goods, services and people across national 
boundaries; reducing environmental pollution’ (Majone, 1994, p. 85) 
 
It is the significance of this supranational dimension to the economic and social 
issues which is promoting the role of the European Commission.  Although 
complexity is recognised as a functional factor in explaining delegation, it is 
important to distinguish the increasing role and importance of the European 
Commission in originating directives and policies which lead to a perception that 
certain policy areas are complex. In the telecommunications sector, for example, 
there has always existed technical complexity, which it would appear did not 
provoke policy actors to delegate to independent agencies until recently. 
However, the progressive liberalisation of telecommunications markets and the 
increasing role of the European Commission in this process have resulted in a 
proliferation of directives, recommendations and policy initiatives which have 
made the telecommunications sector more complex for policy actors to manage. 
The argument then is that complexity of itself is a clear functional motivation to 
delegate but the increasing administrative role of the European Commission is a 
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separate non-functional factor in a number of sectors. The growth of the role of 
European regulation is also explained through the motivation of the European 
Commission in wishing to increase its influence by expanding its competencies 
mainly as a means to expand its budget, and the preference of multinational 
companies to deal with one single regulatory authority as opposed to individual 
countries. 
 
Moran (2001) supports this view and argues that a further reason for the rise of a 
regulatory state is the growing influence of the European Commission. Moran 
shows that the European Commission particularly has contributed to the 
expansion of regulatory measures in workplace health and safety, environmental 
protection and the regulation of previously self-regulated spheres like financial 
services. Majone (1994) has highlighted that the European Commission has 
sought to increase its influence over countries by expanding the scope of its 
regulatory authority. The diffusion of agencies needs to be considered in the 
context of the role of the European Commission across both economic and social 
areas. The importance of the European Commission could be resisted by 
countries wishing to retain administrative and regulatory control in their member 
state. Majone (1994) argues that the European Commission has a number of 
advantages over national regulators or administrations. Firstly, the credibility of 
policies, whether economic or social, depends to a large extent on enforceability 
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and as a supranational institutional the European Commission can enforce 
directives on regulated firms more strictly than national agencies. Countries may 
be willing therefore to cede regulatory oversight to the European Commission. 
This is particularly the case in competition policy. Majone (1994) highlights that 
the European Commission is more likely to operate at a technical expert level 
with national administration officials. Through a myriad of advisory committees, 
expert advisors and well qualified staff, the European Commission can be seen to 
take the lead on regulatory policy in the community. 
 
A particular sector where the influence of the European Commission has been 
recognised is in the area of telecommunications regulation. Schneider and Werle 
(1990) demonstrate that the European Commission was the policy driver for 
telecommunications reform. They argue that the European Commission used 
Treaty of Rome provisions to gain the policy initiative over countries. From the 
publication of the 1987 Green Paper (Commission of the European Communities, 
1987) which set out policy and objectives for a liberalised telecommunications 
market, the European Commission developed a series of directives which 
culminated in the 1997 Open Network Provision (ONP) directive, (European 
Parliament and Council, 1997) which set a date for liberalisation of voice 
telephony markets across Europe. Thatcher (1999) argues that in fact the 
European Commission worked in partnership with countries to develop this 
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policy. The 1997 ONP directive recommended the creation of independent 
agencies in telecommunications to address the conflict of interest that would exist 
in a number of countries where the Ministries were shareholders of the main 
telecommunications company and also the principal regulatory authority. This 
provision made clear, certainly in the telecommunications sector, the preferred 
institutional response to newly liberalised markets. The European Commission, 
in other economic sectors particularly for energy, also recommended the creation 
of independent agencies.  
 
A further reason for the increasing incidence of independent agencies is argued to 
be policy learning and institutional isomorphism. Thatcher (2002b) argues that 
once a successful model of an agency was created there was a ‘snowball’ effect 
and the model was copied for other sectors. Thatcher cites the example in the UK 
of Oftel (the Office of Telecommunications) which was rapidly copied in other 
sectors in the UK, notably Ofwat and Ofgas. Gilardi argues that agencies: 
 
‘are not established as a legitimisation device, but simply because other 
options are not even considered, while IRAs (independent regulatory 
agencies) have become the normal or obvious thing to do in given 
contexts’ (Gilardi, 2003a, p. 24) 
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In this context the number of independent agencies increases as legitimacy 
increases and the organisational form becomes more accepted. Levi-Faur (2002) 
describes the process of isomorphism as herding. McLean (2004) describes this 
institutional mentality as: 
 
‘..the next least risk-averse person(nation) joins the first. Which in turn 
induces the next least risk-averse…and before long, the whole herd has 
followed its leader, ending with (respectively) the collapse of the regime 
and the liberalisation of telecoms in the Maldives’ (McLean, 2004, p. 58) 
 
This argument of institutional isomorphism has been advanced as the reasoning 
behind the rapid increase in independent central banks. In the case of central 
banks, McNamara (2002) shows there was limited evidence to show that 
governments interfered with money supply for short-term political gain, yet this 
was the main reason cited for the creation of independent central banks. A further 
reason cited for the creation of independent central banks was the policy goal of 
low inflation. The economic debates of the 1970s had developed price stability as 
the key policy objective of governments, including those of the left who would 
have traditionally considered unemployment and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth as the main policy objectives. Independent central banks with 
responsibility for money supply and interest rates were the institutional answer 
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increasingly suggested by both the EU in terms of the development of the 
European Monetary Union and suggested by the International Monetary Fund. 
McNamara says: 
 
‘we should examine whether or not the material economic circumstances 
in advance of the decision to delegate do indeed match the conditions that 
independence is meant to improve on’ (Mc Namara, 2002, p. 56) 
 
McNamara (2002) goes on to argue that when EU countries set up independent 
central banks it was at a time of low inflation. It is clear there are other factors 
involved in explaining the growth of independent central banks. McNamara 
argues: 
 
‘it is the symbolic properties of central banks independence that carry  
substantial weight in explaining policy diffusion, rather than the 
expressed functional properties of delegation’ (Mc Namara, 2002, p. 59) 
 
Particularly in the case of central banks, the argument is that in the 1990s it 
became de rigueur to have an independent central bank. McNamara (2002) posits 
that the process of institutional isomorphism, both normative and coercive, is 
evident in the diffusion of independent central banks. Political actors are 
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borrowing the institutional models they see as successful, even though the 
motivation for the independence of the central bank may be decoupled from the 
functional objectives of the agency. In the case of coercive isomorphism, the 
creation of the independent central bank results from both formal and informal 
pressures exerted on organisations by other organisations upon which they are 
dependent. Such cohesive pressures can be seen not only in the context of central 
banks but from the European Commission. Thatcher (2002b) argues that 
‘coercive isomorphism’ was evident in the EU Commission’s attitude to 
Germany in relation to electricity policy and to Italy in relation to competition 
policy when they asked both countries to create independent agencies for these 
sectors. 
 
McNamara’s views on central banks offer some explanation as to the increasing 
diffusion of the independent regulatory agencies as an institutional model. A 
similar example is the diffusion of independent competition authorities which has 
been described as an ‘orgy of borrowing’ (Wilks & Bartle, 2002) from other 
jurisdictions and countries. Wilks and Bartle (2002) highlight those political 
actors, who recognising the benefits of independent agencies in some areas of 
policy and created independent agencies to solve political problems. The role of 
knowledge elites, particularly banking and legal professionals has put pressure on 
governments to adopt independent agencies as they perceive the model works in 
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other jurisdictions or believe that the area of policy should not be a government 
concern. Thatcher (2002b) argues that the decision to delegate has to be 
examined in the context of the role of interested parties. For example, lobby 
groups or vested interests and even scandals motivate elected officials to reform 
the institutional landscape and conclude that direct control over certain domains 
are no longer advantageous. 
 
In creating the Environmental Protection Agency in Ireland, the pressures 
arguably came as much from the growing influence of Dublin smog and the 
pressures of business and agriculture sectors to resolve the ineffectiveness of 
local authorities in dealing with the growing environment legalisation (Shipan 
2005). Moran (2001) also posits that many innovations in regulation in the last 
quarter of the century have been precipitated by scandals. The creation of an 
expert agency has been considered therefore for the more cynical reason of blame 
shifting. The motivation of the policy actor to delegate to an independent agency 
is a process of shifting responsibility to independent agencies, particularly in 
areas where unpopular decisions may need to be taken. The argument is that 
politicians use independent agencies to avoid being caught in the crossfire 
between different sets of interest groups and constituents. Epstein and O’Halloran 
(1999) argue that the degree of discretion will vary as a function of the issue 
concerned. For example, they argue that governments will wish to retain a greater 
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degree of control over agencies whose actions are likely to be published. Similar 
arguments are made by Fiorina (1977) who posits that legislators will focus on 
non-controversial issues and delegate responsibilities for policy areas to ensure 
re-election. 
 
A less developed debate has centred on state traditions and leadership as reasons 
for the development of independent agencies. This is particularly argued in the 
case of the UK where privatisation policies led the way with the introduction of 
regulators to monitor the new competitive utility markets. Thatcher (2002b) 
argues that state traditions, structure and political leadership are important 
mediators in the creation of independent regulatory agencies. Thatcher argues 
that there are historical precedents for independent regulatory agencies as a 
solution to difficult problems in the UK. Such precedents for problem solving do 
not exist in some other European countries. Thatcher argues that the political 
leadership of a country is an influence on the extent of delegation to independent 
agencies. The UK Conservative government was a supporter of privatised 
industries and many utilities were opened to competition. The creation of 
independent agencies in certain sectors was to protect consumer interests and to 
promote competition.  Other EU countries did not follow this trend until later in 
the process. Thatcher (2002b) argues that other countries have varying attitudes 
to the creation of independent agencies. In the case of Germany, for example, the 
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state traditions are informed by federal structures and self-regulation. In a number 
of countries the respective roles of the legislature and the executive inform the 
views on independent regulation. 
 
Finally, Thatcher (2002b) also considers it important to be aware of the broader 
European context in assessing the growth of independent regulatory agencies. He 
argues that governments adopted best practice public management techniques by 
introducing performance management and efficiency measures into the public 
sector. In these cases some activities, considered not core activities to the public 
sector, were hived off as agencies. In many cases, however, these agencies were 
still staffed by public servants and controlled by the Ministry. The creation of 
independent regulators in some utilities sectors also required competition 
authorities and new doctrines on public management. 
 
The non-functional issues presented here are generally based on country-specific 
analysis. Issues such as state traditions and leadership are difficult to measure in 
trying to assess the extent of their impact on the decision to delegate and the level 
of independence given to an agency. However, in any decision to delegate these 
non-functional activities are important to assess and need to be considered to 
ensure a complete picture of the delegation process. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The functional explanations for the increase in independent regulatory agencies 
explain to a large extent the proliferation of independent regulatory agencies and 
their levels of formal independence. Gilardi’s quantitative evidence confirms the 
importance of political uncertainty as a variable in the creation of independent 
agencies and confirms the motivation of principals to credibly commit to policy 
objectives, particularly in the areas of market opening where private investment 
is a factor. However, Gilardi has accepted that the credibility hypothesis cannot 
explain all the variation we observe in agency independence; other factors like 
institutional isomorphism, state traditions and political leadership have a role. 
The creation of independent central banks shows that policy actors may not be 
acting alone in designing institutional forms. The influence of other country’s 
institutional models and the supranational agencies such as the European 
Commission influence the decision to delegate authority.  
 
The range of sectors and services subject to independent and administrative 
bureaucracy is growing as the institutional form becomes more widely accepted. 
The key task therefore is to examine further why this institutional form and the 
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varying levels of independence are favoured by legislators in Europe.  
 
The studies to date have concentrated on cross sectoral analysis to try and explain 
both the reasons for the creation of an independent agency and its level of 
experience. The functional reasons put forward centre on the principal-agent 
theories, which are well founded. Gilardi’s work, particularly in the area of 
credibility, has given a qualitative basis to the view that functional reasons are the 
primary reasons for the creation of independent agencies. The question remains 
however that a large number of independent agencies have been created in the 
last decades despite the functional pressures having been present for some time. 
In addition, the functional explanations alone cannot explain the variation in 
independence in sectors like telecommunications where market opening suggests 
the functional reasons for delegation would be strong. The non-functional 
explanations which have emerged, have concentrated on certain sections or 
developments, for example, the growth of independent central banks. The non-
functional reasons need to be examined using systematic case studies and 
assessed against the actions of policy actors. 
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CHAPTER 2: RADIO SPECTRUM 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The literature to date has identified a number of factors which may explain the 
growth of independent agencies. Credibility, particularly in sectors where there is 
market opening, is the principal reason explaining why policy actors delegate. 
However, other factors also contribute to the decision to delegate. The other 
factors which may contribute to the decision to delegate may not be the principal 
reason but may explain the wide variations in levels of independence. 
  
This chapter will examine why telecommunications as a sector and the 
management of radio spectrum in particular are appropriate areas to consider. 
They are particularly appropriate for testing the non-functional factors identified 
in the literature. Tenbucken and Schneider (2004) argue: 
  
 
‘the telecommunications sector is the only sector in which, next to 
liberalisation and privatisation measures, almost all reform-oriented 
nations have established National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to guide 
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the process of market opening’ (Tenbucken & Schneider, 2004, p. 247). 
 
This chapter will firstly consider the telecommunications sector as an appropriate 
sector to examine the factors explaining delegation to independent agencies. The 
chapter will then examine key responsibilities capable of delegation to 
independent agencies, and will then examine radio spectrum as the key 
responsibility where delegation to independent agencies has been erratic in the 
EU. The chapter will continue with a review of the history of radio spectrum; the 
increasing commercialisation of radio spectrum, and finally why radio spectrum 
regulation is important to consider, specifically in relation to the non-functional 
explanations of delegation. 
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
 
The telecommunications sector has been the subject of regulatory oversight in the 
United States since the 1930s and in the UK since the 1980s and has been the 
subject of much transnational debate and reform in the EU and across the 
countries of the OECD.  Prior to the 1980s all EU countries controlled 
telecommunications as an arm of government. The public telecommunications 
operator held a monopoly in all aspects of telecommunications supply, including 
equipment, access to infrastructure and services. The public operator was 
generally staffed by civil servants with focus on the provision of a public service 
as opposed to any consideration of commercial or market activities. There was 
generally no delegation of expert or regulatory functions to independent agencies, 
and any regulation of the sector was within the civil service and directed by a 
Minister.  
 
There were two distinct pressures on this regime. Firstly, technological change in 
the 1960s and 1970s led to new dynamics in telecommunications.  The extent to 
which one could argue that telecommunications was a ‘natural monopoly’ 
because of large investments with low returns was questioned by rapid product 
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development, lowering of costs and thereby a lowering of the barriers towards 
entry to markets. A second pressure was the growing view that public 
telecommunications monopolies were inefficient. Wright (1994) argues: 
 
‘Skepticism about the efficacy of state intervention has become manifest 
in many countries, and notably in right-wing circles in the UK, Portugal, 
and Sweden. Yet even in socialist France clearly expressed its doubts, as 
it quickly discovered the constraints of the international economy, and 
‘rediscovered the firm’- the principal instrument of wealth generation’ 
(Wright (ed), 1994, p. 3) 
 
The break up of AT & T’s monopoly in the United States, and the creation of 
British Telecom, which was created from the telecommunications’ activities of 
the public entity originally the monopoly provider in the UK, introduced 
competition into markets which had previously been perceived as markets 
primarily offering public goods. There were a number of large multinational 
telecommunications who now competed in the newly opened markets. Wright 
(1994) argues: 
 
‘If the traditionally reluctant management of Telekom, Germany’s state 
telecommunications monopoly, has become increasingly pro-privatisation 
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it is because it is aware that BT, US Sprint and many others can now 
transmit data across borders for German companies, and even carry 
voice messages around international private networks of companies, their 
suppliers and customers’ (Wright (ed), 1994, p. 3) 
 
Changes in Britain, and in the United States, and lobbying by companies wanting 
to expand into other markets, led to pressures for regulatory change in the EU 
(Thatcher 2002b, Noam 1992). The EU had been developing closer relations with 
countries and more contact between senior officials, public operators and 
Ministers led to more cooperation in the development of telecommunications 
policy.  
 
In 1986 a specific directorate was created within the European Commission to 
provide more expertise and focus on telecommunications. The early cooperation 
concentrated on opening parts of the market like the supply of telephone 
terminals.  Despite slow progress, in 1987 the European Commission published a 
green paper on the future of telecommunications and specifically promoting 
liberalising of telecommunications markets (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1987). A series of directives followed, which proposed liberalising 
parts of the market and preventing national monopolies in each member state. 
Among the significant pieces of legislation were: 
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 The Open Network Provision (ONP) directive of 1990 (90/987) which 
proposed to harmonise public access to telecommunications networks; 
 Services Directive of 1990 (90/388) which provides for the gradual 
removal of special or exclusive rights granted in countries to  
telecommunications operators for certain value added and data services; 
 Public Voice Telephony and Infrastructure Directive of 1996 (96/19) was 
one of the central pieces of legislation opening the countries markets to 
full competition with an implementation date of 1st January 1998; 
 Commission directive 96/2/EC amending directive 90/388/EEC with 
regard to mobile and personal communications; 
 European Parliament and Council 97/33/EC on interconnection in 
telecommunications with regard to ensuring universal service and 
interoperability through application of the principles of open network 
provision. 
 
The European Commission also published a number of reports to support the 
legislative agenda, notably the high level group on the Information Society, the 
so-called Bangermann Report published in 1994. 
 
The directive on interconnection is significant in that it proposed that regulation 
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of the sector should be performed by an organisation outside the Ministry. This 
proposal was to avoid any conflict of interest which may exist where the Ministry 
still retained a shareholding as the former public telecommunications operator. 
The provisions of the directive dealing with the competitive environment in 
telecommunications indicate the kind of independent agency the European 
Commission envisaged: 
 
‘In order to guarantee the independence of national regulatory 
authorities: 
 national regulatory authorities shall be legally distinct from and 
functionally independent of all organisations providing 
telecommunications networks, equipment or services, 
 countries that retain ownership or a significant degree of control 
of the organisation providing telecommunications networks 
and/or services shall ensure effective structural separation of the 
regulatory function from activities associated with ownership or 
control’  ( European Parliament and Council, 1997, Article 5a) 
 
The development of the European framework provides a useful legislative 
umbrella to examine delegation and the factors influencing the creation of the 
independent agencies which would in turn influence the level of independence 
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given to the agencies.  
 
As telecommunications was the first public utility to come under such scrutiny at 
a national and European level, a number of studies have examined the 
institutional solutions in place across Europe. Noam (1992) looked at the impact 
of liberalisation on telecommunications markets. Thatcher (1999 & 2001) has 
examined the politics of telecommunications liberalisation and specifically 
examined the role of the European Commission and member states as partners in 
the development of telecommunications policies. Wright (1994) examined the 
experiences of privatisations in Western Europe. Equally, Moran (2001) has 
examined the development of the regulatory state with specific emphasis on the 
UK.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters the existing research shows for 
telecommunications that the level of independence varies across countries, 
despite a consistent telecommunications legislative framework. A number of 
comprehensive datasets have been collated which attempt to measure the 
delegation process in more detail. The datasets measure the level of independence 
in terms of institutional independence. For example, the institutional 
independence can be measured by comparing the provisions involving the 
appointment and removal of the head of the independent agency. The datasets 
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also show the delegation to agencies of operational duties, for example, the 
responsibility for national numbering ranges or interconnection between 
telecommunications operators. Edwards and Waverman (2004), for example, 
identify a number of core functions of telecommunications agencies which are 
standard functions required irrespective of the institutional framework creating 
the regulator. Tenbucken and Schneider (2004) have also developed a dataset 
which includes operational indicators and gives a detailed measure of both 
institutional independence and operational independence. Much of their research 
for these studies comes from original research by the OECD. The OECD has 
reviewed the core functions of telecommunications agencies. These functions are 
core activities related to the proper running of markets open to competition. The 
regulation of prices; issuing of national numbers; the process of licensing and 
interconnection are basic activities of all telecommunications agencies. These 
activities are important to the functioning of an agency and there is very little 
discretion left to the legislator in delegating powers. In most cases when the 
agency is created these powers are delegated.  
 
These datasets have been developed primarily to assess the quality and 
effectiveness of agency decisions and their impact on markets. No studies to date 
have looked at the delegation of these activities. The datasets can help to give a 
better understanding of the motives of policy actors when creating independent 
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regulatory agencies. The core activities of telecommunications agencies, as 
defined by these datasets are: 
 Market entry 
 Interconnection 
 Numbering 
 Price Regulation 
 Universal Service 
 Spectrum Management 
 
The activities reflect the increasing complexity of managing a market that was 
previously served only by a state enterprise. Therefore, there are key operational 
tasks around entry into the market, interconnection of operators in the market and 
regulation of the price of the former state run enterprises’ market prices. These 
activities are central to the activities of the independent agency. In relation to 
market entry this normally refers to the licensing of operators, offering either 
fixed or mobile services. The OECD makes the distinction because for mobile 
operators there is a requirement not only to have licences but also to have radio 
spectrum from which the mobile operator can offer a service. The OECD shows 
that in the case of licensing operators this task is delegated to independent 
agencies in all cases, but for mobile licensing this responsibility is linked with the 
institutional solution for radio spectrum management discussed below.  
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Responsibility for numbering and universal service is delegated to the 
independent agencies. In some cases there is a supervisory role for the Ministry, 
mainly to ensure that the agency has in place a national numbering plan which 
complies with international standards. In the case of universal service this refers 
to the obligation on the old state run entity to provide a telephony service, to 
everyone in the member state. In each European country there is either a 
mechanism to allow this or there is no universal service obligation. In all cases 
the responsibility for the mechanism is with the agency.  
 
In most cases therefore core responsibilities are delegated to independent 
agencies; however the exception to this condition appears to be the management 
of radio spectrum. In some jurisdictions the management of radio spectrum is 
delegated to an independent agency, whereas in other cases it is a separate agency 
under the remit of a Ministry. The level of independence given to regulators to 
manage this responsibility is indicative of the institutional independence intended 
by legislators for the independent regulatory agency. The management of radio 
spectrum involves a number of discrete steps, discussed in more detail below. 
The retention of any or all of these steps can allow the legislator to retain 
strategic control over radio spectrum and ensure some constraints on market 
opening. The position of radio spectrum is interesting in that radio spectrum is 
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increasingly seen as a commercial asset, licensed to operators in competitive 
markets and, as such, should be delegated to an independent agency. However, as 
we will see, the level of independence given to regulators in terms of radio 
spectrum varies across countries. Given the importance of these radio spectrum 
tasks to the proper functioning of the newly opened market why have these 
responsibilities been delegated in different ways in each European country? Also, 
if the remaining key core tasks have been delegated, why is radio spectrum 
treated differently? Finally, could an examination of radio spectrum delegation 
explain in more detail the delegation process and specifically offer a better 
understanding of the non-functional reasons for delegation? 
 
It would be appropriate therefore, at this point, to review the history of radio 
spectrum regulation prior to the market led and political changes in 
telecommunications discussed above.  
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HISTORY OF RADIO SPECTRUM REGULATION 
 
Radio spectrum is increasingly seen as a vital resource in areas such as 
telecommunications and broadcasting.  Radio spectrum is essentially the use of 
radio waves to connect people. This is particularly evident in the growth of 
mobile phones. Gruber (2005) argues: 
 
‘An important year was 2002, when the number of world mobile 
subscribers for the first time exceeded the number of fixed lines. The 
number of mobile subscribers was close to 1.2 billion at the end of 2002, 
while the number for fixed lines was slightly below 1.1 billion’ (Gruber, 
2005, p. 1) 
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Table 1: Evolution of mobile and 
fixed telecommunications 
subscribers, 1996-2001  
 Lines 
1996 
(ml) 
Lines 
2001 
(ml) 
Annual 
Growth 
(percent) 
1996-2001 
Penetration 
rate 
1996 
Penetration 
rate 
2001 
Mobile      
OECD 120 612 39 11.0 53.9 
Non-
OECD 
24 328 69 0.5 6.5 
World 144 940 46 2.5 15.3 
Fixed      
OECD 500 517 1 45.8 45.5 
Non-
OECD 
230 518 18 5.0 10.3 
World 730 1035 7 12.7 16.8 
Source: ITU data, derived from Gruber (2005), P34 
 
 
The history of radio spectrum starts in the nineteenth century with Heinrich 
Hertz’s discovery that an electric spark of sufficient intensity could be 
transmitted at an emitting end and be captured at a receiving end. Guiglielmo 
Marconi was the inventor who exploited Hertz’s discovery and he invented a 
‘radio’ which permitted the transmission of signals over distances. In 1899 the 
signals were transmitted across the English Channel and in 1901 across the 
Atlantic Ocean. Initially transmissions were limited to pulses of electric current 
which were deciphered using Morse code. Technological advances before the 
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First World War, particularly amplitude modulation (AM), allowed the 
transmission of voice and music. The perceived drawback of radio spectrum 
transmission was a lack of privacy which in fact, following the First World War, 
was the basis of its commercial success as radio broadcasting took off, 
particularly in the USA. In Europe, the first regulation of radio spectrum was 
introduced through the licensing of wireless sets. State radio broadcasters were 
set up and their transmissions were received by the increasing number of 
‘wireless’ radios which were licensed by the government. The proliferation of 
radio stations was creating problems with interference and in 1927 the first 
attempt at international regulation was brought about by the need to ensure that 
the proliferation of radio stations was managed internationally. The frequency 
band 550 HMz to 1.5 MHz was allocated internationally to broadcasting. 
 
Developments in technology and regulation centered on broadcasting until after 
the Second World War when the development of private mobile radio during the 
war for military purposes was commercialised, particularly for taxi, police and 
emergency services. The regulation and management of radio spectrum 
throughout this period in all European countries became the responsibility of 
governments. More forward-looking governments, like those in Scandinavia, 
were allocating large sections of radio spectrum for mobile communications but 
for the most part private mobile radio was a stand-alone activity, not integrated 
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with fixed telephony and therefore not interfering with the traditional public 
telecommunications operator.  
 
Due to these technological developments there was an increasing need for 
international cooperation, mainly to minimise the risk of interference, but also to 
promote equipment standards. International cooperation had begun from the early 
years of telegraphy but was put on a more organised basis in 1934 with the 
establishment of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) which 
created an umbrella international organisation covering all aspects of 
telecommunications and adopted radio regulations. These regulations set down 
the allocating frequencies from the radio spectrum for particular services. In 
Europe, following the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the original 
members of the union created the Conférence Européenne des Administration des 
Postes et des Télécommunications (CEPT) which was responsible for the 
coordination of the management of radio spectrum for the members of the EU. 
 
The development of other applications which would use the radio spectrum was 
slow after the Second World War. Bell Laboratories in 1947 developed the 
concept of cellular communications which would not be commercialised until the 
1980s. This technology underpins the development of mobile telephony, allowing 
mobile handsets to roam from cell to cell and was a more efficient use of radio 
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spectrum. The first licences for cellular mobile telecommunications were issued 
in the early 1980s; these were analog systems, so called first generation (1G). 
The development of digital cellular systems and cooperation on the European 
Groupe Spécial Mobile (GSM) standard started to be adopted in 1990. This is 
called the second generation of mobile telephony (2G). EU directives required 
countries to grant at least two GSM licences in each country, thereby introducing 
competition in the mobile sector. 
 
Technological changes in the latter end of the twentieth century have opened up 
the wider use of the radio spectrum and a growing appreciation of its importance. 
The EU recognised this growing use of what is a scarce resource in most 
countries and published in 1998 a green paper on radio spectrum management 
which attempted to address the growing demand. Radio spectrum itself is a finite 
resource and choices on allocation would have to be made. The Green Paper on 
radio spectrum recognised this: 
 
‘As demand for radio spectrum has increased, the co-ordination and 
management tasks have grown more complex as compared to the past’ 
(European Commission, 1998, p. 1) 
 
The EU recognised that the commercial environment surrounding radio spectrum 
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had changed and that radio services and equipment were becoming more global. 
The increasing complexity and globalisation of radio spectrum is shown in the 
growing importance placed on the co-ordination bodies tasked with regulating 
the radio spectrum. 
 
Along with the focus on coordination and increasing use of the scarce radio 
spectrum, the investment required to launch 1G and then 2G digital mobile 
services was very large. The cost of rolling out new transmission networks, 
switching equipment, and in many cases the cost of subsidising handsets to 
encourage subscribers onto your network was a substantial cost in a new 
technology. Gruber (2005) estimated that, per subscriber, the investment cost for 
digital GSM network operator was $2,400. In addition, the licensee had to pay a 
licence fee for the use of radio spectrum which for early licensees was a nominal 
fee as most licences were given to the then public telecommunications operator. 
However, as GSM 2G licences were being issued, governments considered these 
licences lucrative.  
 
In the UK in 1997 legislation was introduced to charge an ‘economic value’ for 
radio spectrum. Governments were increasingly aware of the value of radio 
spectrum particularly as radio spectrum for the next generation of mobile phones, 
called 3G, and were being discussed at the international fora. It is important to 
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note that allocation of radio spectrum takes two forms. Firstly, as radio spectrum 
waves do not respect borders, a high degree of international coordination, 
referred to above, is required to ensure development of equipment and to avoid 
interference. The allocation of radio spectrum therefore takes place at World 
Radio Conferences which occur every three years. The allocation of bands for 
what became 3G mobile telecommunications systems were agreed in 1992 by 
members of the CEPT. Secondly, governments have the discretion to identify the 
number of licences, the allocation mechanism and ultimately the price of this 
radio spectrum. 
 
The increasing commercialisation of radio spectrum is worth considering as the 
investments required by operators are substantial. They were made at times 
when, in most cases in the EU, the allocation process for 3G was being 
considered and at the same time as technological developments were allowing 
other services to be deployed in other parts of the radio spectrum.  
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INCREASING COMMERCIALISATION OF SPECTRUM 
 
The Green Paper in 1998 (European Commission, 1998) initiated a debate on 
radio spectrum policy and particularly highlighted that those institutional 
arrangements for co-ordination and planning of radio spectrum needed to be 
revised to take account of the liberalisation and globalisation of radio spectrum. 
The European Commission argued: 
 
‘These institutional arrangements have come under pressure from 
commercial interests who pursue interests which do not necessarily 
coincide with those administrations representing them in the 
organisations concerned’ (European Commission, 1998, p. 2)  
 
The privatisation of utility markets, like telecommunications, opened markets to 
other operators who may require radio spectrum. New operators had to compete 
with incumbent operators who may have been allocated spectrum as a public 
entity. The increasing demand for radio spectrum from commercial organisations 
and the fact that demand is placed on relatively scarce radio spectrum prompted 
countries to review the valuation of radio spectrum licence fees. In most EU 
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countries, demand for this radio spectrum exceeds supply and governments have 
placed high valuations on particular radio spectrum bands.  
 
Table 2: Radio Spectrum based 
sectors and activities 
Sector Activity 
Telecommunications Mobile phones, Wireless Internet, 
Private Business radio (Taxis),Paging 
Broadcasting Terrestrial television, Satellite TV, 
Radio, Teletext 
Transport Air traffic control, RTT road transport, 
Rail communication, Maritime 
Government Defence, Environment, Emergency 
services, Law enforcement 
Source: European Commission Green Paper on Spectrum Policy, 1998 
 
The most relevant example of this was the licensing of UMTS or 3G mobile 
radio spectrum. The discussions at the World Radio Conferences and the 
international allocation process referred to above, coupled with the ongoing 
success of 2G digital mobile services highlighted to governments the value of this 
particular radio spectrum. There was increasing speculation that this allocation of 
radio spectrum could raise significant sums for governments. For example, in the 
1997 UK legislation the Secretary of State was allowed to decide the allocation 
mechanism and licence fees for radio spectrum. Within the economic community 
there was discussion in the economic literature on the allocation mechanism 
available. For example, Klemperer (2002) and Hazlett (1998) discussed the 
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various allocation methods and the allocative efficiency of each. There were 
typically four ways to allocate radio spectrum: 
 First–come, first served 
 Lottery 
 ‘Beauty Contest’ 
 Auctions 
The economic theory regarding the allocative efficiency of each approach is not 
the concern of this thesis. However, irrespective of the mechanism chosen, the 
process of awarding these licences raised significant sums for the national 
governments and created significant uncertainty in the mobile sector during the 
two years it took for the radio spectrum to be allocated across the EU. The 
decision, for example, to choose auctions as a market based approach to radio 
spectrum allocation gained significant academic support at this time. 
Governments, where they had the ability to influence the mechanism, were 
driven by the motive to maximise revenue from radio spectrum. As Gruber 
(2005) argues: 
  
‘the profit maximising incentive was thus thought to coincide with the 
public interest’ (Gruber, 2005, p. 229) 
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Table 3: 3G Licence Assignment in 
the European Union 
Country Incumbent 
Firms 
3G 
Licences 
planned 
3G 
Licences 
granted 
 3G 
Licences 
not 
assigned 
Assignment 
method 
Licence 
fee/population 
(€) 
UK 4 5 5 0 A 634 
Germany 4 4-6 6 0 A 615 
Italy 4 5 5 0 BC+A 212 
Netherlands 5 5 5 0 A 186 
Austria 4 4-6 6 0 A 101 
Denmark 4 4 4 0 A 96 
Ireland 3 4 3 1 BC 92 
Greece 3 4 3 1 A 45 
Belgium 3 4 3 1 A 44 
Portugal 3 4 4 0 BC 40 
France 3 4 3 1 BC 21 
Spain 3 4 4 0 BC 13 
Finland 3 4 4 0 BC 0 
Sweden 3 4 4 0 BC 0 
Luxembourg 2 4 3 1 BC 0 
Note; A=Auction, BC=Beauty Contest 
Source: (Gruber, 2005, p. 280) 
 
 
The outcome for markets generally was a perception that licence fees had been 
too high. A number of mobile operators returned licences to governments 
because of the excessive cost of rolling out services. Many regulators and policy 
makers were asked to change the conditions of the licences awarded. There are 
two key issues here. Firstly, the allocation of radio spectrum can detrimentally 
affect the market and is therefore significant in terms of firm behaviour and 
decisions to invest. The institution that decides the allocation mechanism and/or 
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the licence fee influences the number of licences to be offered and directly 
impacts on the post-entry competitive environment. The second important issue 
is the value of radio spectrum. Firms bidding for this radio spectrum may have 
shown excessive exuberance for the prospects of the mobile telecommunications 
market and such exuberance was checked following the licence award. This is 
clear from the examples across Europe of licences being returned or requests to 
change licence conditions. Either way it shows the importance of radio spectrum 
to the investment strategy of telecommunications firms.  
 
The traditional users of radio spectrum in sectors such as public sector 
broadcasting and defense, who have received the use of the radio spectrum 
typically without charge, are now the focus of debate, particularly as other parts 
of the radio spectrum become commercialised and demand for radio spectrum 
increases.  The market-based approaches to allocation of radio spectrum does not 
fit with the traditional allocation of radio spectrum for public services like 
broadcasting, particularly when many of the services being offered by 
broadcasters are less about public service and more commercial. Convergence of 
products and services in telecommunications means that broadcasters and 
telecommunications operators are frequently offering the same kind of service. 
Cave (2002) argues that central planning of spectrum in a changed market 
environment inevitably gives rise to inefficiencies and rigidities with the result 
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that radio spectrum may be trapped in inefficient uses. However, it has been 
argued, particularly by Cave in his review of radio spectrum for the UK Treasury, 
that in the longer term a significant amount of current spectrum frequency 
planning could be devolved to commercial spectrum management organisations. 
This would involve radio spectrum pricing for all users including those who 
currently do not pay for radio spectrum, typically security and defense users and 
public broadcasters. 
 
There are a number of areas, therefore, where, it could be argued, governments 
could and should delegate radio spectrum responsibilities to expert independent 
agencies. Aspects of radio spectrum policy could be retained by government 
arguing that some of the uses of radio spectrum are for the public good, namely 
defense, broadcasting and policing services. However, as argued by McNamara 
(2002) in relation to delegation by governments to central banks, the independent 
agency was given the role of policy maker. If one, therefore, takes the view that 
all tasks related both to policy and operational management of radio spectrum are 
potentially open to delegation, then the key tasks open to delegation are: 
 
 Radio Spectrum Planning: this would involve frequency plans being 
published and advised to prospective investors; 
 Radio Spectrum Coordination: this involves liaison with supranational 
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agencies like CEPT and ITU to participation in policy setting and 
coordination at an international level; 
 Radio Spectrum Allocation: this involves the issuing of licences for users of 
defined spectrum including mobile users and public users; 
 Radio Spectrum Pricing: this involves the regime for pricing licences and the 
process of pricing particularly valuable pieces of the Radio Spectrum; 
 Radio Spectrum Fees: this involves the setting of fees for spectrum users, 
either on a licence issuing or spectrum administration fee and who collects 
and retains the revenue. 
 
The market opening policies of many countries and the delegation of authority to 
independent agencies has been explained by both functional and non-functional 
factors discussed in earlier chapters. However, the debate to date has discussed 
these factors generally in terms of institutional design. Earlier studies have not 
discussed what operational responsibilities have been delegated and why, if not 
delegated, they are retained by government. It is useful therefore to take an 
activity such as radio spectrum policy and assess how it has been delegated. For 
example, if the policy actor has created an independent agency, but is concerned 
to retain responsibility for radio spectrum, they can delegate responsibility for 
administrative functions. The setting of radio spectrum fees and the allocation 
mechanism can be retained by the Ministry. As we can see from the 3G licence 
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experience, the allocation mechanism and fee is a key decision. The levels of fee, 
and number of licences issued, impacts the market and investment. If delegation 
is to be effective then all of these functions for radio spectrum should be 
delegated. An argument can be made for some policy oversight on international 
allocation or on radio spectrum strategic planning, but all functions related to 
market facing activities like fees, allocation and assignment should be made by 
an independent agency.  
 
The creation of an independent agency is the result of functional factors such as 
credibility. As Levy and Spiller (1994) argue, credibility is most important in 
sectors where there has been market opening. Telecommunications is a sector 
subject to market opening, and, subject to a consistent legislative framework, 
agreed with the European Commission. The independent agencies created on the 
basis of this market opening however, have not been given the same institutional 
independence or operational responsibilities. This is particularly the case in 
relation to radio spectrum management. The variation in levels of independence 
is argued to be a product of the non-functional factors which may be country 
specific issues such political traditions. An investigation of the delegation of 
radio spectrum would offer a deeper insight into the non-functional issues which 
affect the decision to delegate. It would be useful therefore to examine the 
institutional solutions to radio spectrum management adopted by countries and 
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appreciate how the delegation process has been implemented. 
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INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS 
As discussed earlier in the chapter the responsibilities for key activities such as 
interconnection, price regulation and market entry is consistently delegated to 
independent telecommunications regulatory agencies.  Responsibilities delegated, 
in respect of radio spectrum activities in the EU, have been less consistent.  
 
The key tasks in radio spectrum management, discussed above, can either be 
delegated as a complete set of tasks to an independent agency, possibly with 
some referral to ministers for approval or review. For example, table 4 at the end 
of the chapter, shows that in some countries the planning for radio spectrum is 
retained by the Ministry, normally with close cooperation with the independent 
agency. In all cases the responsibilities are clearly stated in primary legislation, 
normally in legislation creating the independent agency. Also, in most cases there 
exists within the Ministry or an agency of the Ministry, the key personnel 
involved in the management of radio spectrum. The delegation process therefore 
involves re assigning this group to the independent agency. 
 
Governments, in some cases have delegated in full, or to a large extent, the key 
radio spectrum functions to an independent agency. For example, this is the case 
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in the UK and Ireland. In some cases the shared responsibilities extend to 
allocation, for example in Italy. In a number of countries, however, the 
government creates an agency to manage radio spectrum which is separate from 
the Ministry and the independent telecommunications agency. This is the case in 
the Netherlands.  In France, the agency is managed by representatives from the 
Ministry and the telecommunications and broadcasting regulators. The radio 
spectrum agency has direct responsibilities to the Minister but has clear 
collaborative responsibilities with other agencies in the sector.  
 
The delegation of responsibilities for radio spectrum differs from the other key 
tasks for telecommunications regulators. Why is radio spectrum treated 
differently in terms of delegation? The key issue, particularly in those countries 
with separate agencies is to understand why the political actors created an 
independent agency for all other telecommunications activity, but decided for 
radio spectrum management to create a separate agency which typically remains 
under the remit of the Ministry. The increasing commercialisation of radio 
spectrum would appear to be a key issue which provokes governments to seek an 
institutional solution. There is also increasing complexity of radio spectrum use 
and the policy of market opening. Do governments, for functional reasons such 
as credibility, create independent agencies, but for non-functional reasons, not 
delegate aspects of telecommunications activities to independent agencies? 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study will complement earlier work on the reasons why independent 
agencies are created but will pay particular attention to radio spectrum 
management as an aspect of telecommunications activities which, despite market 
opening, has in some cases not been delegated. 
 
One could assume investors would be encouraged to invest if independent 
agencies had the power to licence radio spectrum and raise clearly published fees 
for its use. Investors would, no doubt, have concerns, particularly with the 
perceived high value of radio spectrum that the fees and competitions to get these 
licences were in the gift of the Ministry. The fear for investors would be the 
government’s attitude of extracting the maximum rent from such a licence.  Also 
of concern to investors is the willingness of government to retain spectrum for 
broadcasting and defense uses which would not be managed by an independent 
agency and would not be subject to a licence fee. Having created an agency to 
manage other complex issues and to enhance credibility, are governments 
retaining key aspects of telecommunications activities for non-functional 
reasons? 
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Radio spectrum is an important, distinctive function of telecommunications 
regulation and one where the pressures of liberalisation and market opening are 
heightened by a desire of legislators to retain control over a natural asset that is 
perceived as having an economic value to government. It is important therefore 
to understand why this is the case and consider what non-functional factors 
were important to the decision to delegate. 
 
 
Table 4: Responsibility for 
Telecommunication Regulatory 
Activity 
 
Country Market 
Entry 
Interconnection Numbering Price 
Regulation 
Universal 
Service 
Spectrum  
Management 
Austria R R M/R R R M 
Belgium R R R R R R 
Denmark R R R R R R(M involved 
in planning) 
Finland R(M for 
Mobile) 
R R No 
Regulation 
No 
Mechani
sm 
R 
France R R R R R R/ANF 
responsible 
for Spectrum 
Planning 
only 
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Germany R R R R R R/(M 
consultation 
required for 
usage plan 
Greece R R R R No 
Mechani
sm 
R 
Ireland R R R R No 
Mechani
sm 
R 
ITALY M R R R R R/M for 
Spectrum 
Allocation 
Netherlan
ds 
R/(Mobile – 
RCA) 
R M/R R No 
Mechani
sm 
RCA 
Portugal R R R R R R 
Spain R/(M- 
mobile) 
R M/R R R M/SRA 
Sweden R R R R No 
Mechani
sm 
R 
UK R R R R R R 
Note: R= Regulator, M=Ministry, RCA – Dutch spectrum agency, SRA –Spanish 
spectrum agency (proposed), ANF – French Spectrum Agency 
Source: OECD(2005) 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION 
We have already examined the research on independent agencies which 
concludes that functional factors to a large extent explain delegation to 
independent agencies. Non-functional reasons were also evident in some 
decisions to delegate. Specifically, the non-functional reasons help to explain the 
variations in the levels of independence to agencies. The research to date 
suggests that the non-functional factors should be examined further to deepen our 
understanding of the motivations of policy actors who delegate to independent 
agencies. The empirical work to date has mainly concentrated on the institutional 
independence of agencies through an examination of the characteristics of the 
agency. Factors such as source of funding, and the appointment of senior 
management of independent agencies, have been measured (Gilardi, 2001). There 
is significant work on independent central banks (Cukierman, Webb, & Neyapti, 
1992) and (Elgie, 1998). These studies have concentrated principally on the legal 
instrument, typically primary legislation, which has created the agency. However, 
more recent studies have included operational indicators which give a deeper 
understanding of the remit of the agency and are also important to consider in the 
overall level of independence given to agencies (Edwards, 2004) and (Tenbucken 
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and Schneider, 2004).  
 
In the last chapter radio spectrum responsibilities were examined; as they are 
firstly part of an economic sector, and secondly, part of a sector which has been 
subject to market opening. Levy and Spiller (1994) have argued that in these 
sectors credibility is the most likely explanation of delegation to independent 
agencies. The treatment of radio spectrum responsibilities in terms of delegation 
to independent telecommunications agencies, unlike other telecommunications 
activities, has been erratic. The models discussed in the last chapter show that 
although all EU countries have independent agencies created to manage the 
telecommunications market, not all countries have fully delegated responsibility 
for radio spectrum. Radio spectrum is accepted as a key responsibility for 
telecommunications agencies but many Ministries have retained some oversight 
on the allocation or pricing of radio spectrum. In some EU countries the radio 
spectrum responsibilities have been delegated to an agency which remains within 
the remit of the Ministry. 
 
The differing treatment of radio spectrum needs to be examined and considered 
in relation to the non-functional factors influencing the delegation decision. This 
chapter will examine the most appropriate methodological approach to answering 
these questions.  
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This chapter will initially discuss narrative approaches as the most appropriate 
approach to measure the non-functional factors considered in the literature review 
and will argue for the use of case studies as an appropriate methodological 
approach to presenting this narrative. The chapter will continue by assessing, for 
the purposes of case selection, the development of indices which seek to measure 
the level of institutional and operational independence evident in independent 
agencies. The selection of an appropriate index will identify potential case study 
countries. 
 
Finally, this chapter will select appropriate cases which will best develop a 
deeper understanding of the factors influencing the levels of formal independence 
and additionally the levels of operational independence in relation to radio 
spectrum. 
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NARRATIVE STORIES & CASE STUDIES 
In chapter 1, it was noted that Gilardi (2002b) attempted to quantitatively 
measure some of the functional factors identified as important reasons for 
delegation to independent agencies. Gilardi used quantitative measures to 
conclude that credibility, in situations where there was market opening and 
privatisation, explained to a large degree the decision to delegate to an 
independent agency. However, other factors identified, such as political 
leadership or institutional isomorphism, are more difficult to measure 
quantitatively. These factors require a more holistic review of the decision to 
create an independent agency.  
 
The non-functional factors are embedded in the decision to delegate and these 
contextual factors are therefore difficult to measure. The case study method 
deliberately places the factors we wish to examine within the context of other 
decisions. A quantified analysis would divorce the factor from the context of the 
decision being reviewed. A case study can, for example, examine several factors 
within the context of the decision being examined. Yin defines a case study as: 
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‘..An empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin, 2003, p13) 
         
King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that decisions on case selection are vital 
as ‘poor case selection can vitiate even the most ingenious attempts, at a later 
stage, to make valid causal inferences’ (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, p 115). 
There is the possibility of random selection when approaching case selection. The 
benefit of random selection is it removes the risk of research bias or selecting 
cases on the basis of possible explanatory variables. There is a risk of selecting 
cases which may not be independent and therefore invalidate the inferences or 
conclusions from the research. Shively (2008) argues that too often researchers 
gravitate to case studies where the outcomes are interesting. The optimal 
approach, therefore, is case selection on independent variables.  Shively (2008) 
argues that this approach is particularly useful for large sample studies but less 
for intensive studies of one or a few cases.  Shively (2008) proposes: 
 
‘Choosing instead cases that represent varying instances of your 
explanatory variable allows you to examine the full range over which 
your explanation is meant to apply, but it does not fiddle with at all 
with the likelihood that the outcome occurs, and so allows you to 
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examine straightforwardly where the chips fall under the varying 
circumstance’ (Shively,2008, p109)    
 
Although case studies suffer in the methodological literature as an approach 
which is less scientific than other methodological approaches to theory 
development, there are distinct advantages. Case studies are generally strong in 
areas where statistical methods or formal models are weak. There are particular 
strengths in case study methods. Case study methods allow a high level of 
conceptual validity to the theoretical concepts under review. Case studies require 
a detailed consideration of contextual factors, which is more difficult in large 
sample statistical studies. Case studies can aid theory development through 
examination of variables identified through quantifiable methods and through 
further examination can derive new hypotheses capable of broader statistical 
review.  Case studies also allow for exploration of causal mechanisms which may 
appear in detailed single case analysis.  
 
A further advantage of case studies is the ability of the researcher, in case study 
research, to examine complex interactions and effects which may not be evident 
in large sample studies. The broad range of primary sources and research 
methods including survey, questionnaire and interviews allow sources to be 
compared and complex interrelations explained.  
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In case study approaches therefore, case selection and data collection is crucial to 
ensure the strengths of case study research, which, as identified above, can lead 
to valid conclusions and evidence which can be extrapolated to new hypotheses 
or further research. 
 
There are pitfalls and limitations to the case study method. There is a 
straightforward trade-off in terms of case selection. The research needs to balance 
depth and richness of research on single cases against the generalisations that 
may emerge from large sample research. The outcome can be to limit extending 
conclusions in a small sample of cases to the wider population of potential cases. 
There are also issues with case selection bias, where the cases selected are not 
optimal to answering the research question. Case studies are limited in terms of 
their ability to measure conclusions. It is likely that further quantifiable research 
is needed to develop theory across a wider population. This limitation also means 
that in case study approaches there is a potential inability to discriminate between 
competing explanations of theory based on the case study evidence. 
 
A narrative approach, where the story of the creation of the institution would 
allow consideration of a range of factors contributing to the final decision to 
delegate, would appear to be the most appropriate methodological approach to 
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present these factors. A narrative approach allows for an exploration of other 
factors which may not have emerged in research to date and allows scope for 
exploring some factors in depth, if this is appropriate to the case. For example, 
Peters (1998) argues: 
 
‘statistical explanations tend to leave unmeasured a number of factors 
that might be central to the most descriptive and convoluted explanations 
provided through configurative analyses. A methodology based on a 
large quantifiable statistical analysis tells us more about whether a 
hypothesis holds as opposed to why it holds.’ (Peters,1998, p. 7) 
 
Pollack (2002), in relation to studies conducted on United States data and 
specifically examining the principal-agent relationships, comments that case 
studies have: 
 
‘..the advantage of tracing the respective preferences and interactions 
between principals and agents, focusing on the methods used by 
principals to exert pressure on agents (for example, the threat of 
legislative overruling) and the timing and nature of concessions by the 
latter’ (Pollack M. , 2002, p. 206) 
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There are limitations to the use of narratives as a means to identify factors which 
may be relevant to one case but do not extrapolate to other narratives.  Where 
appropriate, factors identified in narratives need to be measured using 
quantitative techniques or confirmed from other sources, or confirmed through 
further comparative analysis. 
 
There are well established common approaches to comparative analysis and the 
selection of cases. The national patterns approach suggests that there are national 
characteristics which exert a major impact on policy decisions. Using this 
approach would involve one country or a two case comparative study where 
variations would be explained by national characteristics or traditions.  
 
The policy sector approach claims that national patterns are not as important and 
instead suggests there are similarities across sectors irrespective of national 
conditions. The international regimes approach emphasises the extent and depth 
of reforms of international regimes. The temporal patterns approach suggests a 
diachronic examination of national, sectoral or international regimes, and may 
reveal critical, remarkable events, which influence the political landscape. 
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Table 5: Common Approaches to 
Comparative analysis  
Approaches Cases to be 
compared 
Predictions as to 
variations 
Predictions as to 
similarities 
National patterns 
approach (NPA) 
Nations Across nations Across sectors, time 
and international 
regimes 
Policy sector 
approach (PSA) 
Sectors Across Sectors Across nations, 
time and 
international 
regimes 
International regime 
approach (IRA) 
International 
regimes 
Across international 
regimes 
Across sectors, time 
and nations 
Temporal patterns 
approach (TPA) 
Politics before and 
after major event 
Across time Across sectors, 
nations, and 
international 
regimes 
Source: (Levi-Faur D. , 2004) 
The most appropriate comparative approach is dictated to a large extent by the 
questions being asked in the research. Using narratives in case studies, as an 
approach, helps to establish what events happened prior to the creation of the 
agency, and the motivations of political and other actors in the formulation of the 
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legislative basis of the agency. The objective in developing the cases should be to 
construct a logically persuasive and empirically valid account that explains how 
and why events occurred. 
 
In terms of case study selection the option of a single case methodology 
examining the experience of one country might be considered. A single case 
analysis has the advantage that it allows more carefully focused analysis. The 
examination of a single case would allow a detailed review of a single decision to 
delegate but does not allow for the factors evident in the single case to be 
accepted as true for other decisions to delegate in other sectors or other countries. 
Whereas a large dataset of cases would by definition have the disadvantage of not 
allowing the researcher to go into great detail, a broader approach could be to 
select a range of decisions across sectors in one country. A single country case 
study would allow a cross-sectoral analysis which would involve examining 
delegation across both economic and social regulation and would be subject to 
variables not easily comparable to other countries. Case study results from single 
case analysis or even single country case studies cannot be generalised to other 
cases. A more convincing approach is through comparable case studies which 
allow case selection on the basis of independence measures that are clearly 
different across the same sector and within similar economic and legislative 
frameworks. Using comparative case studies one can establish trends and factors 
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which expose differences at national level in developing policies to address 
similar economic problems. This approach would equate to the national patterns 
approach. The key challenge is to select comparison countries which include 
variables which best answer your research question. 
 
It would be feasible considering the factors already identified by others in the 
literature to examine the experience in each state on a factor-by-factor basis. An 
approach could be to examine the evidence, for example, for policy learning as a 
motivation for the creation of independent agencies in the telecommunications 
sector across the EU.  The advantage of this approach would be a thorough 
examination of a factor which could then support that factor as a non-functional 
reason for delegation. This approach would reveal more detailed evidence 
supporting a factor but it would not be able to examine other factors, and the 
relative importance of other factors, to the decisions of policy makers.   
 
The analytical narratives, through case studies, are preferable as it allows us to 
consider the non-functional factors. A comparative case study approach allows a 
thorough examination of the factors influencing the delegation decision and 
allows fuller explanation of all factors. It will also, to the extent that the cases 
selected are appropriate, allow a better understanding of why in terms of radio 
spectrum responsibilities policy actors have taken different approaches.  
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The above analysis argues for a narrative methodology as the most appropriate 
methodology to answer the question of variations in the levels of independence 
afforded to independent agencies and assess the factors influencing the delegation 
of radio spectrum responsibilities. Whereas there are some quantitative 
approaches which could be taken to measure a number of the factors contributing 
to independence, many more factors cannot be measured or assessed without a 
qualitative assessment.  
 
A weakness of case design can come from the effect of third variables or 
‘concomitant variations’. The selection of cases needs to minimise the risk of 
extraneous error and ensure they are capable of answering the research question 
defined.  This risk can be limited by ensuring case conditions are fairly uniform. 
Peters (1998) argues in case selection that using a range of countries that appear 
to be similar in as many ways as possible would minimise the risk of ‘extraneous’ 
variance weakening the case outcomes and observations. It is a trade-off for the 
researcher between a large ‘N’ sample and small ‘N’ sample, where a large ‘N’ 
sample would minimise the risk of extraneous error but the size of the sample 
may be impractical to complete. Levi-Faur (2004) argues: 
 
‘A more convincing argument for the effect of domestic politics and 
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national agencies would have come from a study of countries that are as 
similar as possible (MSSD2) on the relevant control variables’ (Levi-Faur 
D. , 2004, p. 190) 
 
In examining delegation one could examine the levels of independence across a 
number of sectors and jurisdictions.  Gilardi (2002a) has examined regulators 
across a number of sectors and cross-nationally. A limitation to the narrative 
approach is the ability to understand in great detail all the factors that contributed 
to the delegation decision in all of the jurisdictions and sectors examined. The 
narratives in these cases would be exhaustive and could lose in their detail the 
true variations in the factors explaining variations in independence.   
 
One could consider a cross-sectoral, cross-national analysis of the factors leading 
to differences in the levels of independence across a number of agencies. 
However, a clearer methodological approach would be to limit the research to a 
single sector and consider variations cross-nationally. This would usefully 
combine both the national patterns approach and the policy sector approach of 
comparative analysis. A cross-country comparison, for example, an examination 
of a number of regulatory agencies in the same jurisdiction could be considered. 
However, the weakness of such an approach would be the inability to examine 
                                                 
2 Most Similar System design 
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factors such as political leadership or state traditions, which could only be 
examined and compared cross nationally. 
 
Additionally, the legislative basis supporting each agency would differ and it 
would be difficult to compare, for example, an environmental agency and a 
telecommunications agency, where the impact of European-wide directives, 
specific to the sector examined, would be difficult to assess. 
 
The most effective methodology would be, therefore, to select cases from one 
sector which would minimise these difficulties. If the selection process examines 
those sectors where credibility has been argued to be strong, the variables in the 
level of independence are more likely to be explained by the non-functional 
factors. The next section examines the feasibility of using telecommunications as 
a sector. 
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
 
Gilardi (2002a) suggests that sectors with economic regulators and with market 
opening are the most likely to show credibility as the primary motivation to 
delegate. Choosing a sector which conforms to Gilardi’s thesis would limit, to 
some extent, variations in independence not explained by these factors. One 
could examine the Gilardi view and compare social and economic regulators to 
assess the accuracy of Gilardi’s conclusions. However, it would appear a more 
robust approach to understanding delegation to independent agencies if the 
Gilardi thesis was supported in terms of scope. 
 
There is a need therefore to construct a framework within which some criteria 
can be applied to reduce the dataset of sectors and countries to a level which 
allows more precise case selection. 
 
In comparative analysis the key aspect is the removal of alternative explanations 
for variations (Peters, 1998). The cross-sector analysis opens the possibility of a 
number of extraneous factors which could explain reasons and difference in the 
levels of delegation given to independent agencies. Peters argues that cases 
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should be as similar as possible.  
 
It is appropriate therefore when examining delegation, and the factors influencing 
government in delegating authority, to consider the development of the 
telecommunications sector. The sector has been the subject of regulatory 
oversight in the US since the 1930s and in the UK since the 1980s. The sector has 
also been the subject of much transnational debate and reform in the EU and 
across the OECD.  
 
To limit extraneous factors impacting the level of independence the cases 
selected should be from EU countries. In most sectors the legislative framework 
for most EU countries is consistent and can be compared across countries. For 
that reason it is also useful to limit the dataset to a single sector. Gilardi (2002a) 
specifically identified economic regulation, market opening and privatisation as 
the key factors contributing to the levels of independence to independent 
agencies. All three factors are present in the telecommunications sector. The 
markets in all EU countries have been opened under the liberalisation process and 
independent agencies exist in all EU countries. The EU countries examined are 
subject to the same EU directives and recommendations. As Edwards and 
Waverman (2004) argue, studying all EU countries eliminates many of the 
difficulties of heterogeneity in cross-country analysis. It is also important to 
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emphasise that the comparison should be based on the membership of the EU 
post-1995 but prior to the expansion of the EU in 2004.3 These countries, as the 
countries with most experience of delegation and privatisation in 
Telecommunications, have been subject to a series of directives and 
recommendations from the EU on the telecommunications sector since the 
publication of the Green Paper in 1987 (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1987). The group of countries who joined the EU in 2004 have 
only created agencies recently and it is difficult to assess the legislative 
transformation which, in some cases, not been completed. 
 
The need, identified earlier, for a logical supportable limit to the dataset of 
possible case studies to be examined to a dataset and, using consistent rules 
which are manageable, can be addressed through telecommunications. A dataset 
which is limited to the EU countries defined, and concentrates on the 
telecommunications sector, ensures a dataset within a consistent EU legislative 
framework, a dataset of economic regulators operating in open markets.  
 
To answer our research questions therefore, it is important to a have clear 
methodological approach to case selection. The questions firstly examine the 
                                                 
3 The EU 15 refers to the membership of the EU prior to enlargement in 2004. The countries are UK, Ireland, 
France, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Spain, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Portugal, Luxembourg, 
Italy and Greece. 
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non-functional reasons for delegation. As our dataset is derived from a sector 
where it is argued that credibility is a strong factor in delegation, it follows that 
case selection should be based on the levels of independence of these agencies. 
Ideally, in answer to this question, selecting the most and the least independent 
agencies, and for comparative purposes an agency with mid range independence, 
would allow sufficient data to assess the non-functional factors which have 
impacted both the decision to delegate, and the level of independence. Therefore 
it is important to have a list of telecommunications agencies ranked in terms of 
level of independence. In relation to factors influencing the delegation of radio 
spectrum the EU is also useful in answering this question as all independent 
agencies under the same EU framework are capable of delegating radio spectrum 
responsibilities to agencies. The case selection approach should therefore be 
based secondly on the institutional solution to radio spectrum across the EU 
dataset as defined above. 
 
The first step is to select potential cases based on a well founded measure of 
independence. There have been a number of attempts to measure independence 
and the next section examines this research and assesses whether they form a 
basis for case selection. 
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ASSESSING AGENCY INDEPENDENCE 
 
This section will aim to examine the issue of delegation to regulatory agencies 
via measures of independence across countries.  Research to date, developed 
initially to measure the independence of central banks (Cukierman, Webb, & 
Neyapti, 1992), has been used to test independence in utility and social regulatory 
agencies and specifically in telecommunications. The indices have been 
developed to test theories on diffusion of agencies (Gilardi, 2005), and more 
recently in telecommunications, to develop some understanding of regulatory 
decisions (Edwards & Waverman, 2004). 
 
When examining the motivations of elected officials in creating independent 
agencies it is important to consider the level of formal independence. It is at the 
point of creation that the legislator has most discretion to shape the level of 
independence, and the ex-ante and ex-post controls considered necessary to 
address the policy or political issues the legislator is trying to address. The 
construction, not only of the agency, but also its operational remit, is important to 
assess when assessing levels of independence. 
 
 Theory on the measurement of independence initially concentrated on the 
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independence of central banks. The initial measures of independence were based 
primarily on statute and a legal interpretation of independence. However, later 
analysis (Cuikerman Webb Neyapti 1992) developed a number of additional 
criteria which tried to incorporate a broader range of indicators and included 
indicators examining the organisational structure of the central bank including the 
appointment and term of office of the Governor. Indicators also examined policy 
formulation and objectives which were clearly set out in legislative texts. The 
aim of this literature was to test whether policy outcomes were affected by the 
levels of independence afforded to central banks. Issues like price stability, 
budget deficits and the management of money and credit in the macro economy 
were the stated reasons why central banks were given more independence. 
Cuikerman et al. (1992) were examining this hypothesis by examining policy 
outcomes in countries where an independent central bank had been created. To 
test policy outcomes Cuikerman et al. (1992) added further characteristics to the 
independence index which examined the ability of the central bank to achieve 
these policy outcomes. Cuikerman etal. (1992) therefore looked at objectives 
stated in legislation and powers in terms of policy formulation.  
 
Cuikerman etal. (1992) advocates the use of several different indicators of 
independence because: 
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‘in addition to the noise that they contain, each indicator captures a 
somewhat different aspect of independence’ (Cukierman, Webb, & 
Neyapti, 1992, p. 355).  
 
 Practical measuring was straightforward, with each indicator given a score of 
one for full independence or zero for no independence.  
 
Others have developed this framework, particularly to group indicators for 
political independence and economic independence in the case of central banks 
(Elgie, 1998). With this distinction between political independence and economic 
independence, the level of independence can be better understood with some 
indicators measuring institutional design and other indicators measuring 
accountability and assessing ability to achieve policy outcomes and objectives. 
This multi-layered approach to indicators allows more detailed analysis of the 
independence measure and more opportunity for cross-sector and cross-national 
comparisons. 
 
However, the early development of independence indices is not without criticism 
(Forder, 2002). Constructing measures based on statute reading does not 
determine the true power of the institution. A statute driven analysis does not 
give a full picture of independence, as statutes over time can be changed and this 
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gives government ultimate control over policy outcomes. If the institutional 
design is not achieving the objectives set by policy makers, the government can 
amend the statute. Ultimately, the ability to change statute may be a sufficient 
threat to induce cooperative behaviour (Forder, 2002). 
 
It has been argued however, in response to the criticisms above that the measures 
have great heuristic value; ‘they help us to make informed time-series 
observations and cross-national comparisons, albeit ones that admittedly are 
neither truly scientific nor objective’ (Elgie, 2002) 
 
Gilardi’s (2002a) work is of particular interest as he measures independence for 
independent agencies across a number of sectors. Gilardi (2002a) has developed a 
measure of formal independence, which consists of 21 indicators grouped under 
five equally weighted dimensions: 
 
 Status of agency head,  
 Status of members of board of management,  
 Relationship with government and Parliament,  
 Financial and organisational autonomy, 
 Regulatory Powers.  
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For each indicator a score of 0 or 1 is given with a score of 1 being full 
independence.  
 
The measure of independence therefore is linked with the legislative basis of the 
agency concerned. The degree of independence using these indicators is 
concerned with the influence a Ministry or legislator has on the composition of 
the management of the agency or its funding, and the regulatory powers 
delegated to it under legislation. 
 
Full independence would depend on the status under the above headings at the 
time of creation of an agency. The key issues with the agency head and the 
management board are the length of time of appointment, who appoints the head 
and under what grounds can that person be removed. The appointment of a head, 
or senior management officials, without interference from the government, which 
allow for ministers, or government, to remove officials easily, would count 
against a high independence score. The independence of the agency in terms of 
its financial autonomy and its ability to hire and maintain what it considers to be 
an adequate staff, without interference from government, would also warrant a 
high independence score. Finally, the abilities of the agency in terms of expertise 
to perform its task would be further evidence of independence and score highly. 
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Gilardi (2003a) accepts that this measure of independence is not without 
criticism. The criteria used for example are not weighted and it is difficult to 
assess in a qualitative fashion the relative levels of independence. Gilardi’s 
measures do not extend to measures related to objectives and policy outcomes. 
Gilardi’s motivation is to examine the reasons behind the creation of agencies 
and later to use his independence index to try to explain the diffusion of 
regulatory agencies across his dataset. Unlike Cuikerman et al., Gilardi’s initial 
motivation is not to test policy objectives or outcomes. Gilardi is using his 
independence index as a dependent variable to better understand the factors 
which influence the decision to delegate authority. Gilardi argues that measuring 
independence is: 
 
‘an unavoidable step for any research aiming to study independent 
agencies in a comparative way, and is particularly important because the 
institutional design of independence agencies, as is often stressed, is 
characterised by extreme heterogeneity’ (Gilardi 2003a) 
 
Gilardi’s measurements build on the work of the OECD (2000), where a range of 
factors have been measured by the OECD to help develop country profile reports. 
More recently, in the interests of developing theory on the effectiveness and 
quality of regulation, more refined independence measures have been developed. 
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Edwards (2004) has developed a database of independent telecommunications 
agencies capturing the characteristics of the agencies and including some quality 
indicators for the period 1997-2003. The dataset covers 17 institutional elements, 
measured either as 0 or 1 to indicate the level of independence. The dataset is 
restricted to the membership of the EU prior to the accession of new members in 
2004. 
 
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) has also developed profiles 
of telecommunications regulators, particularly across Europe. Their dataset 
specifically examines, not only the institutional factors examined by Gilardi to 
measure formal independence, but also characteristics which attempt to measure 
the operational independence and remit of the agency. These factors are 
important as the operational tasks of telecommunications agencies, identified in 
the chapter on radio spectrum, are important in assessing the level of 
independence of a telecommunications agency. 
  
The ITU and OECD datasets have been further developed by Tenbucken and 
Schneider (2004) who examined the diffusion of regulatory reform in the 
telecommunications sector. Tenbucken and Schneider differ from Gilardi in that 
they only examine telecommunications agencies but they also expand the range 
of criteria examined. The authors include criteria not only on legislative 
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independence but also examine operational indicators. These competencies cover 
licensing, radio spectrum management, numbering, interconnection and pricing. 
The authors argue that their index assesses the material independence of agencies 
and covers 27 OECD members.  
 
In terms of organisational independence, Tenbucken and Schneider have 
included similar characteristics to Gilardi and are consistent with criteria 
identified by others for Central Banks. However, the authors have collected and 
measured competence indicators from source data collected by the ITU4. These 
indicators assess the power of the authority to regulate prices, to licence and to 
resolve interconnection disputes. They argue these additional characteristics are 
required to assess the material independence of the institution as many countries 
have created independent agencies but the powers of these agencies are in some 
areas restricted. One example of the benefit of broadening the range of criteria 
beyond the organisational characteristics is the view that a policy actor, to ensure 
credibility, may create the agency and make the agency legislatively independent, 
but in delegating the agencies operational remit the policy actor limits the range 
of operational remit of the agency. Tenbucken and Schneider (2004) have 
identified South Korea and Turkey from their database of OECD countries where 
there is evidence of organisational independence but limited functional 
                                                 
4 see www.itu.int/ITU-D/treg/profiles/regprofile.asp 
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delegation of competences, they argue: 
 
‘Both have created NRAs5 which possess rather high levels of 
independence as regards their organisational characteristics and the 
lowest scores as regards their functional profiles. This asymmetry most 
probably originates in the fact that the creation of an NRA was a rather 
symbolic move to comply with harmonization requirements at the OECD 
and WTO level and to enhance policy credibility in order to attract 
foreign direct investment’ (Tenbucken and Schneider, 2004, p. 261) 
 
The broad criteria demonstrate what Tenbucken and Schneider refer to as 
divergent convergence in the title of their article (Tenbucken and Schneider, 
2004). The broadening of the criteria assessing independence and the deployment 
of competence based indicators is also consistent with those assessing the 
independence of central banks.  
 
The Tenbucken and Schneider analysis is therefore a valuable dataset to look at 
in the context of case selection. It addresses the criticism of Forder (2002), 
referred to earlier, which argues that independence measures are restricted to a 
review of legislation. The inclusion of operational criteria gives a fuller picture of 
                                                 
5 National Regulatory Authorities 
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the independence given by the principal to the agent. 
 
This thesis could develop a dataset of independence indices and use this index to 
select appropriate cases. A brief questionnaire could be developed and issued to 
telecommunications regulators. However, the level of detail and factors available 
through other sources appear sufficient for the purposes of case selection. The 
ITU dataset, used by Schneider and Tenbucken, has robust indicators on 
institutional independence and the structure of the regulator. The dataset will also 
allow cross-country analysis and allow case selection on a wide range of criteria. 
Additionally, the criteria include not only institutional criteria but operational 
criteria and therefore allows for case selection based on a deeper understanding 
of the level of independence in each country. Additionally, the operational 
indicators for radio spectrum cover criteria like allocation and planning of radio 
spectrum. The only missing criteria is funding for radio spectrum activities, 
which is missing from the criteria listed by the ITU. Although operational 
authority to collect and retain funds from radio spectrum activities are important 
to an understanding of the level of independence in an agency, the additional 
criteria would not materially impact the outcome of the result as it would only be 
one criteria across several and if collected is unlikely to make any major impact 
on the independence values presented by Tenbucken and Schneider. The funding 
of radio spectrum activities and the associated funding allocations will be an 
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issue addressed in the case studies themselves.  
 
The selection of cases on the basis of the Tenbucken and Schneider independence 
index will allow case selection to answer the question on the non-functional 
factors. However, does it also allow us to answer our second question, trying to 
address the erratic delegation of radio spectrum?  
 
Before proceeding to case selection, the institutional solutions for radio spectrum 
responsibilities discussed in the previous chapters needs to be included in the 
methodological approach to case selection. Radio spectrum responsibilities have 
either been delegated in some fashion to independent agencies or retained within 
the Ministry and in some cases retained in the form of a non-independent 
governmental agency. Case selection purely on the basis of independence of 
telecommunications agencies may include agencies where the radio spectrum 
responsibilities are not included. The Schneider and Tenbucken dataset does 
assess independence, including radio spectrum criteria, and should therefore be 
able to distinguish the level of independence given on radio spectrum activities. 
The only further methodological check should be to ensure selection of cases on 
the basis of an institutional solution where the radio spectrum responsibilities 
have not been delegated to the independent telecommunications agency. In this 
case the independence index would not be able to measure radio spectrum. There 
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is a need, having assessed the appropriate cases on the basis of the independence 
dataset, to look at the institutional solutions to radio spectrum to ensure case 
selection will allow an examination of the role of radio spectrum as a non-
functional factor in delegation. The next section will therefore propose a two 
stage methodology for case selection. Firstly: on the basis of an absolute 
independence index and secondly: on the basis of the institutional solutions to 
radio spectrum responsibilities. 
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CASE SELECTION 
The Tenbucken and Schneider independence index is the starting point for case 
selection. The index provides a dataset of independence values which would 
allow case selection, not only on the basis of variation in institutional 
independence, but also on the basis of operational characteristics. The operational 
characteristics are particularly relevant to the discussion of delegation of 
operational responsibilities, such as radio spectrum management. 
 
Peters (1998) argues that the most crucial issue facing the researcher in case 
selection is whether to choose the most similar or most different systems. The 
cases selected therefore need to have similarities in terms of their overall 
suitability. The Tenbucken and Schneider database is therefore reduced to EU 
countries for the reasons discussed above on the similarity of the EU legislative 
framework. A further issue is the relative importance of institutional and 
operational characteristics and their importance in case selection. The 
institutional characteristics are to a large extent more important than the 
operational as the process of creating an agency, and its structure and powers, is a 
major decision for policy makers. The operational characteristics, although 
giving the researcher a more detailed view of independence, are to some extent 
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subordinate to the institutional. 
   
Tenbucken and Schneider’s operational measures use a simple binary 1 or 2 
score to denote independence. If the regulatory authority has complete 
independence the score is 2. There is a score of 1 for some competence remaining 
with the Ministry. In relation to institutional measures there are scores of 1, 2 or 3 
on the criteria listed in table 6 below i.e. the more independent the agency, the 
higher the score. The dataset can therefore recognise if there is a shared 
competence or an institutional factor which may need some further assessment. 
For example, the independence measure is higher if the term of office of the 
agency head is equal to or longer than 6 years. 
 
Table 6: Tenbucken and Schneider 
agency institutional and operational 
criteria 
Code Institutional Criteria Operational Criteria 
RI Regulatory Agencies  
ST Staff per inhabitant   
IP Independence from political 
power  
 
RT Who does agency report to  
AD Autonomy in decision  
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making 
OD Who can overturn decisions  
AB Approval of Budget  
FF Source of Finance  
CB Size of collegiate Body  
AH Appointment of Head  
TO Term of Office  
FL  Fixed Voice Licensing 
ML  Mobile Voice Licensing 
OL   Licence Requirements 
MA  Merger Approval 
IC  Interconnection charges 
DR  Dispute Resolution 
SP  Spectrum Planning 
SA  Spectrum Allocation 
NP  Numbering Planning 
NA  Numbering Administration 
RP  Regulatory Body (Pricing) 
FP  Fixed Price Regulation 
 
 
 
Tenbucken and Schneider’s source data is derived from the ITU data, across both 
institutional and operational measures, as detailed above. In terms of both sets of 
measures the table below highlights the average mean value by country. The 
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mean values are then combined to give a combined average mean score for both 
institutional and operational criteria. 
 
Table 7: Tenbucken and Schneider 
Independence ranking6 
Rank Country Institutional 
Value 
Operational 
Value 
Joint Value 
1 Germany .731 1.0 .866 
2 Ireland .764 .939 .852 
3 Portugal .709 .939 .824 
4 Sweden .674 .939 .807 
5 Italy .718 .751 .735 
6 Denmark .634 .758 .696 
7 Austria .665 .663 .664 
8 Finland .718 .592 .655 
9 Belgium .661 .645 .653 
10 France .623 .606 .615 
11 UK .627 .594 .611 
12 Spain .633 .574 .604 
13 Greece .731 .464 .598 
14 Netherlands .596 .574 .585 
 
                                                 
6 Luxembourg is not included in the data collected by Tenbucken and Schneider 
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The dataset can be graphically displayed as follows: 
Table 8: Schneider and Tenbucken’s 
Independence Index – scatter chart 
Independence Index
0.4
0.5
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0.7
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0.9
1
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Ins
 
 
Tenbucken and Schneider comment on the results of their analysis, pointing out 
in terms of institutional independence and organisational profile, RegTP in 
Germany and ComReg in Ireland are the most independent and have measures 
close to the USA. They posit: 
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‘the agencies often labeled by the literature as classic examples of 
independent NRAs, such as Oftel (since 2002, Ofcom) in Great Britain or 
OPTA in the Netherlands, demonstrate a surprisingly low degree of  
independence’ (Tenbucken and Schneider, 2004, p. 263)  
 
It is unusual to find the UK towards the bottom of the independence index 
considering the UK has the longest history in the EU of institutional reform in 
telecommunications. Comparing the findings of the independence index with 
other independence indices, the results appear consistent. Edwards (2004) shows 
that Ireland is consistently among the high independence category, with the UK 
and the Netherlands towards the end (Edwards & Waverman, 2004, p. 50). 
Gilardi in several studies (Gilardi, 2003a) and (Gilardi, 2002a) show that Ireland 
has consistently been recognised as creating agencies across several sectors 
which exhibit higher than average independence scores when compared across 
the EU.  
 
The highest joint value in the dataset is Germany, with the second highest 
institutional independence in the dataset. In other independence indices however 
Germany is not placed so highly. In the Edwards (2004) dataset Germany is mid 
table and in Gilardi (2002a) Germany is not considered a country with a tradition 
of independent agencies across sectors. Gilardi’s score for RegTP is not the 
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highest in the sample he has chosen. 
  
On the basis of the table above the country with the highest institutional value is 
Ireland and the lowest is the Netherlands. On the basis of the comments of 
Schneider and Tenbucken regarding the unusual score of the UK an interesting 
mid-range country could be the UK. As the country with the longest experience 
of independent agencies in telecommunications, the UK is also a very interesting 
case to examine. 
 
As discussed above, before deciding on these countries the selection needs to be 
assessed against their institutional solution to radio spectrum management in each 
country. In the previous chapter the responsibilities for each telecommunications 
agency was detailed. In relation to radio spectrum in most countries the regulator 
has primary responsibilities for radio spectrum. In Austria, France, Netherlands 
and Spain the Ministry retains responsibility for most radio spectrum activities. In 
Austria there is no separate agency, but in France, Netherlands and Spain there is 
a separate agency, under the direction of the Ministry, with sole responsibility for 
radio spectrum. In terms of case selection it would be relevant to have in the 
countries selected a case where there is a separate government agency for radio 
spectrum. This reinforces the view that the Netherlands should be one of the 
countries examined. 
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In terms of the UK and Ireland both countries have delegated radio spectrum 
responsibilities to independent agencies. The Tenbucken and Schneider 
independence index measured the extent of delegation for operational factors like 
radio spectrum. The index gave Ireland among the highest value in the EU and 
gave the UK among the lowest. The UK is also a useful case study because it has 
tried a number of institutional solutions to manage radio spectrum. In 1984 it 
created Oftel as an independent agency dealing with telecommunications but did 
not delegate any radio spectrum responsibilities. In 1990 the UK created the radio 
communications agency which was a Government run agency dealing with radio 
spectrum. In 2003 this agency was merged with Oftel and other media agencies 
to create Ofcom. The various institutional decisions, including the final decision 
which in effect made radio spectrum activities more independent of policy actors, 
make the UK a compelling example for inclusion. 
 
The case studies selected, based on the Tenbucken and Schneider independence 
index and a review of radio spectrum responsibilities, are the UK, Netherlands 
and Ireland. 
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CASE STUDY APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
In terms of the source data to be examined in each particular case, it is important 
to consider: 
 
‘ in a configurative approach, the primary purpose is the thorough 
description of a case or cases, so that the consumer of the research will 
be capable of comprehending the logic of political life in that limited 
number of settings’ (Huber and Shipan, 2002) 
 
The data used allows an examination of the processes involved in not only the 
creation of the agency, but also an examination of the delegation of operational 
responsibilities. The role of ex-ante and/or ex-post controls in constraining the 
independence of the agency will also be important to consider. The detailed 
examination will review such powers and changes to the initial legislative basis 
and how this has evolved over time. The source data from Parliament and 
national debates will be supplemented with one-to-one interviews with policy 
making officials and officials involved in the delegation process.  
 
The interviewees selected for each case study will be selected based on their 
involvement in the key legislative decisions in each country. By definition a large 
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majority of these will be civil servants and politicians. The period under 
examination runs from the early 1990s to 2003 and there is a risk that the passing 
of time and events will distort the recollection of interviewees. For example, in 
Ireland the initial legislation setting up the regulator was quickly seen as flawed, 
and the changes proposed in subsequent legislation were designed to correct the 
problems perceived by the civil servants with the initial legislation. The civil 
servants and politicians interviewed may use hindsight to reflect on earlier 
events. In oral history terms this is referred to as ‘elite’ oral history (Seldon and 
Pappworth, 1983). In an attempt to mitigate against this, the composition of 
interviewees in each case is balanced with external experts, regulatory staff and a 
range of politicians. This is to try and recreate, in so far as possible, the 
motivations of policy actors at the time of drafting the legislation. 
 
The interviews will be a dialogue as opposed to a survey approach listing set 
questions only. There will be a series of set questions which will establish 
initially the involvement of the interviewee in the process and their seniority. It 
will also be important to ascertain the interviewee’s attitude to the various factors 
identified in the literature and their importance in the case being discussed. A 
dialogue approach will allow the maximum use of the interviewee’s time and 
their experience, to delve into the part in the delegation process which most 
involves their role. A mixture of political and public service interviewees will 
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allow a balance to be drawn on the issues being prioritised during the delegation 
process. For this purpose all interviews will be face to face and none will be 
conducted over the telephone or via written correspondence. In a number of cases 
it will be necessary to have more than one conversation with the interviewee if 
subsequent interviews raise concerns about their recollection of events.  
 
All interviewees will be asked if they would prefer their contributions to be 
confidential or quoted in the thesis. The option allows, particularly public 
officials, to be free to express their views under the cover of anonymity.  
 
The case studies need to examine the decision to create the agency under review 
and by definition will be an historical assessment of the factors evident at the 
time the decision was taken. However, the agencies selected have been subject to 
legislative changes since their formation. Subsequent legislative changes may 
have impacted the level of either operational or institutional independence of the 
agency. The timeframe will therefore have to cover the initial legislative process 
and the most recent legislative process.  
 
The cases will concentrate on the factors identified in the literature as the non-
functional factors. It will also examine the process of delegating radio spectrum 
and offer a better understanding, in the cases selected, why there are such widely 
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divergent institutional solutions to radio spectrum. The analysis will also consider 
exogenous institutional factors at the EU and transnational level, to assess to what 
extent the developments in other jurisdictions, and at the EU, influenced the 
decisions to delegate. In building this story it will be necessary, for the countries 
selected, to examine the debates surrounding the delegation of powers from the 
executive. In this area, work by the OECD, ITU and European Commission is 
useful in reporting events and constraints on decision making but also local press 
and informed comment and reviews will contextualise the decision making 
process.  
 
The various levels of delegation in each member state have developed over the 
past number of years. The key developments in this period have been market 
opening and the increasing commercialisation of radio spectrum usage. The 
institutional solutions adopted however, deserve consideration given that 
delegation to independent agencies follows from credible commitments to 
liberalise markets, and the level of investments potentially available to countries 
will be reduced if governments are seen by investors to intervene in the newly 
liberalised markets, specifically in relation to radio spectrum. 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter has outlined the methodological approach best suited to assessing 
the extent of non-functional factors in the decision to delegate. The chapter 
initially considered the appropriateness of narrative stories and comparative case 
studies as the appropriate methodology to understand the wide range of factors, 
particularly factors not capable of quantitative analysis. The chapter continued to 
assess independence indices as the appropriate data source for identifying cases. 
The chapter discussed the most appropriate independence index to be used to 
consider further analysis and considered the independence index developed by 
Tenbucken and Schneider to be the most comprehensive available. The approach 
of selecting an independence index on the basis of one sector cross-nationally 
was also discussed. 
  
Using the analysis from Tenbucken and Schneider, it was decided to examine in 
more detail the ‘story’ of delegation in telecommunications in the UK, Ireland 
and Netherlands. These countries were selected as they were the countries with 
the least independent agency measured by institutional factors, and the most 
independent by institutional factors. A final case was selected as the country with 
a mid range independence score, but with a varied approach to delegation, 
specifically for radio spectrum. 
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The case studies will examine the ‘story’ of delegation via primary and secondary 
sources, and interviews to establish the decisions and motivations not only of 
political actors but also of others influencing the outcome. The chapters on 
individual experiences will be compared in a conclusion which will seek to 
identify common themes and contrasts in the cases examined. 
 
The first case study to be examined is the UK. The UK has the most extensive 
experience of delegation and market opening. The UK delegation process has a 
number of legislative steps starting in 1984 and concluding with the creation of 
Ofcom in 2003. As the country with the most comprehensive treatment of 
delegation in telecommunications it is appropriate to start with the UK. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE EVOLUTION OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REGULATION IN THE UK WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO 
RADIO SPECTRUM REGULATION 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The UK is an early adopter of the liberalisation agenda in telecommunications. In 
1984 the British Government created a fully privatised British Telecom and at the 
same time created the telecommunications regulator, Oftel. The 
Telecommunications Act (1984) established the regulatory body as a non-
Ministerial government department under a Director General of 
Telecommunications who, for the duration of his appointment, was independent 
of Ministerial control. The independence indices discussed in the previous 
chapter position the UK at mid or below the average level of independence. The 
UK would have the most experience in the EU of institutional solutions to solve 
issues of market opening in the telecommunication sector. Also, the UK dealt 
with radio spectrum, firstly as an executive agency, and then as part of a 
converged agency, Ofcom. It is clear from the organisational independence of 
Ofcom that merging radio spectrum functions with Ofcom represented a more 
independent treatment of radio spectrum. In the view of Jim Norton, a former 
chief executive of the radio communications agency, the agency was in the ‘face 
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of the minister’ when required, but as part of a converged agency radio spectrum 
management had more freedom in terms of allocation of spectrum and the setting 
of radio spectrum fees. 
 
This chapter will examine the key events which changed the institutional 
approach to telecommunications regulation and radio spectrum in the UK. It will 
examine the creation of the Radio Communications Agency in 1990 and examine 
its powers and responsibilities. It will also examine the Wireless Telegraphy Act 
(1998) which was the first major piece of radio spectrum legislation since 1949. 
This legislation was an opportunity to assess the institutional approach to radio 
spectrum under a new Labour government. The chapter will then examine the 
creation of Ofcom and the debate on the converged regulator, specifically 
examining the Office of Communications Act (2002), which was the paving 
legislation creating Ofcom, and the more comprehensive Communications Act 
(2003) which detailed Ofcom’s functions and duties.  
 
The objective of this case study is to assess the motivation of policy actors and 
assess these motivations against the criteria identified in earlier chapters on 
reasons why policy actors delegate. A large number of studies and reports on 
telecommunications regulation have been published in the years since the 
privatisation of British Telecom in 1984. There are Parliamentary debates and 
 132 
 
 
government command papers which are useful sources of government thinking 
on telecommunications regulation. Also, the Communications Act (2003), which 
was the major piece of legislation creating Ofcom, was the subject of pre-
legislative scrutiny. The scrutiny was in the form of a Joint Committee which 
took evidence and conducted hearings on the broad range of issues raised by the 
Communications Act. The Parliamentary debates, reports, command papers and 
independent studies which looked at the evolution of telecommunications 
regulation in the UK are a key source in assessing the motivations of policy 
actors. The evidence presented in these reports is also supported by interviews, 
mainly with those who did not have a voice directly in the Parliamentary 
proceedings but were key influencers behind legislation or government policy 
throughout the period. 
 
As there were a large range of primary sources available, particularly in relation 
to the creation of Ofcom, there was a limited need for an extensive use of 
interviews. The main interviewees were either involved in the radio spectrum 
policy issues as advisors or chief officers of the radio communications agency, or 
were officials or advisors to government in the 1990s when most of the policy 
debates in telecommunications were being formulated.  
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Table 9: List of Interviewees for UK 
case study 
Name Current title Reason for interview 
James Purnell MP Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions 
Member of influential 
advisory think tank, 
Institute for Public Policy 
Research (IPPR), in 1990s 
and advisor on 
communications policy to 
the Prime Minister in first 
Labour government 
Dominic Morris Chief of Staff to Ofcom 
Chief Executive. 
Member of the Downing 
Street strategy team 1995-
1997 and advisor to deputy 
prime minister, Michael 
Heseltine 
Jim Norton Advisor to Institute of 
Directors and 
independent consultant 
Former Chief Executive of 
the Radio 
Communications Agency 
in the mid-1990s 
Professor Martin Cave Professor at Warwick 
business school  
A leading academic writing 
on regulation and author 
of study into Future of 
Radio Spectrum 
commissioned by 
Chancellor Gordon Brown 
in 2001 
David Hendon Senior official at 
Department of Trade 
and Industry 
Former Chief Executive of 
the Radio 
Communications agency 
and head of the ‘bill team’ 
on the Putnam committee 
examining the 
Communications Act 2003
David Cleevley Former Managing 
director of Analysys 
consulting, independent 
consultant and member 
of Spectrum 
Advisor on radio spectrum 
strategy to Downing Street 
Strategy Office and 
founding member of 
SMAG, advisory body on 
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Management Advisory 
Group (SMAG) 
radio spectrum to Ministry 
 
This case will firstly examine the evolution of radio communications regulation, 
the creation of the radio communications agency, and the development of its role 
through the Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act.  
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADIO COMMUNICATIONS REGULATION 
 
Before assessing the institutional regulatory framework in the UK it is important 
to consider the history of radio spectrum regulation in the UK. Radio spectrum is 
defined in more detail in the earlier chapters. However, in terms of innovative 
radio spectrum management and innovations generally in telecommunications 
markets the UK was an early leader. In 1901, Gugliemo Marconi, the inventor of 
radio, sent the first radio communication across the Atlantic Ocean from the UK. 
With the development of Morse code, communication via radio became more 
popular. In 1912 following the sinking of the Titanic, the Postmaster General 
claimed that 700 lives had been saved by Marconi’s invention.  
 
Aside from the use of radio spectrum for telegraphic communications the next 
technological development and use of radio spectrum was the introduction of 
radio broadcasting which began in the UK with test broadcasts in 1920. In 1922 
Marconi set up the London broadcasting station. In 1932 the British Empire 
Service, the forerunner of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) World 
Service, was launched and in 1936 the BBC Television Service was launched. In 
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1955 the first independent television station was launched in the UK, with ITV. 
In 1964 BBC2 was launched.  
 
The uses of radio spectrum for most of the century were essentially 
telecommunications and broadcasting. The use of fixed telephony (i.e. 
communication via fixed copper wires) overtook the use of telegraphs following 
the Second World War and radio spectrum became increasingly more important. 
Radio spectrum moved into more commercial communication areas with the 
launch of cellular phones by Cellnet and Vodafone in 1985. Radio Spectrum’s 
range of uses also expanded as the use of private business radio expanded and 
radio spectrum was used to extend networks for cable television and fixed 
telecommunications voice and data applications, like wireless broadband.  
 
The growing acceptance of radio spectrum as a key resource was recognised 
early in the UK. In 1904 the UK adopted the first Wireless Telegraphy Act which 
introduced the concept of licensing for the use of radio spectrum. The 
administration of the radio spectrum was a matter for the Post Office and the 
Postmaster General. In 1918 the Wireless Telegraphy Board was created within 
the General Post Office and was required to manage the interference between 
radio spectrum users. 
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The next major legislative change was the Wireless Telegraphy (1949) Act which 
introduced fees for radio spectrum and passed the management of the radio 
spectrum to the General Post Office. This Act, which updated the management of 
radio spectrum to reflect its growing use and importance, was the main legislative 
document for the next fifty years.  In 1969 the responsibility for the management 
of radio spectrum was transferred to the newly formed Department of Posts and 
Telecommunications. In 1973 the Department of Posts and Telecommunications 
was dissolved and the Radio Regulatory Division was created within the Home 
Office. In 1983 the Radio Regulatory Division moved to the Department of Trade 
and Industry and in 1986 it was renamed the Radio Communications Division. 
The semi-independent nature of the unit and the specialised services it offered 
meant it was a clearly defined distinct unit with the Department of Trade and 
Industry. One interviewee, Dominic Morris, suggested that it was made an 
executive agency for the simple reason that most of the Radio Communications 
Division was located in a separate building in London’s docklands and there had 
been little integration into the main Department of Trade and Industry.  
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Radio Communications Agency 
 
The Radio Communications Agency was created in 1990 as an executive agency 
of the Department of Trade and Industry. The management of the radio spectrum 
for the armed forces remained within the remit of the Department of Defence. 
 
The concept of Executive Agencies was introduced in the Ibbs Report published 
in 1988. The Conservative governments in the 1980s had been concerned about 
the performance and size of the civil service. The Ibbs report was commissioned 
to see how structurally these issues could be addressed. Ibbs recommendations 
were:  
 
‘to ensure that the organisational structure and skills of the Civil Service 
are adapted to deliver government services as effectively as possible’ 
(Ibbs, 1988,p4)  
 
Ibbs recognised the need to professionalise the civil service and ensure improved 
performance through target setting. Ministers were increasingly overloaded with 
additional work and Ibbs argued: 
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‘Because of other pressures on Ministers, and because for most time 
management is not their forte and they don’t see it as their function, 
better management and the achievement of improved performance is 
something that the Civil Service has to work out for itself’ (Ibbs, 1988, p. 
4) 
 
Ibbs also identified that across the civil service there was a lack of clear 
accountability and responsibility for performance. There was a need to focus on 
results and outputs as opposed to inputs in the civil service. Ibbs’ main 
recommendation, therefore, was an organisational change to create executive 
agencies.  
 
Ibbs defined his agencies as: 
 
‘part of government and the public service…We use the term ‘executive’ 
agency not in its technical sense but to describe any executive unit that 
delivers a service for government’ (Ibbs, 1988, p. 9) 
 
Ibbs argues, ‘the choice and definition of suitable agencies is primarily for 
Ministers and senior management in departments to decide’ (Ibbs, 1988, p. 9). 
Ibbs recommended that Ministers and senior Department officials set out the 
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strategy framework within which the agency should be held accountable. There 
should be clear accountability in terms of performance to the senior officials and 
the Minister, particularly in relation to sensitive political issues. 
 
The agencies created following the Ibbs report were mainly created by 
departments and their Ministers. There was no need for primary legislation 
although Ibbs did envisage that some agencies may need to be created within a 
legislative framework. Ibbs did see agencies as primarily units that deliver 
services for government. He believed that once the policy framework was set 
then the management of the agency should be as independent as possible in 
deciding how the framework objectives were achieved. The oversight of these 
agencies by Department officials and their lack of independence from the parent 
Department suggests that executive agencies are not independent agencies as 
detailed by Thatcher (2002b) in earlier chapters.  
 
The Radio Communications Agency had wide discretionary powers to ensure the 
‘nuts and bolts’ of managing radio spectrum was conducted separately from the 
principal Department. Jim Norton, a former chief executive officer of the Radio 
Communications Agency, explained that, although the agency and the Chief 
Executive reported to the Minister, the Chief Executive’s line managers were 
assistant secretary grade in the Department of Trade and Industry. The Chief 
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Executive had little discretion in terms of hiring and structuring the agency. The 
senior managers in the agency were all career civil servants who did not report to 
the Chief Executive directly. The agency, although far from independent, was 
generally free of Ministerial interference7. To a large extent independence was 
not an issue for the agency. Interviews with both Jim Norton and his successor 
David Hendon identify that independence from the Minister was never 
considered in any discussions during their period of office as Chief Executives of 
the agency. This period covered the preparation of the Wireless Telegraphy 
(1998) Act, and the change of government from Conservative to Labour in 1997. 
It also covered the years just prior to the merging of the agency into Ofcom. 
Generally the agency acted as part of the principal Department and the Chief 
Executive was generally a career civil servant who returned to a position in the 
Department of Trade and Industry, once they had completed their stint in the 
agency.  
 
The institutional solution found for radio spectrum in 1990, retaining control as 
part of the Ministry, raises a number of issues with the theory. Credibility 
theories suggest that in cases where there is policy uncertainty and complexity 
policy actors will delegate those activities to independent agencies to ensure their 
policy decisions are credible. Levy and Spiller (1994) show that these decisions 
                                                 
7 Interview, Jim Norton 
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are most likely in cases where there are market opening policies. For investors 
the key issue is the assurance of independence from Ministerial interference. In 
the case radio spectrum this meant no Ministerial interference with the allocation 
of radio spectrum licences. It appears from the evidence presented by two Chief 
Executives of the Radio Communications Agency that Ministerial interference 
was never an issue and therefore independence was never an issue. David 
Cleevley, a member of the Spectrum Management Advisory Board (SMAG) 
which was set up after the Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act to advise the Minister 
on radio spectrum policy, argued that it would not occur to Ministers or the Radio 
Communications Agency to be independent as the agency was full of ‘boring 
people performing some ‘black art’ that most people did not understand’.8 
 
The main concern, and the main reason the agency remained within the Ministry, 
was to ensure the efficient management of radio spectrum. An argument 
presented in support of this, from one interviewee, is that in terms of industrial 
policy the UK had to be at the forefront of innovation and promoting UK 
industry. This interviewee argued that it was the view of successive UK 
governments from Harold Wilson’s Labour government, first elected in 1964, 
which promoted the ‘white heat of the technological revolution’ of UK industry 
                                                 
8 Interview with David Cleevley 
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in the 1960s, to the Thatcher free market policies9 that there was a focus in the 
UK on promoting innovation. Radio spectrum policy was considered part of this 
approach. The key objective for Ministers was to ensure radio spectrum policy 
did not fall behind and did not hinder UK industry and hamper innovation. 
Therefore, it needed close political oversight. Jim Norton argued that the Radio 
Communications Agency had a clear objective to be transparent in its processes 
and decisions. It could not therefore be accused of political or Ministerial 
interference. The agency published strategy documents and annual plans to assist 
those who may wish to invest and apply for a licence. The agency never had a 
policy role, but Jim Norton argued that the close working relationship with the 
parent Department promoted policy stability, which in his view was a key 
promoter of investment in the sector. A final argument which may be put forward 
to explain the agency’s lack of independence was the nascent commercialisation 
of radio spectrum. In the early 1990s it was not the case that radio spectrum was 
seen as a commercial asset by government. Prior to the Wireless Telegraphy 
(1998) Act radio spectrum licences were issued for a small administrative fee.  
 
A further issue to be considered at this stage is the decision not to include radio 
spectrum as part of Oftel in 1990. The decision not to merge may have been a 
reflection on the limited role of Oftel. In the early stages of liberalisation in the 
                                                 
9 Interview with David Cleevley 
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UK, Oftel was concerned mainly with the management of British Telecom and 
one other competitor, Mercury. Jim Norton’s view was that at that stage in the 
evolution of the telecommunications sector, radio spectrum was not considered 
an important component of a telecommunications market. It was only in the early 
1990s that a full liberalisation agenda was adopted. Also the remit of the radio 
spectrum agency, as constituted in 1990, was broader than just 
telecommunications. It had responsibilities for broadcasting which was managed 
by other agencies such as the Radio Authority and the Independent Television 
Council (ITC). Jim Norton argued that radio spectrum was seen as a government 
resource. As a wholesaler, the agency’s role was to ensure efficient management 
of the radio spectrum. Jim Norton argues that there was limited conflict in this 
role with other agencies or with government. There were departmental 
committees and liaison with the Department of Defence, particularly on radio 
spectrum planning. The general impression given by all interviewees is that the 
agency, particularly in its early years, was performing a technical and in many 
cases highly complex, but essentially bureaucratic role. 
 
These arguments do not undermine the view that credibility is a key functional 
reason for the creation of independent agencies. The motivation of policy actors, 
as evidenced in the Ibbs report, was efficiency and public sector reform. The 
concern of government was to ensure the strategic management of radio spectrum 
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at a time when the pressures of market opening in telecommunications did not 
impact on the commercial value of radio spectrum. In the early 1990s the 
importance and commercial value of radio spectrum was not recognised and the 
need to credibly commit to a policy did not have the same importance it was to 
have by the end of the 1990s. 
 
The next major development in radio spectrum management was the decision to 
value radio spectrum licences based on market values, not on administrative 
charging. The Radio Communications Agency, recognising the growing 
importance of radio spectrum started to lobby in the mid-1990s for more 
flexibility in awarding licences. The commercial uses of radio spectrum were 
increasing, particularly in relation to mobile telephony. The lobbying started 
under John Major’s Conservative government. The Conservative government had 
been re-elected in 1992 for a third term. The fiscal environment was difficult for 
the government at the time and the argument that government could raise 
additional funds from radio spectrum was very welcome. The growing 
commercial importance of radio spectrum is illustrated in an anecdote recounted 
by a number of interviewees. The Radio Communications Agency proposed 
changes to the wireless telegraphy legislation to allow for radio spectrum to be 
sold at market-based prices. The agency recognised, however, that parts of the 
radio spectrum, particularly for next generation mobile telephony, could raise 
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significant funds if based on market prices. If this approach was adopted the radio 
spectrum licences would be valued well in excess of costs. The proposed 
legislation was discussed with the then deputy Prime Minster, Michael Heseltine, 
who was told speculatively that the radio spectrum for next generation mobile 
could be valued at up to stg£5billion. This raised awareness of the issue in the 
Conservative government and the draft legislation was approved at one of its last 
cabinet meetings. The valuation of radio spectrum also featured in the 1997 
election campaign when the Labour Party election literature included a valuation 
of stg£10billion for radio spectrum licences.10  
 
It is important to consider the growing strategic and commercial importance of 
radio spectrum and consider what changes were proposed in the Wireless 
Telegraphy (1998) Act. This is particularly important in relation to the 
institutional independence of the Radio Communications Agency as the 
legislation was the first opportunity to address the agency’s institutional status. 
 
Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act 
 
The increasing importance of radio spectrum was recognised by the Radio 
Communications Agency who consulted on the ‘Future Delivery of Spectrum 
                                                 
10 David Cleevley  - confirmed that the Sunday Times had a story on the value of radio spectrum in April 1997, 
prior to the general election 
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and on Spectrum Pricing’ in 1996. The legislation which followed this 
consultation, the Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act, changed the way radio 
spectrum was valued and introduced the concept of radio spectrum pricing. The 
Minister, introducing the Wireless Telegraphy bill in the Commons, argued: 
 
‘The Bill will bring about a radical change in the way in which the 
spectrum is managed. It will enable--indeed, require--my right hon. 
Friend the Secretary of State, when setting fees, to take account of a 
range of criteria connected with the efficient management of the 
spectrum, rather than, as at present, simply applying administrative 
costs’. (John Battle, 29/10/97,col.925,House of Commons) 
 
The debate on the Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act was extensive, despite all-
party support. The Conservative Party 1997 election manifesto said: 
 
‘We will keep Britain in the vanguard of new mobile service development 
- including mobile telephone and information services - by introducing a 
pricing system for the radio spectrum to achieve more efficient allocation 
of radio frequencies’11 
 
                                                 
11 Conservative Election Manifesto 1997 located at www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/con97.htm 
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The Labour government supported this concept and the Wireless Telegraphy Bill 
was one of the first Bills published by the new government. The main areas of 
debate centered on the rights of existing users, and the extensive powers being 
devolved to the Secretary of State that would allow him or her to decide on radio 
spectrum auctions, and radio spectrum pricing. It is interesting to note that the 
debate did not discuss the institutional arrangements of the Radio 
Communication Agency status as an executive agency. This was the first 
opportunity for Parliament to assess the powers delegated to the Secretary of 
State and, prior to the 1998 Act, the Radio Communications Agency had the 
power to set administrative fees which essentially covered their costs of issuing 
licences. Under the proposed legislation the agency could recognise the economic 
value of radio spectrum and charge above costs for these fees. It also proposed 
that the Secretary of State could set fees via auctions which could raise 
significant sums for the UK Treasury.  The Conservative opposition contribution 
to the debate did not focus on the power of the agency or the role of the Secretary 
of State. The Conservative opposition argued that the change to economic 
charging for radio spectrum was a tax on business. In fact the demands from 
industry that the legislation may to a broader remit for the Radio 
Communications Agency were addressed by the Minister during the debate on 
the Act when he agreed to set up an advisory committee: 
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‘We recognise that there are enormous resources of knowledge, expertise 
and experience in the radio industry. It is to everyone's advantage that we 
draw upon them in getting the Bill right…The decision to set up the 
spectrum management advisory group, together with the Bill's provisions 
and the agency's commitment to consultation, should demonstrate beyond 
any doubt our total commitment to ensuring that the interests of users are 
placed at the heart of policy making in this area’ (Mr. Battle, 29/10/97, 
col.932, House of Commons) 
     
Institutionally, it appears from the debate that there was widespread support for 
the central role played by the Secretary of State in directing not only radio 
spectrum policy but also the role of the Radio Communications Agency as the 
expert administrative group under the direct control of the Secretary of State.  
 
The approach adopted by both Conservative and Labour governments to radio 
spectrum reflects the debate in earlier chapters in relation to decisions by 
governments to delegate in areas of complexity. The notion that governments 
delegate powers to independent agencies in areas where there is increasing policy 
complexity was discussed in the literature review and will emerge in other case 
studies. In this case a motivation to create the telecommunications regulator was 
to address the complexity of managing a liberalised market and in the case of 
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radio spectrum increasingly complex spectrum licensing, commercialisation and 
allocation. Interviewees confirmed that the Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act was 
not about institutional arrangements for radio spectrum but rather to pave the way 
for future spectrum auctions which would raise large sums of money for the 
Treasury. The future direction where UK telecommunications policy was 
heading, particularly in relation to institutional solutions, was raised once in the 
debate in the Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act, where it was proposed: 
 
‘I hope that my hon. Friends the Ministers will consider a small 
suggestion. There is a plethora of regulators in broadcasting and 
communication. In the past we advocated rationalisation, and I believe 
that the system that is proposed--in addition to the advisory committee, 
which I welcome--might work better, allocating licences on a qualitative 
assessment of bids, if it were made part of the remit of an external 
regulator, such as the Ofcom that was proposed to replace the Office of 
telecommunications. Ministers might care to consider that in detail. The 
provisions in clause 4 give the Secretary of State the power to do 
something along those lines, should she wish. I certainly hope that it will 
be given careful consideration’ (Dr Moonie, 29/10/97, col.953, House of 
Commons) 
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It could be argued that the new Labour government, despite having a 
commitment to a converged independent regulator included in their 1997 election 
manifesto, considered it too early to suggest institutional solutions in 1998 and 
were more focused on the economic value which could be gained from radio 
spectrum.  
 
The Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act is important to consider in two respects. 
Firstly, it was an opportunity to consider the functional structure of the agency as 
it would be responsible for the management of radio spectrum that was 
universally agreed would be more valuable. Secondly, because the provisions in 
the 1998 Act, which allowed the Secretary to State to decide, not only the policy 
in relation to radio spectrum, but also allowed the Secretary to State to decide on 
the mechanism to allocate spectrum, was a provision debated at length in the later 
Communications (2003) Act. The radio spectrum auction for next generation 
‘3G’ radio spectrum, which was held just after the passing of the Wireless 
Telegraphy (1998) Act, raised £22.5billion for the Treasury and the powers 
delegated to the Secretary of State were therefore given more scrutiny. 
 
What is clear from the creation of the Radio Communications Agency through to 
the Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act is that radio spectrum was considered a 
natural resource by the government. As we see in the UK and in the cases to 
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follow, radio spectrum management is not delegated to independent agencies in 
cases where policy actors believe they need to retain control over the financial 
rewards which result from the allocation of radio spectrum licences. The 
increasing commercial value of the radio spectrum was being recognised in the 
1998 legislation and it is clear from the contributions to the debate on the 1998 
legislation that the Labour government was considering institutional change; 
however, this change was an evolution of the existing agencies into a more 
converged structure.  
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TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION AND THE CREATION OF 
OFCOM 
Chronologically the next major legislative event after the Wireless Telegraphy 
(1998) Act was the creation of Ofcom. This section will first examine the debate 
surrounding the converged regulator and specifically the White Papers published 
by the Labour Government in its first term of office. It will also examine the 
debate surrounding the radio spectrum role within a converged regulator. This is 
particularly influenced by the radio spectrum auctions which netted significant 
revenue for the Treasury in 2000. Secondly, the section will examine the pre-
legislative scrutiny which was a particular feature of the legislative process for 
the Communications (2003) Act. Finally, it will assess the delegated powers of 
Ofcom and the radio spectrum provisions of the Communications Act and assess 
these considering the criteria identified in the literature on delegation. 
 
As discussed above Oftel had operated a ‘duopoly policy’ which allowed limited 
competition to British Telecom from only one operator, Mercury. Oftel’s remit 
was broadened in the early 1990s when the market was opened further and other 
telecommunications operators were allowed to compete with British Telecom. 
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The convergence of services to consumers, encompassing both traditional 
telecoms and broadcasting companies, led to the view that a single regulatory 
authority was required to manage the markets covered by electronic 
communications. Such changes were also driven by changes in European 
legislation as telecommunications markets were liberalised across the EU. There 
was also tension between the agencies and duplication of activity. These factors 
increased the calls for a converged regulator12. 
 
The UK’s institutional approach to independent regulation, prior to the debate on 
the single regulator, had been to create non-Ministerial departments generally 
staffed by civil servants but with the power and authority held by a Director 
General. Oftel had a number of Director Generals, some of whom exercised 
significant independence from Ministerial authority. The personalising of 
regulation was a particularly UK innovation which was taken up by other 
countries. It has been argued:  
 
‘The statutory and media personalisation of the OF-Type DGs created an 
impression of regulatory monarchs who were masters of all they 
surveyed, and whose imperious whims could affect the fates of giant 
                                                 
12 Interview Dominic Morris, confirmed that conflict existing between Oftel and the ITC 
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corporations and millions of consumers’ (Hall, Scott, & Hood, 2000, p. 
61) 
 
The public profile and importance of such individuals should not be 
underestimated. On several occasions the Director General of Oftel, Dan 
Cruickshank, at the time of John Major’s government, threatened to resign if his 
proposals were not supported and such public resignations could have led to the 
fall of the government13. The cult of personality was a deliberate policy of civil 
servants when Oftel was created. The intention was to have a clear public image 
which could compete against the much larger resources of British Telecom.  
 
 
 
The converged regulator 
 
The review of the regulatory framework for communications was undertaken 
following the change of government in May 1997 and had been less radical than 
anticipated (Vass, 2001, p. 74). Government White Papers in the early years of 
the Labour government concentrated on modernising the regulatory framework 
with a clear focus on competition and consumers. One interviewee argued that 
                                                 
13 Interview with Dominic Morris 
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the Labour Party differed from the previous Conservative governments in that the 
Labour governments placed a greater importance on competition and competitive 
markets unlike the Conservative Governments who put the emphasis on 
companies ahead of markets and competition14. The process creating a converged 
regulator emphasised the importance of promoting competition and changes in 
industry structure and technological innovation. The pace however was 
evolutionary, as opposed to revolutionary. 
 
The thinking process behind the creation of Ofcom started in the mid 1990s with 
a number of policy papers. In May 1995 the Institute of Public Policy Research 
(IPPR) published ‘Regulating in the public interest; looking to the future’, in 
which recommendations were made on the most appropriate regulatory structure 
to match the changes in market structure identified in the policy paper: 
 
‘…the regulatory structure must adapt to match the industrial structure 
that it regulates and needs to regulate in future. Telecommunications and 
broadcasting transmission uses the same technology to do the same thing 
– to move bits of data from one place to another. Their infrastructures 
compete with and complement one another. All regulatory functions 
concerning the digital transmission of information – whether in oftel, the 
                                                 
14 Interview James Purnell 
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ITC or elsewhere – should be brought together in a single regulatory 
authority’. (Souter, p4, 1995) 
 
The paper foresaw the move to more digital networks; increasing convergence 
and investment as the key drivers in the sector. The perception, in the heat of the 
‘dot com’ explosion, was that digitalisation of telecommunications would create 
problems for the existing institutional structure. A converged regulator, with both 
of the telecommunications networks, media content and media regulators 
combined into one more effective agency, would more efficiently manage the 
converged marketplace. The proposals at this stage however did not extend to the 
regulation of content services. Where the regulation of transmission networks 
was economic, content delivered on these networks was social and therefore 
should be regulated separately. 
 
A further contribution to the debate was made a year later in 1996 when Murroni, 
Collins and Coote published ‘Converging Communications: Policies for the 21st 
Century’. The authors argued that the media and communications sector was 
governed by too many regulators, fourteen in total and with overlapping 
responsibilities. The authors noted that the situation concerning conditional 
access requirements in broadcasting were covered by both the Independent 
Television Commission and by Oftel. The authors believed two changes to the 
 158 
 
 
current regulatory framework were required. Firstly, a set of regulatory principles 
needed to be applied to regulation in the future and secondly, there needed to be a 
rationalisation of the regulators covering the media and communications sectors. 
The authors argued: 
 
‘We propose that the confusing and wasteful plurality of regulators in the 
UK be reduced to a single statutory regulator in charge of both content 
and carriage matters. For our purposes we call this OFCOM. Although 
content regulation and the regulation of markets are different tasks, they 
are necessarily best done by separate bodies.’ (Murroni, Collins, & 
Coote, 1996, p. 52) 
 
These policy papers should not be underestimated in terms of their impact on 
Labour Party policy. The proposals argued that convergence would undermine 
the separation of regulators and the Labour Party manifesto in 1997 did 
recommend a single regulatory agency in response to convergence. The IPPR 
policy papers were supported by a number of influential people like Chris Smith 
MP, Patricia Hewitt MP and James Purnell MP who went on to be Ministers 
and/or advisors in the first and second Labour Governments. The proposal to 
have a single regulatory authority was also raised in the business manifesto of the 
Labour Party published in 2000, prior to the 2001 general election. The 
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arguments made in the policy papers are cited again as the reasons for the 
converged regulator. At the end of the first term of the Labour government, the 
Department of Trade and Industry published the Communications White Paper, 
titled ‘A new future for Communications’. The paper proposed the converged 
regulator and is recognised as the start of the process which led to the creation of 
Ofcom and the Communications Act in 2003. 
 
Communications White Paper: A new future for Communications 
 
The start of the legislative process to create Ofcom was the White Paper, ‘A New 
Future for Communications’ published at the height of the dotcom boom in 
December 2000. The extent of the remit of the White Paper is indicated by the 
fact that two government departments, the Department for Trade and Industry 
and the Department of State for Culture, Media and Sport were sponsors. The 
paper is filled with excessive hyperbole and government objectives for the sector. 
One of the government objectives states: 
 
‘We want to unleash the potential for these convergent communications 
technologies to extend choice, deepen democracy, enrich entertainment 
and enable learning’ (Department of Trade and Industry & Department 
of Culture Media and Sport, 2000, p. 10) 
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The growth of digital television and increasing blurring between the markets 
regulated by the number of content, telecoms and media regulators is the main 
motivation for converging with the regulator. The White Paper argues: 
 
‘Reform to bring together the existing regulators more closely would be a 
second-best response. We need more radical measures. That is why the 
centerpiece of this White Paper is the creation of a single regulatory body 
for the communications and media industries – an Office of 
Communications (Ofcom)’ (Department of Trade and Industry & 
Department of Culture Media and Sport, 2000, p. 11) 
 
The White Paper proposed that Ofcom would be a unified regulator responsible 
for the communications sector. It proposed that the regulator was to be 
independent and act at arm’s length from the government, but will work closely 
with the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and other relevant departments. 
The paper argued that the new regulator needed to have delegated powers to act 
independently in response to fast-changing circumstances. Ofcom would be a 
body corporate with a chairman, board and a chief executive. 
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Table 10: Agencies merged to become 
Ofcom 
Agency Responsibility Type of Agency 
Oftel Regulation of the 
telecommunications 
industry 
Non-Ministerial 
Government 
Department 
Independent Television 
Commission (ITC) 
Licensing and regulation 
of all commercial TV 
services 
Statutory Corporation 
Radio Communications 
Agency 
Management of the non-
military radio spectrum in 
the UK 
Executive agency of 
the Department of 
Trade and Industry 
Radio Authority Licensing of all 
commercial radio stations 
Statutory Corporation 
Broadcasting Standards 
Commission 
Maintaining Standards and 
fairness in TV and Radio 
Broadcasting 
Non-departmental 
public body 
 
 
In relation to radio spectrum policies it was proposed in the White Paper that the 
Radio Authority, which dealt primarily with the licensing of broadcast radio, and 
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the Radio Communications Agency, would be merged with Ofcom. The rationale 
was explained as: 
 
‘the growing importance of decisions on spectrum assignment for the 
promotion of competition and economic growth makes it no longer 
sensible to separate the economic regulation of communications from the 
provision of spectrum’ (Department of Trade and Industry & Department 
of Culture Media and Sport, 2000, p. 21) 
 
The consultation process led to some disagreement about what should be merged, 
but according to the considered opinion at the time, ‘the overall decision to merge 
was not highly contentious’ (National Audit Office, 2006). David Hendon, during 
interviews, confirmed that the Radio Communications Agency was not 
supportive of the proposal to be part of the converged regulator but as a 
government agency the agency itself was prohibited from responding publicly to 
the consultation process. David Hendon argued in private with Ministers that the 
Radio Communications Agency had a specialised expertise. He argued, with new 
enhanced powers delegated via the Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act, it was not 
the right time to merge them with other agencies. He argued that the agency was 
a world leader and would be subsumed within a larger organisation. Other 
interviewees confirmed that there was resistance to merging the radio spectrum 
 163 
 
 
agency within the wider Ofcom. James Purnell argued that there was no rational 
reason to exclude it from the converged regulator. If the objectives of the 
converged regulator were to reflect the changing market circumstances, then it 
did not make sense to have businesses approach several agencies before they 
could launch a service. David Hendon cited an example of this confusion when 
he referred to the creation of a new satellite channel, Info-TV, which was 
required to get approval from several agencies prior to its launch. A further factor 
which militated against the Radio Communications Agency going alone was the 
view that the agency’s culture was not appropriate to a market based approach. 
One interviewee, David Cleevley, argued that there had been little cultural 
change in the agency. He argued that Jim Norton as Chief Executive had started 
on the road to reform the agency and to modernise, but had got 10 miles in a 
1,000 mile journey. He argued that there was a perception that the people in the 
Radio Communications Agency did uninteresting jobs and were ‘pipe-smoking 
tweed jacket’ people who would be redundant in the future as the newly opened 
market would allocate radio spectrum without the need for an agency. 
 
The perception that the market would in the short term remove the need for any 
regulation of radio spectrum was a popular view at the time and was reinforced 
by the sale of mobile spectrum licences and a growing belief that radio spectrum 
management could be managed by the market. In March 2001, the Treasury and 
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the Department of Trade and Industry commissioned Professor Martin Cave to 
review the future of radio spectrum management. The review was conducted 
against the backdrop of the review of communications policy discussed in the 
White Paper, ‘A New Future for Communications’ published in December 2000. 
The policy document was published following the auctioning of valuable radio 
spectrum licences used for advanced mobile telephony. These licences raised 
£22.5billion for the government and also raised expectations in government that 
radio spectrum licences would be a new source of revenue for government. The 
review conclusions, published a year later in March 2002, proposed that a more 
market based approach should be adopted for the management of radio spectrum. 
The argument made by Professor Cave was that spectrum was becoming 
commercialised and the existing regulation needed to be rowed back to allow 
companies to trade spectrum. The review concluded that there was a reduced role 
for regulation in the short to medium term, ‘in the long run the move to spectrum 
trading would lead to a reduction in work associated with designing, pricing and 
monitoring some spectrum licences’ (Cave, 2002, p. 33) 
 
The review did make a number of recommendations on the respective roles of 
Ministers and the proposed converged regulator, Ofcom. The review proposed: 
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‘In addition to clarifying the objectives of Ofcom with regard to spectrum 
management, the Communications Bill should establish clearly the 
dividing line between Ofcom’s independence in spectrum matters and the 
continuing role for Ministers in giving Ofcom political direction’ (Cave, 
2002, p. 14) 
 
Professor Cave’s review did recognise the role of government in strategic 
decisions in relation to both commercial and non-commercial spectrum and it 
was appropriate for the government in the forthcoming Communications Act to 
provide for some power of direction over Ofcom to ensure such strategic 
oversight, however, Professor Cave concluded: 
 
‘…it should not be necessary for Ministers to take further powers to 
direct Ofcom in the specifics of its spectrum assignment, licensing and 
charging activities. This could risk undermining the regulatory 
independence of Ofcom in carrying out its well defined remit, potentially 
creating uncertainty in the market about the stability and direction of 
spectrum regulation….As with other spheres of economic activity, the 
review considers that the government should aim to bolster the 
independence of the statutory spectrum regulator and reduce Ministerial 
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involvement in the detail of specific regulatory decisions’ (Cave, 2002, p. 
15) 
 
The respective duties of regulator and Minister in relation to radio spectrum were 
debated further when the draft Communications Bill was discussed by the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee reviewing the proposed legislation. It is important, 
therefore, to consider the deliberations of the Joint Committee as they examined 
in detail the draft Communications Bill and discussed these issues with a number 
of stakeholders. 
 
Pre-Legislative Scrutiny - the Puttnam Committee 
 
The idea of pre-legislative scrutiny was a relatively new idea which allowed more 
time for Members of Parliament, and the general public, through public session 
of committees, to contribute to the detail of major pieces of legislation. The 
government published the draft Communications Bill in May 2002, following 
consultations on the White Paper and the general election in 2001. The 
government indicated its desire to have a Joint Committee examine the 
Communications Bill in April 2002 and a committee chaired by Lord Puttnam 
was formed and met first on the 9th May 2002, two days after the publication of 
the Draft Communications Act. The government had decided to publish and 
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enact a smaller Office of Communications Bill in 2002 which was to create the 
legal entity and the establishment of Ofcom to allow for the transition proposed 
in the Communications Act. David Hendon confirmed that the reasons for the 
pre-legislative scrutiny were as much to keep the focus on the Bill during the 
summer recess. The Bill was so long and complex it was believed it could not get 
through both Houses of Commons and Lords in the session prior to the summer 
2002 recess. The pre-legislative scrutiny was important to retain a focus on the 
Bill, and try to resolve some of the more contentious issues before getting it into 
the Parliamentary debates. 
 
The Communications Act covered a wide range of activities and touched on 
several key policy areas for government, only one of which was the convergence 
of the regulators. The Bill had 259 clauses and 13 schedules and covered areas 
like the governance of the BBC, cross media ownership and issues of content 
regulation. The Joint committee met from May 2002 to July 2002 and published 
their report on the 22 July 2002 (Joint Committee on the Draft communications 
bill report, HL paper 169-I, HC 876-1, session 2001-02). 
 
The Committee heard evidence from the legacy regulators, the sectoral operators 
and the ministers responsible for the legislation. The Committee commissioned 
reports on various aspects of the legislation, including a report on radio spectrum. 
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The expert report on radio spectrum received by the Committee, written by Peter 
Kiddle, on radio spectrum gives a view very similar to the view which was being 
expressed privately by the Radio Communications Agency. The final comments 
of the Kiddle report are worth quoting in detail: 
 
‘Radio spectrum issues, frequency allocations and appropriate technical 
requirements of licences are at present dealt with by the RA (radio 
Communications Agency). The RA would appear to be the odd spoke in 
the OFCOM wheel as primarily being a technical and engineering 
organisation including the necessary technical research capability to 
support these functions. Additionally they are the only one of the 
regulators which is a Government Agency with wide powers and as such, 
represents Government on spectrum and standards issues in the 
International fora, being the UK signatory to many International 
agreements. They also have significant enforcement powers and 
applications for search warrants and powers of seizure of apparatus may 
be more relevant to Government than OFCOM.  
The committee may therefore wish to consider that OFCOM, considered 
by many to be primarily the regulator for the entire broadcast and media 
sector, would be more focussed and possibly stronger without the 
addition of the RA which would remain a government agency with only 
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those staff associated with broadcast/media being integrated into 
OFCOM. The RA would of necessity, provide the appropriate technical 
and spectrum support to OFCOM, whilst itself concentrating on the 
major issues of spectrum efficiency, Interference management and 
International and European spectrum and standards harmonisation for 
the future. It is also worthy of consideration that the relationships and 
trust established over several decades by the RA not only in the UK but 
within Europe and the rest of the world with their equivalent Government 
bodies may take considerable time to re-establish by the much wider 
regulatory and non governmental OFCOM organisation’ (Report of the 
Joint committee on draft communications bill, annex 8 Kiddle report.). 
 
This proposal from Kiddle mirrors proposals which one interviewee, David 
Hendon, said were discussed during the negotiations of the Bill. It was proposed 
that only those staff dealing with broadcasting and telecommunications issues 
would move into Ofcom. However, David Hendon believed that this represented 
the core of the agency staff and the decision was one of status quo or complete 
assimilation. Hendon said there was strong pressure from Downing Street for an 
independent regulator15. 
                                                 
15 Interview David Hendon, CEO of the Radio Communications Agency at the time of the review. David 
Hendon at the time of Joint Committee deliberations was in fact in charge of the ‘Bill Team’, a team of 
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Most of the contentious issues with the legacy regulators were resolved prior to 
the Joint Committee. When Mike Goddard, the Chief Executive of the Radio 
Communications Agency, who succeeded David Hendon in 2002, appeared in 
front of the committee he was asked for his views on the merging of the Agency 
with Ofcom: 
 
‘…radio spectrum is at the heart of the communications revolution. 
Putting spectrum management at the heart of OFCOM will provide a 
more effective regulatory regime and create conditions conducive to the 
success of the communications sector, which is so important to future 
prosperity and social goals. I look forward to OFCOM continuing and 
building on the Agency's achievements in managing the radio spectrum to 
foster a successful and competitive economy and enhance quality of life’ 
(Mike Goddard, Joint Committee on Draft Communications Bill, 
proceedings from the committee, 27/5/02) 
 
The Committee members were expecting a least some resistance or complaint, 
the Committee in replying to Mr. Goddard said: 
                                                                                                                                  
officials supporting the committee on the detail of the legislation. David Hendon was succeeded by Mike 
Goddard. 
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‘..you are the fifth regulator that has told us that you are happy with the 
Bill, that you are happy with the powers and that you are happy with the 
staff that you are going to be given under this, and yet this is a Bill that 
the Government tells us is going to be lighter of touch, slimmer, etcetera. 
Do you not think we should start smelling a rat somehow about this Bill?’ 
(Lord Mc Nally, Ibid, 27/5/02) 
 
The committee did quiz the legacy regulators and the politicians, on the detailed 
provisions of the Bill. Lord McNally was concerned that with Ofcom responsible 
for telecoms and spectrum that issues related to radio spectrum would be 
marginalised and become a Friday afternoon job. Tony Stoller, Chief Executive 
of the Radio Authority, argued: 
 
‘OFCOM will have telecoms and spectrum management, so we are 
worried it might not be a Friday afternoon job so much as a going-down-
the-lift-at-the-end-of-Friday-evening job!’ (Tony Stoller, Ibid, 27/5/02) 
 
David Edmonds, Director General of Oftel, restated his support for the Bill on the 
basis that it emphasised Ofcom as an independent regulator but in relation to 
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radio spectrum he was concerned about the powers retained by the Secretary of 
State: 
 
‘I think in allocation of spectrum I do have some doubts. I think you have 
said what are the pros? The pros are the allocation of spectrum that can 
be perceived to be industrial policy in that sense rather than regulation, 
therefore the Secretary of State is retaining a power I can see the 
justification for. On the other hand, were I the Secretary of State I would 
be worried that I would be subject to lobbying from interest groups from 
different directions and I am not sure I would want that’ (David 
Edmonds, Ibid, 27/5/02) 
 
The Spectrum Management Advisory Group (SMAG) created under the 1998 
Wireless Telegraphy Act also expressed concern that advisory committees to 
Ministers were not mentioned in the Act: 
 
‘ ..SMAG feels strongly that there is a need for clarity in the respective 
roles of Ministers, OFCOM, and various Advisory Committees. There are 
a number of potentially conflicting issues that emerge in the Bill, such as 
the indication that Ministers wish to retain powers of intervention in the 
allocation of spectrum, but wish to introduce spectrum trading which will 
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restrict those powers’ (Memorandum submitted by SMAG, Ibid, 
discussed 10/6/02) 
 
The Joint Committee also interviewed Professor Martin Cave and questioned him 
on the proposed powers delegated to the Secretary of State in relation to spectrum 
management. Professor Cave argued: 
 
‘My preference would be for a division of labour which put that 
particular aspect of the regulatory activity on the OFCOM side of the 
fence rather than the Secretary of State's side of the fence. I say that 
because I think it is essentially a sort of subordinate technical function 
rather than a strategic issue; and secondly, I think that in the long term 
the Secretary of State might be glad not to be intimately involved in what 
might be very difficult technical decisions for which he or she will be 
subject to a great deal of lobbying’ (Prof Martin Cave, Ibid, 10/6/02) 
 
The committee asked the Bill team, the supporting civil servants responsible for 
examining the provisions of the bill to the Committee, to explain the powers of 
the Secretary of State:  
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 ‘(Mr Green) There is a fairly strict test or hurdle for the Secretary of 
State to overcome before giving a direction. It is clearly not something 
that is done lightly or every day of the week. For example, it is necessary 
for the Secretary of State to go to Parliament and effectively get the 
direction confirmed; otherwise it ceases to have effect. So what the Bill 
tries to balance is the degree of intervention on the one hand by ministers 
on matters which are of wider public interest, with ensuring a degree of 
transparency and Parliamentary accountability’. 
 
Professor Cave was asked if his concerns over the oversight the Secretary of 
State were assuaged by the constraints placed on the political oversight. Professor 
Cave replied:   
 
‘On that footing, the thought comes to my mind that if the Secretary of 
State did not use the power then perhaps it might be better, in the 
interests of certainty, for the power not to be available to the Secretary of 
State’ (Mr. Green, bill team, Ibid, 10/6/02) 
 
The debate continued with an attempt to explain the oversight powers of the 
Secretary of State being required for reasons of policy and the public interest. Mr 
Green of the Bill team argues:   
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‘When one comes onto spectrum, I guess the question is the extent to 
which ministers need to be involved in the wider public interest, bearing 
in mind that, for example, the remit of OFCOM on spectrum management 
will go much wider than just telecommunications and broadcasting 
spheres, so across the broad spectrum… Then, there is a legitimate 
question, it seems to me, which is, are we saying, or should the 
Committee consider, that that is something that ministers should not be 
involved in at all, it should be left totally to the independent regulator? 
The other point of view is that this is a matter of major national strategic 
importance bearing various implications for public policy, and it is right 
that ministers should be allowed to become involved, subject, of course, 
to the Parliamentary accountability that I referred to earlier’ 
 
Professor Cave responded: 
 
‘I would certainly regard it as being appropriate for the Secretary of 
State, for example, to decide whether spectrum should be allocated to 
public service broadcasting or to a commercial use. I would regard that 
as being a decision which related to a key policy output, and that, in my 
view, is the appropriate sphere for Secretary of State decisions, whereas 
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the ways and means of conducting auctions—first-price auctions, second-
price auctions, things of that kind—seem to me to be something better 
done by the appropriate agency’ (Prof Cave, Ibid, 10/6/02) 
 
When the respective Ministers appeared before the committee, the committee 
members resumed the debate on the balance of powers retained by the Secretary 
of State and the independence of Ofcom. Patricia Hewitt MP replied: 
 
‘On the powers that are kept, as it were, the direction-making powers for 
the Secretary of State, those particularly apply to spectrum matters. I 
think the starting point here is just the recognition that radio spectrum is 
the raw material for the communications sector, and it is a hugely 
important and, as it happens, very valuable economic and social 
resource, and the decisions that we make about its management will have 
a huge impact on whether or not we achieve our aim of making Britain 
one of the world leaders, the most dynamic and competitive 
communications markets in the world’ (Patricia Hewitt MP, Ibid, 8/7/02)  
 
The decision was taken that Ministers ought to be able to intervene on grounds of 
national security, public safety and health, and international relations. Patricia 
Hewitt MP argued that there were wider public interest considerations which 
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would lead Ministers to set the strategic allocation of radio spectrum. Patricia 
Hewlett concludes: 
 
‘I really cannot imagine that we or any government would want to leave 
the decision on switching off analogue television to an independent 
regulator. It seems to me that is a decision that ought to be made by 
ministers, and ministers should be held accountable for it…I think our 
view at this point is that it can be very difficult to separate the strategic 
decisions from the management specifics, and certainly if one thinks 
about 3rd generation mobile spectrum, the decision whether or not to 
have a 5th licence, which from one point of view is a specific of spectrum 
management, was a hugely important issue that will actually determine 
how competitive the market is’  (Patricia Hewitt, Ibid, 8/7/02) 
 
David Hendon confirmed this was the view of officials in the Ministry and the 
Radio Communications Agency. Specifically, the issue of the use of radio 
spectrum available in the market as a result of the switch from analogue 
broadcasting to digital broadcasting, which was argued to be a decision for 
Ministers not for the regulator. The Minister was questioned on her role vis-à-vis 
the independent regulator and the policy framework and asked whether she could 
resist getting on the backs of the regulator. Patricia Hewitt replied: 
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‘There is a huge range of decisions here that will be entirely matters for 
OFCOM, and OFCOM will have to make the judgement within its 
statutory duties, and it will be accountable to Parliament for those 
decisions. Once we have established an independent regulator or a 
regulator with a very significant degree of independence, then I am very 
clear that the role of ministers is to be a robust defender of that policy 
framework, … But I think in the narrower but nonetheless very important 
area of spectrum, the first thing we have to do is decide where we set that 
boundary. Having set it, I am very clear that any Ministerial direction 
would have to be published. In the case of the direction of spectrum 
management, it would have to be confirmed by Parliament with an 
affirmative resolution procedure. We would have to be able justify it to 
Parliament and persuade both Houses that it was the right thing to do. It 
is not something either of us would envisage using, particularly routinely’ 
(Ibid, 8/7/02) 
  
 The debate above was concluded with the Joint Committee’s final report where 
they seem to accept the Secretary of State legitimate need to be involved in 
policy formulation: 
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‘there is a wider public interest in the allocation, assignment and 
management of spectrum that OFCOM, even with its duty to further the 
interests of all citizens in its optimal use, may not be best placed to 
judge’. (Joint committee response, HL 169-I, HC 876-I) 
 
In their reply to the Joint Committee’s recommendations the Department of 
Trade and Industry agreed: 
 
‘to meet the concerns of the committee and the independent review, we 
intend to amend the Bill to require approval by Parliament of directions 
under the clause to be prospective instead of retrospective except in the 
case of urgency. In addition, we propose to add a requirement that the 
Secretary of State should consult OFCOM and other stakeholders before 
giving a direction except in case of urgency’. (Department of Trade and 
Industry, 2002) 
 
In the final version of the Communications Act the provisions remained 
unchanged and the Secretary of State, albeit with Parliamentary oversight, has the 
power to intervene and allocate spectrum in the public interest.  
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The exchange above, quoted at length, is vital to our understanding of the powers 
delegated to independent agencies. There is an acceptance that Parliament or 
policy actors have a policy role in terms of communications strategy. The 
solution in the Communications Act for radio spectrum was ex-ante controls 
which restricted Ofcom’s discretion in terms of allocation of radio spectrum. The 
non-functional reasons discussed in chapter 1 accepted that credibility is a key 
driver creating independent agencies. They suggest that policy actors would 
delegate decision making powers but would impose ex-ante or ex-post controls to 
address the risk that agents may not reflect the preferences of principals. The 
controls placed in the legislation reflect this principal-agent relationship and 
confirm Gilardi’s (2007) view that the ally principle cannot always be assumed in 
decisions to delegate to independent agencies. The decision to allocate radio 
spectrum is complex and requires expertise therefore the need for Ofcom, without 
interference from Ministers, to decide on allocation. There is a need for the 
Secretary of State to protect the public interest and ensure the potential revenue 
from radio spectrum allocations are maximised. The Communications Act 
recognises this need to retain some ex-ante control on allocation, albeit limited. 
In situations where there is market opening, policy actors want to ensure 
investors, and those operating businesses in these newly owned markets, that the 
market will operate free from political interference. However, the discussion 
above highlights that in certain cases the delegation is tempered by the view that 
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the radio spectrum asset is valuable and political expediency requires the 
Secretary of State not to have forgone the opportunity to intervene and ensure the 
maximum benefit for the government. The Secretary of State does not want to be 
blamed for letting go of the opportunity to generate public funds by delegating 
authority completely to an independent regulator16 
 
The Communications Act, having been scrutinised in the Joint Committee, did 
address many of the contentious issues which made the debate in the Commons 
generally non-contentious in terms of controversial issues to be raised. 
 
 
 
Communications (2003) Act 
 
The Communications (2003) Act gives effect to the reforms set out in the 
Communications White Paper and gave effect to the functions and duties of the 
Office of Communications (Ofcom) which combines the activities of a number of 
previously separate agencies. The agencies remit covers broadcasting, 
telecommunications and radio spectrum. In the debate on the Act in the House of 
                                                 
16 Interviews with David Hendon confirmed this view. He lobbied for this power to be retained by the Minster 
on the basis of the risk of future spectrum auctions not being controlled by Ministers. 
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Commons, e-commerce Minister Stephen Timms MP, summed up the rational 
thinking behind the converged regulator: 
 
‘Higher capabilities of mobiles, rapid take-up of broadband, growing use 
of wireless for fixed communications and the spread of digital television 
are all blurring the old distinctions. Bringing the Regulators together is, 
therefore, clearly the right action…What is important, however, is that 
those who make judgments about how these matters should be regulated, 
will be in one place rather than in different agencies. Increasingly, more 
than one of those regulators has had to get involved in a particular case. 
Ofcom will be the place where these decisions are made, which is clearly 
a big improvement’ (Stephen Timms MP, col 852, 3/12/02, House of 
Commons) 
 
 
Ofcom had in fact been created in the Office of Communications 2002 Act, 
which was paving legislation to create Ofcom and allow it to exist prior to the 
Communications Act being adopted. The 2002 Act is important as it sets out the 
structure of Ofcom. Essentially Ofcom is a Board whose members shall not be 
less than three and not more than six. The size of the Board and the appointment 
of the Chairman shall be by the Secretary of State. Executive members can be 
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appointed and a Chief Executive Officer position is established, who will be part 
of the Ofcom Board. The Chief Executive is appointed by the Chairman with the 
approval of the Secretary of State. The executive members shall not exceed the 
non-executive directors. Section 9 of the Act states that Ofcom is not a body 
exercising functions on behalf of the Crown and no person by reason of 
employment or membership of Ofcom can be considered a servant of the Crown. 
In a majority of cases in the legacy regulators the employees were considered 
civil servants and servants of the Crown. This is especially the case for the Radio 
Communications Agency.  The Ofcom board can appoint ‘such other employees 
as they may determine and make other such arrangements for the staffing of 
OFCOM as they think fit’ (Office of Communications Act, 2002) 
 
In terms of finances, Ofcom cannot borrow money unless authorised to do so by 
the Secretary of State, and it is its duty to ensure their revenue matches its costs. 
Any surplus will be allocated in a manner the Secretary of State, after consulting 
Ofcom, may direct. Ofcom have obligations to publish an annual report and to 
have accounts audited by Comptroller and Auditor General. In terms of the 
institutional independence of Ofcom, compared to other European 
telecommunications regulators, scores mid-range in various studies discussed in 
earlier chapters. Ofcom is more independent than the regulators it converged 
with. This is mainly by virtue of its freedom to hire employees under contracts 
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which are not subject to civil service contracts. Interestingly, the Secretary of 
State did not impose a cap on staff levels at Ofcom, which may have been 
difficult and unwise considering the merging of existing regulators. It was the 
case that the aggregate headcount of all the legacy regulators was higher than the 
Ofcom headcount and savings were made as a result of the merger. 
 
The independence of the Ofcom board is the main area where institutional 
political oversight is most evident. The appointment of the chairman and a 
majority of the directors would ensure some degree of control over the institution 
and may have been justified in the context of the wide media remit of Ofcom. 
One interviewee, James Purnell, commented that Ofcom as an institution was 
useful to the government. He argued it would be inappropriate for the 
Government to criticise aspects of ITV’s content, but perfectly acceptable for the 
regulator to tackle such an issue. The role of chairman and the appointment of 
Lord Currie as the first Chairman of Ofcom, raised a number of concerns about 
Ofcom’s independence. In the House of Commons debate on the 
Communications Bill, one MP commented: 
 
‘I believe that Lord Currie has a very good reputation, and I have no 
personal criticism of him whatsoever, but I consider it a very great pity 
that so many key appointments in the Government's gift go to known 
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Government supporters. It is no surprise that there is an issue of Tony's 
cronies, in which connection we might just mention the BBC, where the 
chairman, the director-general and the political editor are all known 
Government supporters. This is a very serious issue about impartiality, 
but Labour Members just sit there and laugh (Mr Robathan, 3/12/02, col 
850, House of Commons) 
 
Ofcom’s duties and functions relate to its functional independence. The issue of 
Ofcom’s operational independence in relation to radio spectrum is discussed later 
however in terms of a general overview of Ofcom it is clear the Communications 
(2003) Act sets out broad functions and corresponding duties on Ofcom, some of 
which mitigate independence. Ofcom, like most telecommunications regulators, 
have an obligation to promote the interests of consumers and promote 
competition. All of the functions and duties of the legacy regulators have also 
been transferred as part of the Communications (2003) Act. The Act also requires 
Ofcom to create regional offices and to create a number of boards, the 
composition and activity of which are detailed in the Act. Ofcom are obliged to 
create a consumer panel, a content board and an elderly and disabled people’s 
advisory committee. In most cases the membership of these groups is within the 
remit of Ofcom, with certain conditions on suitably experienced participants. In 
most cases the groups advise Ofcom or advise the consumer panel. The consumer 
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panel is more important in that the membership is subject to approval by the 
Secretary of State and the panel is obliged to report on their activities annually 
and Ofcom is obliged to publicly explain its actions where it differs from the 
advice of the consumer panel. 
 
Functionally there are further accountability and ex-ante controls to ensure 
Ofcom is held to account for its activities. All of Ofcom’s decisions have to be 
transparent, accountable and proportionate. There is an obligation to prepare 
impact assessments and regular reviews of regulatory burdens. Ofcom is obliged 
to set promptness standards with an oversight from the Secretary of State and to 
actively promote media literacy. The cumulative effect of these provisions is to 
provide a network of safeguards, both ex-ante and ex-post, which will ensure 
accountability, and limit the independence of the regulator.  
 
In the House of Commons the debate concentrated on regulating the BBC and 
Ofcom’s role in relation to the BBC. There was also interest in cross media 
ownership and particularly in the ownership of ITV. There were more parochial 
issues discussed particularly regional representations on the various committees 
to be created under the Communications Act and managed by Ofcom. There was 
cross party support for the idea of a converged regulator. Individual legacy 
regulators were criticised as ineffective.  
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The key powers of the Radio Communication Agency are conferred on Ofcom 
automatically. These principally refer to powers of assignment, to issue licences 
and to raise fees. The 2003 Act obliges Ofcom to give advice, conduct research 
and maintain records in relation to radio spectrum. Ofcom are also obliged to 
manage the radio spectrum by assessing demand for future radio spectrum and to 
publish a UK Plan for Frequency Authorisation. Under section 156 the Secretary 
of State may issue directions relating to radio spectrum. The Secretary of State is 
retaining the powers to allocate certain bands, under auction conditions and at 
whatever fees the Secretary of State sees fit. Interviewees considered it 
appropriate that the Secretary of State had reserve powers. James Purnell, 
although disliking the concept of interference with the independence of Ofcom, 
said these provisions were necessary to ensure the policy objectives of 
government were respected. This provision reflects the debate surrounding the 
third generation mobile licences which generated significant windfalls for the 
Treasury.  
 
The sum of the Communications (2003) Act and the earlier Ofcom (2002) Act 
was a regulator which was more independent than the legacy regulators which 
preceded it. The independence of Ofcom in terms of its funding, and its ability to 
resource itself, were constrained through the provisions which allow the 
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Secretary of State to make key appointments and in the Secretary of State role in 
the consumer panel. These ex-ante provisions are generally not measured in an 
analysis of independence and therefore, although Ofcom is independent, it is still 
not as independent as other regulators across the EU despite the fact the Ofcom 
remit is broad and the market has been liberalised for some time. 
 
Based on the Parliamentary debates and the supporting interviews there appears 
in the UK an acceptance of the role of the Secretary of State in key policy 
decisions, such as radio spectrum. This is consistent with the example in Ireland 
where policy directions are allowed under the Communications Regulation 
(2002) Act to ensure policy objectives of government are supported by regulatory 
actions. The UK, however, goes further, particularly in relation to radio spectrum 
and the consumer panel, which allow interventions by policy actors in the 
operational management of the regulator. In the Parliamentary debates there was 
little comment on these issues. In fact one can point to a number of references in 
the debate where the MPs questioned whether the Secretary of State had enough 
oversight.17 The only critical examination of the power delegated to Ofcom was 
on radio spectrum in the Puttnam Committee, where, despite some tough 
questioning, the Secretary of State retained the power to intervene.  
                                                 
17 Rev Martin Smith questioned the Secretary of State should have more oversight on Broadband, Nick Harvey 
also suggested that the Consumer panel should be appointed by the Secretary of State 
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The provision allowing the Secretary of State to intervene in certain allocations 
of spectrum was as much the legacy of the 3G mobile spectrum auctions referred 
to above, which showed the government the economic value of radio spectrum 
and ensured that the Secretary of State would not delegate her scope to raise for 
the Treasury large sums of revenue from the spectrum auctions of the future.  
 
In earlier chapters it was discussed how important political leadership was in 
deciding to create an independent regulator so it is important to consider the role 
of political leadership and tradition in the UK and assess whether these were 
factors in the creation of independent regulatory authorities. It is also important to 
assess other non-functional factors raised in the literature.   
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NON-FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF DELEGATION IN THE UK 
The evidence presented in the earlier chapters argued that there were a range of 
non-functional reasons explaining variations in the level of independence to 
agencies. Political leadership and tradition were important factors to consider in 
the decisions to create independent regulators (Thatcher, 2002b). It is argued by 
Thatcher that in the UK, since the election of the Margaret Thatcher MP 
government in 1979, there has been clear political leadership to promote market 
liberalisation and promote small government which has been an impetus to the 
creation of independent regulators. The UK was the first to privatise utility 
sectors, not only in telecommunications but in energy and transport. McLean 
(2004) argues that there were three phases to the Margaret Thatcher governments, 
each roughly covering the length of a Parliament. McLean argues privatisation 
took centre stage after the 1983 General Election. He argues that privatisation 
was not promoted in terms of economic efficiency but rather by the need to open 
markets to competition. McLean argues that there were better economic 
arguments for privatisation which followed the 1987 General Election when 
railways, electricity and coal were privatised. 
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Table 11: Principal UK 
Privatisations 1983-87  
Company Gross Proceeds of sale, 
£ml 
Date of Share offer 
British Telecom 3916 3/12/84 
British Aerospace 550 14/5/84 
Cable & Wireless 602 13/12/85 
TSB 1360 10/10/86 
British Gas 5603 8/12/86 
British Airways 900 11/2/87 
Rolls-Royce 1360 20/5/87 
Source: McLean (2004), p61 
 
The issue is not the privatisations themselves but the extent of the programme 
which required an agency to monitor the emerging market. The regulator’s main 
function was to control the prices of the privatised company. The key issue was 
that the UK government created separate agencies to perform these tasks. 
 
This philosophy was not initially supported by the Labour opposition, but 
successive Labour governments since assuming power in 1997 have not 
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overturned the privatisation trend. Speaking in the debate on Ofcom, one 
Conservative member said: 
 
‘I have served in the House for a number of years, and I have been a 
member of Committees that scrutinised Bills that created XOfthis", 
XOfthat" and XOf-the-other"—I have not regretted scrutinising any of 
those Bills, particularly the one on XOf-the other". The particular matters 
that came before us encountered resistance from the Labour party, but as 
time has gone on, all those bodies have been welcomed and have come to 
be regarded as good things. They have gone from strength to strength’ 
(Richard Page MP, 3/12/02, Col.816, Commons).  
 
Vass (2001) argues: 
 
‘The strength of the underlying regulatory framework in the UK 
regulatory system has been demonstrated, by the continuity of policy  
between the Conservative administrations  over  the 1979-97 and the new 
Labour government elected in May 1997’ (Vass, 2001) 
 
The history of privatisations shows that the UK was a policy leader on 
privatisations and the creation of regulatory bodies and this would explain to 
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some extent the factors which led to the creation of Oftel in 1984. However, 
Oftel, as a non-Ministerial agency, was not as independent as its successor, 
Ofcom. For example, employees of Oftel retained civil service status. Also the 
remit of Oftel was limited even in terms of telecommunications. During the first 
phase of market liberalisation, Oftel operated a ‘duopoly policy’ which allowed 
competition to British Telecom from only one operator, Mercury. In March 1991 
the Conservative government’s White Paper ‘Competition and Choice: 
telecommunications policy for the 1990s’ expanded the telecommunications 
market to allow cable and other public telecommunications operators to compete 
with British Telecom. This differed from the regulators created in the 1990s 
across Europe which were created specifically within a framework to manage 
newly liberalised markets. Radio spectrum management was not moved to Oftel 
and remained part of a government Department until 1990 when the Radio 
Communications Agency was created as an executive agency. Despite being a 
separate agency the Radio Communications Agency was an agency under the 
direction of the Secretary of State.  
 
The UK institutional approach to independent regulation, in other utility sectors, 
has been to create non-Ministerial departments generally staffed by civil servants 
but with the power and authority held by a Director General. Gilardi (2005a) has 
argued that in comparing the level of independence across a number of European 
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countries, the UK is surprisingly mid-table, which suggests that although there 
was political leadership in terms of privatisation and an ideological attitude in 
favour of market based approaches to utilities, it does not necessarily follow that 
the agencies created to police the newly created markets were independent 
regulators as discussed by Gilardi and others in earlier chapters. Levy and Spiller 
(1994) have shown that liberalisation and privatisation policies have led to 
delegation to independent agencies and this is the case in the UK. However, it 
would appear that the political tradition ensured that these agencies were created 
with more Ministerial oversight, certainly in their early manifestations, than 
would be expected. This conclusion would support the view that there is more 
than just issues of political leadership or tradition which define the extent and 
remit of independent regulators.  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The evolution of independent regulation in the UK is important to examine as the 
UK has approached telecommunications regulation with a number of different 
approaches. At first, with the liberalisation of the market, the UK government 
created Oftel which although a non-Ministerial agency was an independent 
regulator in the same way independent regulators were created across Europe 
following liberalisation in the 1990s. The UK also addressed the issue of radio 
spectrum management through an executive agency, not necessarily to give a 
credible commitment to a certain policy approach to radio spectrum, but rather to 
address inefficiencies in the civil service and to address policy complexity in the 
late 1980s.  
 
The developments within the communications markets and the evolution to 
independent agencies promoted the idea, early in the new Labour Government, 
that a converged regulator with wide remit would be the most effective way to 
regulate the increasingly complex and competitive communications market. The 
convergence of the regulators into Ofcom in 2003 was a genuine promotion of 
independent regulation with non-Ministerial agencies replaced by an agency 
which was institutionally independent of government. This was particularly the 
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case for radio spectrum. An indication of the lack of independence of the Radio 
Communications Agency can be found in the preamble to the Communications 
(2003) Act where each legacy agency, converged into Ofcom, is mentioned by 
name with the exception of the Radio Communications Agency, where powers 
are transferred from the Secretary of State:  
 
‘…in so far as she has a role in respect of the allocation, maintenance 
and supervision of non-military radio spectrum in the UK. This role is 
exercised through the radio Communications Agency, an executive 
agency of the Department of trade and Industry’ (Communications Act 
2003 p2, House of Commons publications) 
 
The non-functional factors considered in earlier chapters, which should influence 
the policy actors in deciding on the level of independence delegated to an 
independent agency, have been referred to throughout the chapter. It is important, 
in relation to radio spectrum, to restate the importance of the recognition in the 
Wireless Telegraphy (1998) Act of the economic value of radio spectrum. In the 
UK the government was interventionist. This was supported by senior officials in 
the Department and the Radio Communications Agency. There was a clear belief 
that officials in the Ministry could better manage the process than an independent 
agency. This is evident in the close working relationship existing between the 
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Ministry and the Radio Communications Agency in the 3G auction process in 
2000, and the advice given by senior officials in the debate on the pre-legislative 
scrutiny. The legislative provisions related to radio spectrum limit the 
independence of Ofcom in relation to radio spectrum management. However, 
these limitations should be understood in the context of ex-ante controls and a 
consideration of the ‘ally principle’. The motivation of the Secretary of State, 
stated during the pre-legislative scrutiny, is to protect the public interest. All 
interviewees mentioned the importance of radio spectrum to the government, 
both in terms of revenue generating and also in terms of industrial policy. It is 
clear therefore, that the intention was to delegate powers to an independent body 
which had clearly not been delegated before. A number of limited functions were 
retained by the Secretary of State. There were further provisions in the 
Communications (2003) Act which allowed the Secretary of State to issue 
directions to Ofcom in relation to general policy issues. 
 
In the next case study the government decided to delegate extensive radio 
spectrum management responsibilities to the independent regulator, including the 
power to set the number of licences for advanced mobile telephony. The power 
of the independent regulator to set licence fees, allied to the mix of 
responsibilities, led to conflict between the independent regulator and the 
government. 
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CHAPTER 5: DELEGATION OF RADIO SPECTRUM FUNCTIONS 
AND THE CREATION OF THE IRISH TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
REGULATOR 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the delegation of radio spectrum activities in Ireland 
and the creation of the independent agency, the Office of the Director of 
Telecommunications Regulation (ODTR). The decision to delegate radio 
spectrum is closely linked to the decision to create an independent 
telecommunications regulator in Ireland. The creation of the regulator was driven 
by events leading to the opening of the telecommunications market and the 
concurrent privatisation of the state telecom company, Telecom Éireann. The 
radio spectrum functions delegated resembled the radio spectrum management 
functions of the Minister under various pieces of legislation. There appeared to 
be little innovation in the transfer of powers from Minister to the independent 
agent. One interviewee argued that radio spectrum was technical so therefore it 
was part of a regulatory function.18 
 
                                                 
18 Interview with John Breen 
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As discussed in previous chapters, Ireland is a relevant case to consider as it has 
both one of the most independent telecommunications regulatory agencies in the 
EU and has delegated significant operational independence to the regulator. 
Specifically, in relation to radio spectrum, where other EU countries have either 
limited the functions delegated and/or imposed legislative constraints on the 
delegated authority. In Ireland, a wide range of radio spectrum functions were 
delegated. 
 
This case study will initially detail the history of regulation of radio spectrum in 
Ireland from independence to the 1990s. The key event in the 1990s is the 
creation of the telecommunications regulatory agency. The chapter will examine 
the events and the thinking leading to this decision, and will examine the 
delegated powers given to the Office of the Director of Telecommunications 
Regulation (ODTR). Unlike the UK, Ireland did not have a separate agency for 
radio spectrum so it is important to examine the delegated powers of the ODTR 
as the range of radio spectrum functions delegated would be influenced by the 
institutional independence of the ODTR. The case study also examines the 
evolution of telecommunications regulation through the subsequent 
Communications Act (2002), which dissolved the ODTR and created the new 
telecommunications regulator, the Commission for Communications Regulation 
(ComReg). Again, it is important to consider this, firstly as an opportunity for 
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policy makers to change the delegation of powers to the agency but also an 
opportunity to examine the effectiveness of the institutional management of radio 
spectrum. 
 
Table 12: Key legislative changes in 
radio spectrum management in 
Ireland 
Date Event 
1905 First Major Wireless Telegraphy Act 
introduced concept of licences 
1926 Wireless Telegraphy Act  - first post 
independence wireless legislation 
imposed obligations and fees for 
licences 
1968 Radio spectrum responsibility moved to 
Department of Posts & Telegraphs 
1984 Creation of Telecom Éireann as separate 
commercial entity. Radio spectrum 
remains part of residual Department of 
communications 
1987 Broadcasting Act creates Independent 
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Radio and Television Commission 
(IRTC) to regulate private radio and 
creates regulatory responsibility for 
Technical division in Ministry 
1994-5 Telecommunications Strategy Report 
prepared and completed 
1995-97 EU Liberalisation Directives published 
and finalised in 1997 
1996 Telecommunications Act creates ODTR 
1999 Telecom Éireann sold to private 
investors, renamed Eircom 
2002 Communications Regulation Act creates 
ComReg 
 
This case study has drawn on a review of Parliamentary debates, internal 
Department of Transport Energy and Communications (DTEC) reports; a review 
of DTEC internal files and primary legislation. These documents are supported 
by interviews with key officials and politicians. Interviews were conducted with 
officials in the DTEC who were involved in the regulatory or policy divisions 
and involved in either the drafting of legislation leading to the creation of the 
ODTR in 1997, or individuals involved in the Telecommunications Strategy 
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Report which preceded the decision to create a regulator. The interviews also 
include members of the Technical Division of the DTEC which prior to the 
creation of the regulator was the centre of expertise for radio spectrum. Most of 
the officials interviewed continued in senior positions in the Department of 
Public Enterprise (DPE), which was the successor to the DTEC following the 
election of the Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat coalition in 1997. The officials 
interviewed, therefore, offer an insight into the policy objectives and thinking 
prior to the creation of the ODTR, and the evolution of thinking on 
telecommunications regulation and regulation in general. Interviews were also 
conducted with key politicians, particularly with senior Labour Party TDs who 
were in power throughout the formative stages of telecommunications 
liberalisation and regulation. 
 
Unlike the UK case the creation of the independent regulator was not subject to 
significant Parliament scrutiny. The key piece of legislation, the 
Telecommunications (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1996 concentrated mainly 
on the sale of a portion of the government’s shareholding in Telecom Éireann. 
Consequently, the creation of the ODTR was not the primary area of comment or 
concern by Irish Parliamentarians. Also, unlike the UK, there was limited 
external activity by way of reports or investigations prior to the 
Telecommunications Strategy Group in 1994. For these reasons more interviews 
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were required from both political and administrative opinion formers as there is 
less transparency of the decision making process. Many of the same civil servants 
remained in influential positions throughout the initial delegation process and the 
evolution of the legislation. It is important therefore to treat some of the opinions 
critically. It was clear, for example, in the Irish case that tensions existed between 
divisions within the Department. This is clear from the exclusion of the technical 
division from the drafting process until the final stages. A number of 
interviewees referred to the pressure of time during the drafting of the 1996 
legislation. This pressure to draft legislation trying to create a regulatory 
framework and sell government shares in the main telecommunications company 
was an ever present backdrop to the internal dialogue. To balance these perceived 
biases it was important to interview officials and politicians outside of the 
drafting team. A key source of additional information was having access to the 
key DTEC files surrounding the creation of the ODTR in 1995 and 1996. Access 
to these files is normally restricted under the 30 year rule. There was free access 
to the file; however, restrictions were placed on documents which were 
considered documents for cabinet which were not allowed to be copied.  
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Table 13: List of Interviewees for 
Irish Case Study 
Name Title & Key Responsibility Role in creation of ODTR  
Brendan Touhy Former Secretary General of 
Department of Public Enterprise 
and Department of 
Communications, Marine & 
Natural Resources 
Member of the 
telecommunications Review 
group and assistant secretary of 
Department and subsequently 
secretary general during 
evolution of functions of ODTR 
Eamonn Molloy Assistant Secretary of 
Department of Communications, 
Marine & Natural Resources   
A member of the 
telecommunications Review 
group and assistant secretary of 
Department  during evolution of 
functions of ODTR 
 
Regina Finn CEO of Ofwat, and former 
Commissioner for Electricity 
Regulation 
Assistant Principal in the 
Department of Transport energy 
and communications and part of 
team drafting the 1996 act 
Sean McMahon Principal Officer in the Land 
registry 
Head of regulatory division prior 
to the creation of ODTR 
Etain Doyle Ex-Director of First Director of ODTR 
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telecommunications regulation 
Mary O’ Rourke Former Leader of the Seanad Minister for Public Enterprise 
1997-2002 
Emmet Stagg Labour Party TD Minister of state at DTEC from 
1994-1997 
Ruairi Quinn Labour Party TD Minister for Finance in Rainbow 
coalition from 1994-1997 
Alan Dukes Former CEO of Institute of 
European affairs 
Minister of DTEC from 
December 96- June 97 
Avril Doyle Fine Gael MEP for Leinster Minister of state at DTEC from 
1994-1997 
Peter Scott Head of Unit, policy unit, DG 
Information Society, European 
Commission 
Head of Unit, policy unit, DG 
Information Society, European 
Commission, division responsible 
for telecommunications directives
John Breen Senior spectrum expert in  Senior advisor in technical unit in 
DTEC 
 
 
 
The evidence available through the variety of sources listed above shows, for the 
case of Ireland, that the management of radio spectrum was an adjunct to the 
decision to delegate telecommunications to the independent agency. There 
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appears to have been no review of spectrum policy or specific internal reports 
which examined the role of radio spectrum. The legislation creating the ODTR 
was not considered in detail during Parliamentary debates. The legislation went 
through the Oireachtas committee process but the proceedings were not 
conducted with the same level of detail as the scrutiny of the Communications 
Act in the UK.  Equally, during the evolution of thinking on regulatory policy in 
the period from 1997 to 2002, radio spectrum management and the institutional 
solutions were not re-examined. Where radio spectrum is mentioned, either in 
reports or in interviews, the evidence is evaluated in the case study. It is 
indicative of the approach of the Irish government in formulating policy for the 
telecommunications sector that little thought was given to radio spectrum 
management. 
 
The interviews, reports and Parliamentary debates, where available, will also be 
used to find evidence of the reasons discussed in earlier chapters to explain the 
creation of independent agencies. The Irish case is a relevant example as it is one 
of the most independent agencies in the EU. Based on the functional theories 
advanced for credibility, policy uncertainty, complexity, we should see this level 
of independence across all EU countries. We should therefore not find many of 
the non-functional factors among the reasons for the creation of the ODTR. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF RADIO SPECTRUM REGULATION 
The management of radio spectrum for much of the twentieth century was 
concerned with broadcasting. The legislative history of radio spectrum is 
mirrored to some extent by legislation developed in the UK. Pre-independence 
legislation on Wireless Telegraphy was the same between the two jurisdictions. 
In 1926, the first post-independence legislation, the Wireless Telegraphy (1926) 
Act was passed. It dealt with the regulation of wireless apparatus. Any person 
wishing to operate a wireless apparatus needed a licence issued by the Minister.  
 
The influence of the Minister for Finance was important in these early provisions. 
Prior to the passing of the Wireless Telegraphy (1926) Act, the Minister for 
Finance had lobbied, as part of the Ministers and Secretaries Act (1924), to have 
the post of Postmaster General abolished and the management of radio spectrum 
placed in the Department of Finance (Hall E. G., 1993, p. 106). The Wireless 
Telegraphy (1926) Act allowed the Postmaster General to set licence fees only 
with the consent of the Minister for Finance. The provisions in part 1 of the 1926 
Act relating to the regulation of wireless apparatus are important as they remain 
the key legislative provisions relating to the management of radio spectrum 
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during the preparation of the 1996 Act creating the ODTR. The particular 
provisions which relate to the Minister's responsibilities for radio spectrum were 
transferred, generally without amendment, in the Miscellaneous Provisions 
(Telecommunications) Act (1996), to the ODTR. 
 
The second part of the 1926 Act dealt mainly with the creation of a national radio 
service and, as with the UK, most of the developments related to radio spectrum 
in the subsequent Acts, were to address issues of radio or television broadcasting. 
For example, the 1926 Act was amended at various stages through the century to 
allow for the introduction of licences for televisions, cable television provisions 
and for citizens’ band radio. Hall (1993) argues, that even in the area of 
broadcasting there was very little legislative or institutional change happening 
until after the Second World War: 
 
‘By the 1950s, Ireland was one of the few democratic countries in the 
world where broadcasting was operated as part of the civil service’ (Hall 
E. G., 1993, p. 151) 
 
In 1952 Ireland signed international agreements to agree particular wavebands for 
broadcasting, and, in 1953, Comhairle Radio Éireann, an independent board, was 
created to manage the radio and television services.  
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The single most important issue related to radio spectrum in the 1960s and 1970s 
was the growth of unlicensed radio. Through legislation in 1968 and 1972, the 
Department of Post and Telegraphs was given responsibility to close down such 
pirate stations. The demands for the liberalising of the radio market grew louder 
and louder and a number of Broadcasting Bills were proposed but not presented 
until, finally in 1987, the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Ray Burke, 
introduced the Sound Broadcasting Bill. The Bill, however, encountered 
opposition and was amended at the Committee Stage to the Radio and 
Broadcasting Act (1988) which created a market for independent private radio. 
The Act also created the Independent Radio and Television Commission (IRTC). 
Cullen (2002) details the proactive, high-profile role Ray Burke had in the 
drafting of the legislation and his desire to keep the process of awarding a licence 
firmly in his control (Cullen, 2002, pp. 171-173). The market was now to be 
regulated by the IRTC which issued an agreed number of licences for 
independent radio stations. As the licences required radio spectrum to be 
allocated for the broadcasters the licence was issued by the Minister for 
Communications.  
 
The management of radio spectrum, irrespective of the radio spectrum used by 
state or independent broadcasters began to be more complex in the 1980s.  
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Increasingly, telecommunications companies like Telecom Éireann and the cable 
television companies were using 'radio links' to extend and upgrade networks. 
The World Radio Conference in 1979 agreed many fundamental changes to the 
international coordination of radio spectrum. According to one interviewee, who 
joined the Department of Post of Telegraphs in 1980, the requirements for Ireland 
to attend more conferences on radio spectrum increased the demands on the 
technical division in the Department, and there were repeatedly requests for more 
resources19. In 1984, following the breakup of the Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs into An Post, Telecom Éireann and the ‘residual’ Department of 
Communications, the Telecommunications and Radio (Technical) Division had 
no regulatory responsibility for radio spectrum management. The 
Telecommunications (1984) Act had transferred the technicians dealing with 
radio spectrum management to Telecom Éireann. Personnel in the Department of 
Communications realised, following the 1984 split, that a separate radio spectrum 
regulatory function was needed, which would regulate Telecom Éireann. 
However, under the 1984 Act Telecom Éireann did not require Wireless 
Telegraphy licences and was therefore unregulated. In the Radio and 
Broadcasting Act (1988) provisions were inserted obliging Telecom Éireann to 
hold Wireless Telegraphy licences and thereby moving regulation of radio 
spectrum back to the Department of Communications. 
                                                 
19 Interview with John Breen 
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The complexity of radio spectrum management increased because of 
technological developments. The duties which the technical division mainly dealt 
with were the growth in radio links licences which were radio spectrum licences 
issued to Telecom Éireann allowing it to extend its network geographically. 
These were also issued to An Garda Síochána (Irish Police Force). In the mid-
1980s the start of mobile telephony with the Total Access Communications 
System (TACS) licence issued to what was to become Eircell, was a further 
development, requiring oversight by the technical division. The growth of cable 
television also impacted the work of the technical division as the cable operators 
were increasingly using wireless technologies to extend the reach of their 
services.  
 
In 1992, following a change of government, the Radio and Broadcasting Division 
in the Department of Communications was moved to the Department of Arts, 
Culture and the Gaeltacht. The technical division remained in the renamed 
Department of Transport, Energy and Communications (DTEC). However, 
technical personnel were now acting across a number of departments and 
advising on radio spectrum management not only in traditional communications 
sectors, but also advising on broadcasting policy. Interestingly at this time, due to 
the broad responsibility of the technical division they argued that as a technical 
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and complex section they should be independent of one Department. John Breen, 
a member of the technical division, argued the issue of independence of the 
technical division; and resources for the division were raised with government 
via the civil service unions in 1992. The proposal was not taken forward despite 
additional resources being allocated20. The proposal, however, is indicative of the 
independent nature of the work and the fact that the work was becoming 
increasingly complex and was being operated across a number of departments. 
 
At the time of the Miscellaneous Provisions (Telecommunications) (1996) Act, 
radio spectrum management functions were retained within the technical division 
of the DTEC and this division of 25 people was moved completely to the ODTR 
in 1997.   
  
The organisation of radio spectrum management in Ireland reflects the perceived 
technical nature of the functions and the policy issues related to spectrum were 
always kept separate from the technical group. The group were belatedly given 
the responsibility of regulating Telecom Éireann and given additional resources. 
Unlike the UK the responsibility of the technicians dealing with radio spectrum 
management was across a number of government departments. Interviewees 
responsible for examining the future institutional requirements of the sector did 
                                                 
20 Interview with John Breen 
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not consider a separate agency for radio spectrum. One reason for this lack of 
focus on radio spectrum management suggested by other interviewees was the 
relative scale of the technical division. In the UK, the Radio Communications 
Agency had several hundred employees located geographically, separate to their 
host Ministry. The technical division in DTEC was not of the same scale and 
there was no precedent to create a separate agency in the Irish public 
administrative set up.21 In 1992, although proposals to open telecommunications 
markets were being discussed at European level, Ireland’s radio spectrum policy 
was not being influenced by market opening. Issues of credibility, therefore, did 
not emerge as motivations to separate the technical division from the parent 
Department. 
 
The next section looks in detail at the decision to create the telecommunications 
regulator and specifically the development of key legislation, Miscellaneous 
Provisions (Telecommunications) (1996) Act.  
                                                 
21 Interviews with Brendan Touhy and Eamonn Molloy 
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TELECOMS REGULATION IN IRELAND 
 
This section will examine the creation of the Office of the Director of 
Telecommunications Regulation (ODTR) and will examine the factors 
considered by officials and Parliament prior to the creation of the ODTR. It will 
also trace the evolution of the independent regulator and consider how regulation 
has evolved in Ireland. This evidence will be assessed against the arguments 
presented in earlier chapters and will make specific reference to the radio 
spectrum functions delegated as part of the Miscellaneous Provisions 
(Telecommunications) (1996) Act.  
 
As discussed in previous chapters before looking specifically at the operations 
delegated in relation to radio spectrum it is important to consider the institutional 
independence of the ODTR through the provisions of the 1996 Act. An agency 
can be given high operational independence from the executive; however, the 
institutional independence to exercise this operational freedom is important to 
consider, particularly the extent to which the functions delegated can be enforced. 
In Ireland, it is important to firstly consider the institutional independence given 
to the ODTR. 
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The evolution of strategy in the Department of Transport, Energy & 
Communications (DTEC) leading to the 1996 Act creating the ODTR offers 
insights into the reasons behind the creation of the ODTR. Hall (1993) argues 
that from the late 1970s the role of the Minister as policy driver, regulatory and 
commercial manager of the telecommunications sector was unsustainable. 
Reports in 1969 and in 1978 had tried to address the dual role of Minister as 
policy maker and business manager for the sector. Hall (1993) argues: 
 
‘In an atmosphere of deteriorating service with a management directly 
under the control of a government Department the spirit of deregulation 
inevitably gained momentum’ (Hall E. G., 1993, p. 115) 
 
The Telecommunications (1984) Act creating Telecom Éireann and An Post, was 
an attempt to divorce from the civil service, the commercial functions of both the 
telecommunications and the postal sectors. A recognised need for investment in 
the telecommunications sector was a key driver. In the early 1990s there was 
increasing pressure on the institutional arrangements which allowed the Minister 
to manage both regulatory and shareholder responsibilities. The Culliton Report 
made reference to high telecommunications tariffs and to potential regulatory 
regimes that were evident elsewhere: 
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‘The complex question of providing competition for as many of Telecom’s 
services is as feasible, in order to ensure downward pressure on these 
price levels should be actively explored. Mechanisms to allow for 
competition to Telecom Éireann in the provision of such value added 
services, including allowing the re-sale of leased lines, should be set in 
progress. A systematic regulatory framework is also needed to ensure that 
those services that are not opened to competition are provided at efficient 
cost-based tariffs and, to the extent possible, service contracts should 
specify penalties for failure to meet the specified quality’ (Culliton, p. 47) 
 
Hastings (1994) likewise sees this period as a crisis in semi-states, not just in 
telecommunications: 
 
‘Irish commercial semi-state companies are undergoing unprecedented 
levels of change. Their markets are under threat from new more 
aggressive low cost operators; their economic justification is being 
challenged and the regulatory environment within which they operate is 
being dictated by European rather than purely national considerations’ 
(Hastings, 1994, p. 1) 
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Hastings (1994) alludes to further pressure on the existing regime from Europe 
where the 1988 Green Paper on telecommunications had started the process of 
liberalisation across Europe. Significantly the UK in 1984 and the US, with the 
break up of AT&T in 1982, had pushed the liberalisation debate to the point 
where it was accepted that governments should open up their markets to 
competition. These developments created an international climate in support of 
liberalisation and created a number of opportunities for Ireland to open its 
telecommunication markets. A particular incident was highlighted by one 
interviewee as an important impetus to a review of the telecommunications 
market. In the early 1990s Cable & Wireless approached the Taoiseach, Albert 
Reynolds TD, with a proposal to buy Telecom Éireann. While the offer was 
refused it provoked debate in the Department of Transport, Energy and 
Communications and a strategy review was initiated to assess the future 
development of the sector.22 
 
A Private Members Bill by Fine Gael in 1993 proposed to create a Director of 
Telecommunications, a post which would assume a number of the Department’s 
responsibilities, including control of tariffs. The Fine Gael Bill argued that one of 
the reasons for the creation of an independent regulator with a remit on tariffs 
                                                 
22 Interview Brendan Touhy 
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was to divest the Ministry of its dual role as policy maker and watchdog. Fine 
Gael Deputy Michael Noonan TD argued: 
 
‘If an independent office holder, appointed under a statute enacted by the 
Houses of the Oireachtas had considered the case made by Telecom 
Éireann last spring, borne in mind the interests of the consumer, 
including small businesses, those who provide telephone advisory 
services and old people and made recommendations, the rescheduling of 
charges would have carried far greater authority than one authorised by 
the Minister’ (Dáil debates, 2.11.93) 
 
In the debate on the Fine Gael Bill the Minister, Brian Cowen TD, advised the 
Dáil that he had set in motion a reorganisation of the Department to address the 
conflict of interest issue. The Minister advised that he was predisposed to 
increasing competition and to independent regulation as these go hand in hand: 
 
‘It is also clear that independent regulation of the sector to ensure 
transparency and fairness is a necessary precondition to full competition’ 
 
The Minister continued: 
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‘I have already announced that the setting up of an independent regulator 
authority is under urgent examination in my Department and we are now 
examining this question with a view to having the appropriate structure 
identified and the necessary legislation prepared. As a first step, the 
relevant divisions of my Department have been reorganised so that the 
regulatory function can be operated separately from the functions which 
pertain exclusively to general policy formulation and to the shareholder 
vis a vis Telecom Éireann’ (Dáil debates, 9/11/93) 
 
The Department was reorganised into a policy division, regulatory division and a 
technical division which, as discussed earlier, managed radio spectrum. The 
reorganisation is important for two reasons. Firstly, the Department was starting 
to recognise the functions it would in the future consider regulatory functions. 
Secondly, the staff assigned to the regulatory division would draft the legislation 
and ultimately form the main core of the first staff of the regulator. It is 
interesting to note even at this stage in the development of regulatory policy the 
option was open to the Department to create an independent regulator. 
Progressive democrat, Desmond O’Malley TD, speaking in the Dáil debates in 
1993 addressed the issue of separation of regulatory from operational functions 
and argued: 
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‘The way to deal with this difficulty which has been recognised and, I 
think solved in every other country, is to set up a regulatory office which 
is independent of the Department’ (Dáil debates, 9/11/93) 
 
In 1994 the DTEC set up the Telecommunications Strategy Group which 
included internal departmental officials and external experts. The group was an 
innovative development by government and followed the Strategic Management 
Initiatives of the early 1990s which promoted better government and more 
strategic policy making. The group examined developments in 
telecommunications markets nationally and internationally. It identified the 
issues which would unlock the potential of the sector and identified the principal 
target position for the sector in Ireland. The report recognised the key drivers of 
the sector in terms of technological and demand changes. The report argues: 
 
‘Markets are being increasingly liberalised and the regulatory regime has 
had to be adopted to cope with a much more complex and changing 
structure’ (Department of Transport Energy and Communications, 1994) 
 
The group subscribed to the view that there was an imperative to create an 
effective telecommunications system driven by the private sector and private 
investment concluding: 
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‘for many developing economies, the commitment to establish an effective 
telecommunications system and the timetable for doing so have often 
become a litmus test for a government’s commitment to effective 
economic development’ (Department of Transport Energy and 
Communications, 1994) 
 
A key component for public policy makers was the need for an independent 
regulator. The report concluded: 
 
‘The group strongly supports the intention to establish an independent 
regulatory agency which we urge should be proceeded with without 
delay. We believe that a properly empowered and resourced agency will 
act as a powerful catalyst for constructive change in the industry in the 
directions we are recommending’ (Department of Transport Energy and 
Communications, 1994) 
  
Following the publication of the report the Department and the government set 
about creating the regulatory environment and the priorities for government at 
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this stage were identified by a number of interviewees23. Firstly, there was a need 
to identify a strategic partner for Telecom Éireann. This would ensure much 
needed management expertise was introduced to Telecom Éireann. Secondly, it 
was identified that the government needed to introduce an independent regulatory 
framework which would reflect the functions of the existing regulatory division 
in the Department. 
 
By 1995 the regulatory division of the Department was separated from the policy 
division. The Annual Report said: 
 
‘The increasing number of companies in the telecommunications business 
requires a restructuring of the regulatory functions carried out by the 
Department to ensure orderly development, fair competition and 
protection for consumers. The Department developed the regulatory 
principles which will apply in a liberalised market and a decision was 
taken by government to establish an independent regulatory authority in 
1996’ (Department of Transport Energy and Communications, 1995) 
 
It is clear from the Annual Report that there was a strong recommendation to 
proceed to a liberalised market and the creation of an independent regulatory 
                                                 
23 Interviews Brendan Touhy, Regina Finn and Eamonn Molloy confirm the follow up strategy to the report 
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authority. Interviews with a number of the participants in the 
Telecommunications Strategy Group confirm that it was the Department’s 
strategy, independent of events in Europe, to liberalise the market and introduce 
an independent regulatory regime.  
 
This evidence supports the conclusions of Levy & Spiller (1994) discussed in 
earlier chapters where the creation of an independent regulator was a 
consequence of market opening and liberalisation. The additional need to find a 
credible partner for Telecom Éireann meant that an independent regulator, 
removed from the government shareholder, had to be created. The thinking, 
evident in the Telecommunications Strategy Group report and interviews with 
officials close to the strategic thinking of the Department at the time, shows 
strong evidence for the view that credibility; particularly the ability of the 
regulator to operate without Ministerial interference was an important concern. 
Although for obvious reasons the issue of Ministerial interference was not 
discussed in the Telecommunications Strategy Report it was cited by 
interviewees as an issue. Departmental officials cite the influence of Telecom 
Éireann unions and their access to senior Ministers as indicative of this 
interference. Interviewers cite the example of Telecom Éireann lobbying for 
licences to be granted to them and not to competitors as a key feature of radio 
spectrum regulation. The subsequent allegations of corruption which surrounded 
 224 
 
 
the Minister, Ray Burke TD, in relation to the awarding of the Century radio 
licence in the early 1990s, were known by officials in the Department at the time 
(Cullen, 2002).  
 
Additional reasons cited by interviewees for the creation of the independent 
regulator were increasing in complexity, and highlight the need to delegate rule 
making and to focus the Department on policy development issues. One 
interviewee, Regina Finn, a key member of the regulatory division, points to the 
increasing time spent by officials on dispute resolution issues. These issues grew 
as various parts of the market were liberalised. Regina Finn argued that a key 
reason for having an independent regulator, as opposed to a regulatory division 
within the Department, was the ability of the parties to disputes to directly lobby 
the Minister in relation to their dispute.    
 
The increasing complexity of regulation and the need to remove this 
administrative function from the Department was a clear driver in the creation of 
an independent regulator. Brendan Touhy, Secretary General of the Department 
of Communications Marine and Natural Resources (DCMNR), argues: 
 
‘the response of governments to globalizations and the need for 
economies to increase their competitiveness and to attract foreign direct 
 225 
 
 
investment has been to remove state monopoly and to open up these 
protected sectors to competitive forces’ (Touhy, 2005) 
 
The recommendation of the Telecommunications Strategy Report was not to seek 
derogations from the European Commission which would have the effect of 
delaying full market opening. The report recommended that liberalisation should 
proceed without delay. However, these recommendations were not acted upon. It 
is important to consider the reasons why the recommendations were not acted 
upon. An important influence on the issue of the derogation and the pace of 
liberalisation was the political landscape in Ireland in the 1990s. 
 
The liberalisation of the telecommunications sector was supported by a number 
of political parties in the Dáil. Both major parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael 
supported the liberalisation of telecommunications. One of the smaller parties, 
the Progressive Democrats, also supported the policy. Fianna Fáil and the 
Progressive Democrats had been in government from 1989 until 1992 when, 
following a general election, Fianna Fáil changed coalition partners to the Labour 
Party. The Labour Party attitude to liberalisation was conditioned by their 
concerns about possible job losses at Telecom Éireann. Interviewees argue that 
the Labour Party’s reluctance to privatise Telecom Éireann was also based on a 
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concern that the company was not ready to compete in a liberalised market24. 
During the early years of this government, as we have seen from the discussion 
above, some changes were made in the structure of the Department but the Fine 
Gael Bill to create a director of telecommunications was not accepted. In 1994 
the government composition changed as the Labour Party withdrew its support 
for Fianna Fáil and a ‘Rainbow’ coalition of Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic 
Left assumed power. It was the rainbow coalition government that sought a 
derogation extending the deadline for liberalising of telephony markets from 
1998 to 2000. Despite the derogation it was in the three year period of the 
rainbow coalition from 1994-1997 that the legislation to create the independent 
regulatory agency was prepared and enacted. McDowell (2000) argues that the 
attitude of the Labour Party is central to the development of market opening: 
 
‘It is useful to reflect that as recently as 1992 the post-election 
negotiations which preceded the formation of a government were 
dominated by a demand from the Labour Party to which Fianna Fáil 
assented, that there would not be a progamme of privatisation of the 
public sector commercial agencies. Yet within a few years, and now with 
other partners in Government, the Labour party had accepted the 
principle of limited privatisation’ (Mc Dowell, 2000) 
                                                 
24 Interview with Emmet Stagg TD, Regina Finn and Brendan Touhy 
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The fair-weather attitude of successive governments to telecommunications 
policy can be reflected in the attitudes to the derogation. Massey and Daly (2003) 
argue: 
 
‘In the case of telecommunications Ireland sought two year derogation 
from liberalisation. The government subsequently did something of a u-
turn apparently triggered by newspaper reports that a major industrial 
project had been lost because of inadequacies in the telecommunications 
network’ (Massey & Daly, 2003) 
 
It is important to stress the conflict which existed between Department officials 
and the politicians who were against the idea of an independent regulator. Regina 
Finn, in interviews, argued that the Minister of State, Emmet Stagg TD, had 
ideological problems with the idea of an independent regulator. Emmet Stagg 
TD, in interviews, said that Labour Party policy had been opposed to the 
privatisation of Telecom Éireann, but as the Bill was being finalised, the Labour 
Party changed its view. He argued that his concern was in relation to the fact that 
a very independent regulator was being proposed. He was advocating that the 
government should sell all of its interests in Telecom Éireann which would have 
removed the conflict of interest and therefore regulation could stay within the 
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Department. While the aim of the officials was to remove Ministerial influence, 
Emmet Stagg TD was arguing the need to ensure that stronger accountability 
measures were in place. In his view the independent regulator, created by the 
1996 Act, was not accountable. The issue of accountability was raised in the 
discussion on the 1996 Act in the Dáil, and this was linked in particular to the 
independence of the Director of the ODTR, specifically if the position was to be 
a civil servant position. Desmond O’Malley TD, a member of the Progressive 
Democrats argued, for example, that: 
 
‘The regulator should be somebody from outside the public service who is 
appointed because he or she has, or is capable of having, a consumer 
orientation or background’ (Dáil debates, 26/9/96) 
 
Éamon Ó Cuív TD, a member of Fianna Fáil, was concerned at the level of 
accountability of the Director: 
 
‘The Director will be independent and can do what he or she wants 
within the minimalist controls proposed in Section 7. The Director should 
be answerable to this House or the Minister and we should retain the 
power to direct him or her in certain fundamental directions…I would 
find it very difficult to agree to a provision which states that the Director 
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shall be independent and not answerable to anybody, including the 
members of the houses of the Oireachtas’ (Dáil debates, 3/10/96) 25 
  
The conflict between the officials and the politicians is reflected in the literature 
where, despite the need to ensure an independent regulatory authority is created 
on the basis of credible commitments, there is a concern about accountability to 
policy actors and Parliament. These concerns are normally addressed through 
either ex-ante controls or ex-post controls on the agency. There is no evidence 
that the views of the Labour party or the Minister of State, Emmet Stagg TD, 
changed the structure of the bill. A review of the files and discussions with the 
drafting officials confirm this. Emmet Stagg TD confirmed that he had difficulty 
getting his views across. Emmet Stagg TD was the junior Minister in the 
Department. He had been responsible for Energy policy and was asked by the 
senior Minister, Michael Lowry TD, to get involved as, in the opinion of Stagg, 
the Minister found the issues too complicated. A number of interviewees from 
the Department involved in the drafting of legislation complained that the 
Minister was not close to the issues of liberalisation. One interviewee said the 
                                                 
25 The deputy is consistent in his opinion of the accountability of regulators as he made similar comments in the 
debate on Deputy Noonan’s bill see Dáil Debates 9/11/93 
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Department had arranged meetings specifically to brief the Minister on the draft 
1996 legislation but on many occasions he did not turn up.26 
 
Emmet Stagg TD was asked to steer the legislation through the Dáil and Seanad 
(upper house) despite not being close to the issues. He complained that his 
concerns were raised late and therefore did not have the impact he had hoped. 
Regina Finn confirmed that the Minister attended few meetings on the issue. The 
lack of political oversight of the process is evidenced from a number of 
interviews and is in contrast with the active participation of both senior civil 
servants and a range of politicians, in the pre-legislative scrutiny of the 
Communications Act in the UK. 
 
The debate of the draft Bill in the Oireachtas, therefore, should have addressed 
the issue of independence and accountability. However, Emmet Stagg TD argued 
that Dáil Deputies did not understand the Bill, and were more concerned about 
the ownership of Telecom Éireann. A review of the Dáil debates on the 
Miscellaneous Provisions (Telecommunications) (1996) Act, shows that the main 
issue of concern was the ownership of Telecom Éireann. The consequences of 
neglecting to address the accountability issues led to a number of changes in the 
                                                 
26 Interview Regina Finn 
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subsequent legislation. It became clear that the officials were not satisfied with 
the ex-ante or ex-post controls they had on the ODTR.   
 
The conclusions of the Telecommunications Strategy Report were evident in the 
opening statements in the Dáil and the Seanad. Supporting the arguments of Levy 
and Spiller (1994), there was a clear acceptance that an independent regulator 
was required when liberalising a market. There was acceptance that the 
liberalisation of the market precipitated the creation of an independent regulator. 
The Minister, Michael Lowry TD, argued: 
 
‘With the emergence of competition in the Irish telecommunications 
market, it is appropriate that the regulation of the sector be seen to be 
independent from the Minister’s shareholding and sectoral development 
functions. This separation is also a feature of telecommunications 
development in most of our EU partners and a requirement of pending 
EU legislation’ (Dáil debates, 3/10/93) 
 
The Minister argued that the telecommunications sector was evolving rapidly and 
these developments were extending the range of services and increasing the 
importance of the telecommunications sector to the economy. The Minister 
concluded: 
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‘These forces of chance are calling into question the current structure of 
the telecommunications industry and are creating new opportunities and 
threats for all players in the industry’ (Dáil debates, ibid) 
 
The forces of change and the associated need to have a regulatory framework 
introduced with market opening is further evidence of the Levy and Spiller 
(1994) view on credibility as the main driver creating independent regulators. 
This is clear in the first instance from the Telecommunications Strategy Report 
and secondly from the Minister’s second stage speech introducing the Bill. 
However, there are clear tensions with introducing the concept of an independent 
regulator, mainly from politicians. Emmet Stagg TD, the Minister of State in the 
DTEC, was clearly unhappy with the level of independence and lack of 
accountability. In the Dáil a number of politicians questioned the agency’s 
perceived accountability. Further evidence that credibility was one factor but not 
the only factor in the decision to create the independent agency is found in the 
timing of legislation. The 1996 Act followed a series of EU policy documents 
and directives, starting in 1988, which had given a clear road map for EU 
members to open their markets and to create regulatory regimes.   
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To gain a better understanding of the process and the extent to which the EU, or 
other factors, influenced the process, it is important to review the drafting 
process. 
 
Drafting the telecommunications (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1996 
 
The files of the DTEC dealing with the drafting of the Act do reveal the thinking 
behind the functions and powers of the independent regulator. The relevant files 
concerning the creation of the ODTR and the Miscellaneous Provisions 
(Telecommunication) (1996) Act covers the period from early 1995 to mid 1997. 
The files are in the archive of the DTEC and were made available by the 
Secretary General of the Department of Communications Marine and Natural 
Resources. All the files are subject to the Freedom of Information Act. The only 
restriction placed on the review of the files was the prohibition on copying any 
documents which referred to advice given to cabinet which would be confidential 
under the 30 year rule. 
 
A review of the Departmental files documenting the creation of the regulator 
leads to a conclusion that the departmental officials drafting the Bill based their 
initial drafts on a precedent which was not independent. An explanatory note in 
an early draft of the Bill explains the thinking of the Department: 
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‘This provision is intended to set up an independent regulatory office 
within the Department of transport, energy and communications that is 
capable of adaptation and incorporation into an independent regulatory 
authority following more comprehensive legislation in due course. The 
model used is that in the Consumer Information Act, 1978. It balances the 
need for simplicity and urgency with the need for legal independence in 
the execution of the delegated regulatory type functions previously held 
by the Minister’27 
 
The initial provisions, therefore, were based on the Director of Consumer Affairs 
and the temporary nature of the provisions were a consequence of the Bill being a 
temporary measure in advance of more expansive legislation. This is a key 
feature of the evolution of the Bill as it was drafted. Eamonn Molloy, a senior 
official in the policy unit of the DTEC, responding to some late proposals in 
October 1996 argues that the urgency and willingness to defer some issues to 
later legislation was an important feature in the drafting of the 1996 Act: 
 
‘The agreement of all Telecoms divisions was that the legislation was not 
designed to cover all regulatory issues. The Bill does not provide for new 
                                                 
27 DTEC TR 5/5, vol 1 draft heads of telecommunications bill, draft 4, undated 
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enforcement provisions for the regulator precisely because it did not set 
out to do so. Enforcement, along with other issues, was agreed to be a 
matter for the Omnibus Bill (Utilities Regulatory Commission) and if 
relevant the legislation relating to the establishments of a multi-sector 
structure’28 
 
The level of independence, therefore, in the final Bill is hard to reconcile with 
these comments which suggest an agency, within the Department, and without 
clear powers. Interviewees have argued that despite this there was a genuine 
desire to create a legally independent entity, as envisaged by the policy reports 
above and the existing regulatory structure in the Department.  
 
An important factor, which influenced the officials, was the strategic alliance 
proposed for Telecom Éireann. The Telecommunications Strategy Report had 
expressed concern at the level of expertise of the management of Telecom 
Éireann and had proposed that an alliance should be sought with a large 
Telecommunications company to import this management expertise into Telecom 
Éireann. The Bill was proposing to sell a proportion of the government’s shares 
in Telecom Éireann to enable this alliance and a consortium incorporating two 
large European telecommunications companies had expressed interest in this 
                                                 
28 DTEC TR 5/5, vol 4 
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alliance. Interviewees argued that a condition of their participation in the alliance 
was the precondition that an independent regulator would be created to manage 
the liberalised market. The concerns of the consortium of KPN and Telia reflect 
the need for credibility and the assurance that post liberalisation there would be 
no government interference in the market. The 1996 Act would legislate for this 
alliance by facilitating the sale of 35% of the government’s shares in Telecom 
Éireann to KPN-Telia. Another reason, raised by a number of interviewees29 
explaining the level of independence of the ODTR, was the view that the Bill was 
being drafted by officials in the DTEC who believed they would be the regulator 
in the future, and therefore wanted to make the regulator as independent as 
possible. This view is confirmed by other interviewees in the Department and by 
Regina Finn. Regina Finn and Sean McMahon were the principal officials, in the 
regulatory division, who were in charge of drafting the Bill. Their aim was to 
ensure that the regulator was as independent as possible30. There is a risk with the 
use of interviews on these issues as the interviewees in question may have a 
motivation to exaggerate their role or their importance. Regina Finn’s view was 
not supported by Brendan Touhy or Eamonn Molloy, both senior officials in the 
policy unit of the DTEC. Both of these officials would have been close to the 
drafting of the Bill. Both Brendan Touhy and Eamonn Molloy argued that the 
                                                 
29 Interviews with Ruairi Quinn and Emmet Stagg but in particular with John Breen who argued he was excluded 
from the drafting 
30 Interviews Regina Finn and Sean McMahon 
 237 
 
 
level of independence in the 1996 Act was intentional and not the product of self-
interest. However, it is clear from a reading of the files that Regina Finn and her 
regulatory unit were the lead group drafting the Bill. Additionally, one 
interviewee, Ruairi Quinn, the Minister for Finance in the Rainbow coalition, was 
monitoring the evolution of the Bill and the view of his officials in the 
Department of Finance was clearly that the drafting of the Bill was being run by a 
small number of officials. This factor is difficult to quantify or measure, but it is 
no doubt a factor in the ultimate design of the ODTR.  
 
In relation to radio spectrum regulation, the above debate is important as the 
approach of the DTEC to the 1996 Act also applied to their approach to radio 
spectrum regulation. Regina Finn argued that the transfer of powers via the 1996 
Act for radio spectrum management from the Minister to the regulator was a ‘tick 
box’ exercise. Where existing legislation gave the Minister responsibility in 
relation to radio spectrum management these provisions were passed to the 
regulator without question. The role of the officials drafting the legislation was to 
ensure such provisions were listed in the 1996 Act. A review of the Departmental 
files shows that the document most referred to by officials and with the most 
redrafts on file was a list of the provisions from previous legislation to be 
transferred, without amendment, to the regulator. The 1996 Act lists in its 
supporting schedules details of legislation where the Ministerial authority is 
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being delegated, word for word, to the regulator. The Telecommunications 
Strategy Report did not refer specifically to radio spectrum despite the 
recognition of its growing importance and the increase in resources prior to the 
strategic review. Interviewees involved in the Telecommunications Strategy 
Review confirmed that radio spectrum was not considered in detail in terms of 
strategy. Brendan Touhy argued that it was not questioned that the radio 
spectrum technical division would be transferred to the regulator as their task was 
essentially complex and expert. The strategy of the Department at the time was to 
concentrate resources of the Department on policy related matters31. 
 
The files reveal that there were concerns about the broad sweep of powers 
delegated to the ODTR and specifically in relation to radio spectrum. There were 
conflicts, evident from correspondence on DTEC files that the regulatory 
Division and Technical division differed in the relative responsibilities of both 
the Minister and the ODTR. Similar to the debate in relation to the institutional 
independence discussed above, the intention of the regulatory division was to 
transfer all relevant powers to the ODTR. The technical division, responsible 
prior to liberalisation for radio spectrum issues, had concerns that the early drafts 
of the 1996 Bill delegated too much power. 
                                                 
31 Interviews with Brendan Touhy and Eamonn Molloy from the Telecommunications Strategy Group. This 
attitude to radio spectrum management is also confirmed by John Breen a member of the technical group. 
 239 
 
 
 
John Breen from the Technical division writing in May 1996 advised the head of 
the Technical division, John McQuaid: 
 
‘The regulator should have responsibility for the issue of licences for 
mobile and personal communications. The Department should have a role 
however in determining the timing of awards around certain classes e.g. 
GSM, DCS 1800 and in the determination of competition parameters, 
selection criteria etc... The ‘narrow bill’32 should therefore reflect 
requirement for advance Ministerial approval for certain actions’33 
 
This note is further expanded by John McQuaid in a note to Martin Brennan who 
was in overall charge of the telecommunications section of the Department on the 
8th July 1996: 
 
‘My preference is for a regime where the Minister publishes clear policies 
for the telecommunications sector including policies and conditions for 
the grant of licences and the regulator is obliged at all times to be 
                                                 
32 Throughout the DTEC files the 1996 Act was referred to as the ‘narrow bill’ or the ‘wee’ bill as the intention 
was to bring in more comprehensive legislation later. 
33 DTEC files 5/5 & Leg/Tel 
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satisfied that the policies published by the Minister are being complied 
with’34 
 
The request by the technical Department reflects the debate discussed in the case 
study in the UK where the Radio Communications Agency were advising their 
Minister on the increasing commercialisation of radio spectrum, and the inherent 
value of the spectrum to the Treasury. The radio spectrum quoted above is the 
third generation spectrum which was sold in a number of jurisdictions for large 
sums of money. John Breen, in interviews, confirmed that his motive in sending 
this memorandum was to retain Ministerial control over radio spectrum. The 
functions transferred to the ODTR obliged them to seek the consent of the 
Minister for Finance for radio spectrum fees but, unlike the UK, not on the 
allocation of the radio spectrum. In the event the Director allocated this spectrum 
in 2001, but the Minister for Finance, Charlie McCreevy TD, withheld consent 
on the basis that the allocation scheme did not maximise the revenue to the State. 
The awarding of the licences was delayed almost a year because of the dispute. 
Arguably, the provision requesting the consent of the Minister for Finance was 
only in the 1996 Act because it was directly transposed from the Wireless 
Telegraphy (1926) Act. The dispute raises the issue about the role of principals if 
the ‘ally principle’ discussed in chapter one becomes an issue. The independence 
                                                 
34 Ibid 
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of the agent can only be constrained by ex-post and ex-ante controls which aim to 
ensure the agents’ preferences are allied to the principal’s preferences. In the case 
of the allocation of third generation radio spectrum, the principal had imposed an 
ex-ante control on the actions of the agent. The conflicting preferences which 
resulted in the protracted dispute between the Minister for Finance and the 
Director shows the importance of ex-ante controls particularly in resolving 
conflicting preferences. In the UK such conflicts were anticipated and the 
awarding of the radio spectrum, conducted mainly by the Radio Communications 
Agency, happened in advance of the discussion on the 2003 Ofcom Act. The 
legacy of the dispute between the Minister for Finance and the Director was the 
increasing focus on ex-ante controls on the regulator in the Irish Communications 
Regulation (2002) Act which we shall discuss in more detail below. 
 
There were specific issues with the transfer of powers under section 6 of the 
Wireless Telegraphy (1926) Act which would allow the Director to issue licences 
without reference to the Minister for new services, and to decide on the selection 
criteria and conditions related to a licence. The regulatory division responded to 
the memos and the proposed amendments from the technical division by arguing: 
 
‘…the proposed amendment to the bill restricts the regulator’s 
independence to an unacceptable degree. It is worth noting that the 
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function of licensing the use of frequency spectrum is being transferred in 
its entirety to the regulator. In addition, the function of making 
regulations which will govern the form and content of such licences is 
also transferred to the regulator but the consent of the Minister is 
necessary to any such regulations. This gives the Minister a powerful veto 
over the licensing of any part of the frequency spectrum and is considered 
a more than adequate control in this case’.35 
 
The regulatory division memo gave an overview of their interpretation of the 
balance of power between the Minister and the regulator: 
 
‘In brief, the Minister should retain the powers necessary to enable him to 
settle sectoral policy for example determining USO/PSO and overall 
strategic approaches to allocation of frequency spectrum. The regulator 
must have complete independence in regulating the market, including the 
granting of individual licences, arbitrating in disputes such as those 
about interconnection, and ensuring equity of treatment of all players in 
the market’36 
 
                                                 
35 Memo from Regina Finn to head of regulatory division, Sean Mc Mahon, TR 5/5 
36 Ibid 
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The compromise reached became Article 3.5 of the 1996 Act which requested 
that the Director should publish a plan known as the ‘Radio Frequency Plan’ and 
Article 3.8, which obliged the Director in formulating revising and implementing 
the radio frequency plan, complied with any direction given by the Minister. The 
Minister’s remit in terms of policy however was questioned when the final Bill 
was debated in the Dáil. Jim Higgins TD, member of Fine Gael, speaking on the 
2002 Communications Act, commented on the duplication and over sight of a 
Minister in being able to consent to regulation and issue policy directions: 
 
‘I am also puzzled by the fact the Minister can, in addition to the power to 
issue policy directives, block radio spectrum regulations made by the 
ODTR. Why is it necessary to have both the authority to consent to these 
regulations and to give policy directives on the same subject? If the 
Minister’s aim is to speed up the making of licence schemes, she is doing 
the exact opposite’ (Dáil debates, 18/4/02) 
 
A review of the departmental files, the Dáil Debates and interviews with both 
politicians and officials shows that there was little consideration of the specific 
functions being transferred for radio spectrum. There was some discussion about, 
but general support for the delegation of powers to the ODTR. Regina Finn 
argued that there was a conservative bias in the technical division. She argued 
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that there should be no Ministerial involvement, particularly with big commercial 
issues, not only in telecommunications but broadcasting. John Breen in the 
technical division argued that the technical division was excluded from the 
drafting of the 1996 Act as radio spectrum suffered from a view in the 
Department which perceived it as technical and not important in terms of 
enabling policy. 
 
The drafting of the 1996 Act did take a short period of time from the end of 1995 
to the early months of 1996. It is important to review the final legislation. 
 
The Telecommunications (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1996 
 
The Act creating the ODTR is a very short piece of legislation. It is clear from 
departmental documents and interviews that the Act was an interim measure 
introduced to allow for the sale of shares in Telecom Éireann. It was not meant to 
be the final word on the regulatory regime. There was a proposal in 1996 to 
introduce a full Utilities Bill which would create a single regulator for energy and 
telecommunications. However, with the Utilities Bill seen as the future regulatory 
legislation the 1996 Act, creating the ODTR was seen more in terms of the sale 
of the government’s share than in relation to creating the first independent 
regulator.  
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The purpose of the Act is two-fold. Firstly, it creates the position of the Director 
of Telecommunications and the office of the ODTR, but also allows the sale of 
shareholding in Telecom Éireann to support the strategic alliance referred to 
above. The Act clearly states that the Director will be independent in the exercise 
of his or her functions. The Director is appointed by the Minister and holds a 
senior civil service position. Her term of office was six years and she could only 
be removed by stated misconduct or ill-health. There were also accountability 
provisions where the executive in the form of the Minister could exercise some 
accountability on the activities of the ODTR. The Director, for example, was not 
funded by the State but by levies imposed on operators licensed by the ODTR. 
The Director had full discretion in setting these fees and levies. The Director, 
however, had to account to the Comptroller and Auditor General in respect of 
Annual Accounts and was obliged to report annually to the Minister. It is 
debatable whether the discretion to hire and maintain a staff was clear. Section 5 
of the Act states: 
 
‘The Minister shall make available to the Director, on a request being 
made by the Director, such staff, premises, equipment, services and other 
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resources as the Minister may determine from time to time in consultation 
with the Minister of Finance’37. 
 
However, the first schedule goes into more details and does allow some 
discretion for hiring of staff that the Director may feel he or she needs. This is 
subject to an overriding provision that with, the consent of the Minister of 
Finance, the Director may determine a total number of staff.  
 
The functions transferred to the Director were essentially those functions already 
in the remit of the regulatory division of the DTEC. There appears to have been 
limited innovation in relation to the functions of the regulator.   
 
In relation to radio spectrum issues, the prevailing piece of legislation which 
needed to be delegated was the Wireless Telegraphy (1926) Act. Under this Act 
the Minister for Posts and Telegraphs was responsible for regulating wireless 
telegraphy apparatus. Under section 5, the Minister was given the power to oblige 
anyone in the state having possession of wireless telegraph apparatus to hold a 
licence. The Minister had the power to define the scope of the licence (section 6). 
The Minister had the power to set fees, subject to the consent of the Minister for 
Finance. There were powers to collect information and to prosecute those without 
                                                 
37 Telecommunications (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1996, section 5 
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licences. These provisions survived as the key legislative powers for the Minister 
of Posts and Telegraph in relation to radio spectrum management until the 1996 
Act creating the ODTR. The 1996 Act transfers, from the Minister to the 
Director, responsibility for the licensing regime which is detailed in section 3 of 
the Wireless Telegraphy Act (1926). The ability to grant a licence and set a fee 
for the licence which again is delegated from section 5 and section 6 of the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act (1926) is also passed on to the ODTR.  The legislation 
extended to the scope of a licence and gave the Director information gathering 
powers. A number of provisions introduced by the Minister via statutory 
instrument were also transferred to ODTR. The ODTR was also obliged to 
publish a radio frequency plan and is obliged in formulating, revising or 
implementing the plan to comply with any direction from the Minister.  
 
The remaining sections of the Act and the more contemporaneously controversial 
sections of the Act deal with the sale of a government stake in Telecom Éireann 
which appears to have exercised the Parliamentarians. The practical effect of the 
1996 Act was to move the regulatory division and the technical division from the 
Department into the new independent regulator. A review of the files and 
interviews with key officials dealing with the drafting suggest that the final Act 
presented to Parliament went through a number of significant changes the effect 
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of which was to make the ODTR and the Director more independent than had 
originally been envisaged. 
 
The creation of the ODTR was motivated by functional factors and specifically 
credibility. The Telecommunications Strategy Report recognised the importance 
of an independent regulator. The key driver was market opening and the need to 
avoid the perception of Ministerial interference in the newly opened market. This 
is particularly the case as the telecommunications companies who were part of 
the strategic alliance with Telecom Éireann insisted on an independent agency to 
regulate the market. In Ireland, however, the independent agency was very 
independent and there were very few constraints on the agency. As the legislation 
evolved did the independence of the agency raise concerns? In relation to radio 
spectrum management were there issues with the lack of political oversight of the 
allocation process? These concerns were evident in the UK case and were the 
justification for ex-ante controls on the allocation of specified radio spectrum.  
 
 
Evolution of telecommunications regulation 
 
The provisions of the 1996 Act were revised through primary legislation in 2002. 
The Communications Regulation Act (2002) made changes which were 
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discussed in policy documents in the intervening years. The office was to have a 
three-person commission as opposed to single person Director and the office was 
to be subject to policy directions by the Minister. The provisions on structure and 
funding remained the same. This is important to consider as this was an 
opportunity for the policy actors to change the institutional arrangements, even in 
relation to key functions such as radio spectrum. An additional change since the 
1996 Act was the government’s sale of all shares in the renamed Eircom. 
Consequently, the Department had no conflict of interest and arguably could 
have initiated a review of the need for a separate agency to manage the 
telecommunications market. This point was referred to in the Dáil debate on the 
Communications Regulation (2002) Bill. Deputy Brian O’Shea TD, from the 
Labour Party argued: 
 
‘When the office of the ODTR was established, the state was still an 
operator in the telecommunications sector but privatisation took place 
under the Minister’s stewardship. The state is neither operator nor a 
regulator in that area now. Given the strategic importance of the 
telecommunications network, not just economically but also socially, is 
there not a case for keeping that part of regulation within the state 
framework?’(Dáil Debates, 18/4/02) 
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The Minister, Mary O’ Rourke TD, Fianna Fáil, replied,’ I see your point’ (Dáil 
debates, 18/4/02) 
 
However, the issue was not addressed by the Minister in her reply to the debate. 
When interviewed she argued that there was no need to change the institution as 
the regulator was created and doing such a good job.38The change of government 
following the 1997 general election had not changed significantly the attitude to 
the role of the independent agencies. The Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat 
coalition had created the second utility independent regulator, the Commission 
for Energy Regulation, in 1999. Mary O’Rourke TD described her relationship 
with the first Director of the ODTR, Etain Doyle as very cordial and good. She 
argued that the Director had a job to do and she let her do it. The attitude of the 
senior civil servant at the time, Brendan Touhy, was much different. There were 
obvious tensions as Etain Doyle asserted her independence in relation to staffing 
issues but in the early years of the ODTR a number of accountability issues did 
emerge which raised the tension and provoked the changes which would 
eventually be proposed in the 2002 Bill. 
 
 The first accountability issue, however, emerged very soon after the change of 
government in 1997 as a consequence of the Director’s decision not to appear in 
                                                 
38 Interview Mary O Rourke TD 
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front of an Oireachtas committee, stating no legal obligation to do so. The 
decision not to appear provoked a furious response from committee members and 
a consequent perception of a lack of accountability. Although Etain Doyle 
explained her reasons for not appearing, the refusal to appear before a 
Parliamentary committee led to concerns about the accountability mechanisms in 
place. The committee wanted to discuss a number of broadcasting and radio 
spectrum issues which were the subject of ongoing consultation and the Director 
argued that she was not in a position to discuss in public her position. The 
broadcasting issues were related to an issue which was legally sensitive and the 
Director felt she had to follow a clear consultative process. The former Fine Gael 
Minister for DTEC, Alan Dukes TD, supported the Director’s viewpoint arguing 
that it was not the correct time for the Director to discuss the issue with 
Parliamentarians39. 
  
A second issue, closely related to radio spectrum, was the award of radio 
spectrum licences for third generation mobile telephony (3G). The dispute is 
discussed in detail earlier in the chapter but the important issue raised by the 
debate was the inability of government to resolve the lines of responsibility 
between the Minister for Finance and the Director. The legislation had not 
anticipated, what was anticipated in the UK, that the Minister for Finance, on one 
                                                 
39 Interview Alan Dukes TD 
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side, would want to maximise revenue for the government from 3G radio 
spectrum licences, and arguably had a political responsibility to do so. On the 
opposite side the Director had a legal responsibility to promote competition. 
There was a need therefore in evolving the legislation to ensure clear lines of 
responsibility were stated. 
 
The renamed Department of Public Enterprise, responded to this debate and other 
concerns surrounding the accountability of the regulator by publishing new 
proposals in a document ‘Governance and Accountability in the Regulatory 
Process’. The Minister in the foreward to this document argued: 
 
‘The separation of regulatory functions from the other duties of 
government and their transfer to independent statutory bodies involves a 
delegation of power from the centre. The interests of democracy demand 
that such delegation of responsibility to regulators be accompanied by 
clear and defined accountability mechanisms’ (Department of Public 
Enterprise, 2000) 
 
In interviews with both the Minister and the senior officials in the Department at 
the time, the main concern was the wide remit and lack of accountability under 
 253 
 
 
the control of one regulator40. The measures proposed in new legislation were 
designed to bring forward accountability measures and not major institutional 
reform. The officials argued that there was never a view to remove the 
independence provisions from the Act. Their view was that the European 
Commission, irrespective of the change in ownership of Eircom, would be 
critical of such a decision. This view does not reconcile with the provisions of the 
directive quoted above. The directives made explicit the view that the need for an 
independent agency was required because the parent Department could not only 
be regulator of the incumbent telecommunications company but also shareholder 
of the incumbent telecommunications company. The dual role was incompatible 
in a liberalised market and therefore an independent agency was needed. The 
European Commission in its Implementation Reports, assessing the effectiveness 
of implementation across the EU on telecommunications liberalisation directives, 
did express concern about the independence of the ODTR in its 4th Annual 
Report published in 1998. Referring to a number of countries, including Ireland, 
the European Commission said: 
 
‘In some countries concerns are reported that the structures in place do 
not ensure that regulatory decisions are not influenced by state ownership 
                                                 
40 Interviews Mary O Rourke TD, Brendan Touhy, Eamonn Molloy 
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considerations. In these cases the necessary separation of the control of 
the incumbent and the regulatory powers should be re-examined’ 41 
 
This would appear to be a widening of the criteria for an independent agency. 
The assumption from the above quotation was that irrespective of shareholding 
an independent regulatory agency is required. A year later, following the sale of 
the Government stake in Eircom, the European Commission commented: 
 
‘The concerns about ODTR’s independence…have now been fully 
addressed following the full privatisation of Eircom. As an increasing 
number of previous Government functions are being transferred to 
independent regulatory bodies, the Minister is planning to launch a 
consultation procedure to discuss the issue of the accountability of 
regulators’42 
 
There appears to have been an acceptance of the institutional validity of the 
ODTR, irrespective of the government’s shareholding in the incumbent 
telecommunications operator. The issue following the creation of the ODTR was 
                                                 
41 European Commission, 4th Implementation report, 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/implementation_enforcement/annualreports/previ
ousyears/index_en.htm 
42 Ibid, 5th Implementation Report 
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therefore to strengthen the accountability provisions of the 1996 Act. Brendan 
Touhy speaking to the OECD argued: 
 
‘The separation of regulatory functions from the other duties of 
government and their transfer to independent statutory agencies involves 
a delegation of specific powers from the relevant Government Minister. 
The interests of society demand that such delegation of responsibility be 
accompanies by clearly defined procedures and accountability 
mechanisms. Regulators, be they state controlled or independent, must 
balance the wider societal interest against that of the regulated sector’ 
(Touhy, 2005) 
 
The checks and balances set out in the 1996 Act were designed to ensure in the 
first place independence by placing ex-post controls on the operation of the 
ODTR. The 1996 Act requested that the ODTR produce an Annual Report and 
allow accounts to be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General. There were 
now further provisions, included in the 2002 Bill, which included reducing the 
term of office of Commissioners from 6 to 4 years; the obligation to publish a 
strategy statement and the requirement to appear in front of Oireachtas 
committees.  
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The institutional independence of the ODTR and subsequently the Commission 
for Communications Regulation (ComReg) was largely retained in terms of 
funding and freedom to manage finances. However, the new Commission was 
less independent using the criteria quoted in earlier chapters. The dilution is 
important when considering the issue of the ‘ally principle’. The ‘ally principle’ 
in sectors other than central banks is assumed. Gilardi (2007) argues that 
principals assume agents will have similar policy preferences to principals. There 
is therefore no need to impose ex-ante or ex-post controls on agents. In Ireland, 
the lack of controls on the agent regulators confirms this ‘ally principle’ as the 
evolution of the legislation confirms the view that if preferences diverge then 
principals will constrain the independence of the agent. 
 
There had been political consensus in 1996 that there was a need to create an 
independent agency. The opposition political party at the time of the 1996 Act, 
Fianna Fáil, was supportive of the regulatory proposals and had committed to an 
independent regulator during their previous administration between 1992 and 
1994. The changes to the regulatory structure as a result of the 2002 Act 
underlined this commitment to a separate independent regulatory authority which 
had wide political support. The changes proposed were, in fact addressing issues 
of accountability which had emerged since the original Act. The changes 
proposed allowed, for example, for Ministerial directions on issues of policy. The 
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provision in the 2002 Act would allow a Minister to direct the regulator to 
perform a certain activity. It is a clear constraint on the independence of the 
regulator. Specifically in relation to radio spectrum, section 13(5) of the 2002 Act 
states in relation to radio spectrum management: 
 
‘may include directions in relating to – 
1. The allocation of particular bands of spectrum for specific categories of 
service, and 
2. The means by which entitlements to use such spectrum may be assigned 
(including appropriate fees), and in giving such direction the Minister 
shall have regard to principles of good frequency management’43 
 
The ability of the Minister to both issue directions and be involved in detailed 
regulations was also in the Dáil Debate on the Communications Regulation 
(2002) Act. Jim Higgins TD of Fine Gael, as quoted above, was puzzled by the 
Minister’s power both to issue directions and block regulations. The ability of the 
Minister to have both policy and radio spectrum management powers reflects the 
debate in the UK on the role of the Secretary of State. There was little opposition 
or debate on this aspect of the Communications Regulation (2002) Act. The all-
party support for the institutional arrangements in place and the focus on a lack of 
                                                 
43 Communications Regulation Act, 2002, Houses of the Oireachtas, Stationery Office, Dublin 
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accountability ensured that Parliament did not question the dilution in 
independence. 
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NON-FUNCTIONAL REASONS FOR DELEGATION IN IRELAND 
The case study to date has outlined in detail the creation of the independent 
agency for telecommunications regulation with particular discussion of radio 
spectrum management. The agency created was among the most independent 
regulatory agencies in the EU at the time and its remit on radio spectrum was 
equally broad. It is clear from the Telecommunications Strategy Report that 
credibility and functional factors were significant drivers in the creation of the 
agency, however, it is unclear why the agency was given such wide powers. A 
view has been put forward that this was partly self interest by those drafting the 
legislation. Also, it is clear from the evolution of legislation that although the 
independence of the agency was preserved, there was a clear intention in the 
Communications Act in 2002 to introduce constraints on the ODTR and to 
impose additional ex-ante controls. 
 
In this section the non-functional factors which may have influenced the policy 
actors throughout this process are discussed and may explain the initial high 
independence and the subsequent change of policy following the 1996 Act. 
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Firstly, this section will look at the development of other agencies in Ireland to 
see if the creation of the ODTR was influenced by a political tradition of 
delegation or policy leadership. Secondly, this section will look at the role of the 
EU in promoting the creation of independent agencies to manage 
telecommunications markets, and finally this section will look at blame shifting 
and other non-functional factors. Specifically, was the motivation on the part of 
policy actors to delegate specific authority on radio spectrum to the ODTR to 
avoid having to deal with a highly contentious issue on broadcasting spectrum? 
 
Political tradition and leadership 
 
It is important initially to contextualise telecommunications regulation against the 
development of other regulatory bodies in Ireland. In earlier chapters it was 
discussed that one factor which may explain the level of delegation to 
independent regulators was political tradition or leadership. Thatcher (2002b) 
argues that the decision to privatise a wide range of utilities in the UK was a 
result of political leadership and commitment to the concept of privatisation and 
liberalised markets. 
 
In Ireland, a number of independent regulators have been created in recent years. 
Gilardi (2005a) compared independence indicators across seven sectors and 
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seventeen countries and he considered that Ireland has some of the most 
independent agencies across seven different areas covering both social and 
economic sectors. The creation of regulatory authorities and agencies in the UK 
was the result of policies reducing the influence of government and particularly 
polices related to privatisations and liberalisation. Levy and Spiller (1994) have 
argued that there is strong correlation between market opening policies and the 
creation of independent regulators and from the UK case study it is clear a 
number of utility regulators were created following the privatisation of utilities 
and the opening of markets. Ireland did have a series of privatisations starting 
with Irish Ferries and Irish Life in the 1980s but the extent of privatisations was 
not on the same scale as the UK. Barrett (2004) argues that privatisations in 
Ireland were the result of events in the sector as opposed to any political tradition 
or leadership. Mc Dowell (2000) argues that the UK privatisations:  
 
‘Took place against a background of ideological conviction on the part of 
the British Government that privatisation was desirable in itself’ (Mc 
Dowell, 2000, pp. 49-50) 
 
McDowell argues that the Irish tradition and approach to privatisation was 
pragmatic and not driven by an ideological commitment to privatisation or 
market liberalisation. Mc Dowell argues: 
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‘there has been no real policy decision on the issue of state, as opposed to 
private sector, production of goods and services in terms of social and 
economic efficiency of the alternative modes of economic organisation. 
This undoubtedly suits the ‘pragmatic’ approach to policy decisions 
favoured by most Irish politicians and civil servants. It enables them to 
avoid causing what they see as unnecessary offence to interest groups or 
ideological opponents’ (Mc Dowell, 2000, pp. 49-50) 
 
In terms of utility regulation it would appear that the timing of the creation of 
utility regulators coincided with similar developments in other EU countries and 
the developments proposed by European directives. This is particularly the case 
in both telecommunications and electricity where Ireland lagged behind a number 
of other EU countries, notably the UK, in the creation of regulatory agencies.  
 
Given the reluctance of successive Irish governments to delegate authority, as 
argued above, and to deregulate markets, the creation of the telecommunications 
regulator, the first utility regulator, is an anomaly which warrants further 
investigation. If there was no political leadership or tradition supporting this drive 
to further delegation we assume a prime motivation was credibility in the context 
of market opening? However, the timing of the creation of the 
 263 
 
 
telecommunications agency coincided with the developments on market opening 
across Europe.  
 
The Impact of EU policies 
 
One of the factors considered in the theory on independent regulation is the view 
that regulators were created because of institutional changes at the EU level. 
There is no doubt that there was a growing number of directives, council 
resolutions and green papers decided in Europe which were important in driving 
the liberalisation and regulatory agenda. The Terminal Equipment Directive44, 
transposed in Ireland in 1991, liberalised the market for telecommunications 
equipment whereby other operators could offer consumer’s handsets for home 
use ensuring subscribers did not automatically have to take equipment from 
Telecom Éireann. Responding to European developments Minister Marie 
Geoghegan-Quinn TD, speaking in 1992, seemed to reflect the growing 
importance of Europe in the policy formulation: 
 
‘…in the light of EU developments it may be that there is a need for the 
setting up of a body, separate from my Department, to regulate the 
telecommunications industry in Ireland. The cost of establishing and 
operating such a body would, judging by the experience of other 
                                                 
44 Terminal Equipment Directive, 91/263/EEC 
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countries, be an inhibiting factor but I am keeping the need for the setting 
up of such a body under review’  (Dáil debates, 26/2/92) 
 
The EU had proposed to accelerate liberalisation of telecommunication services 
and these proposals were reflected in the Telecommunications Strategy Report.  
The report argued that national policies cannot operate in isolation from the 
overall thrust of the strategy at the European level: 
 
‘Our assessment of recent trends is that countries are increasingly 
tending to push ahead with telecommunications liberalisation more 
rapidly than strictly required to comply with EU Directives…Ireland 
cannot escape the impact of liberalisation at EU or at member state 
level…the view of the Group is that prompt implementation of EU 
requirements without availing of derogations should be the minimum 
policy approach’ (Department of Transport Energy and Communications, 
1994) 
 
It is clear from the Telecommunications Strategy Report, discussed above, that 
changes in other EU markets and the inevitability of change were a motivation in 
the creation of the regulatory environment. Westrup (2002) argues that the debate 
about regulation was driven by events in Europe: 
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‘It was the privatisation programme of the public utilities, beginning with 
British Telecom in 1984, and the EU adoption of a policy of market 
liberalisation for the utility sector, that has brought the debate to Ireland’ 
(Westrup, 2002) 
 
Where there is clear evidence to support the views that policy complexity and 
credible commitments were important factors in the creation of the ODTR, the 
timing of the 1996 Act appears to be have been driven by both national and 
European events. There is a clear indication of this in the opening statements to 
the 1996 Act given in the Dáil by Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communication, Michael Lowry TD. The Minister stated: 
 
‘The European Commission has been the driving force behind the 
liberalisation of telecommunications in the EU…the task of developing 
the regulatory package to ensure that competition and that regulatory 
measures are uniform throughout the union falls to the council and 
Parliament’  (Dáil debates, 3/10/96) 
 
There was acceptance that the liberalisation of the market across Europe 
precipitated the creation of an independent regulator. The Minister argued: 
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‘With the emergence of competition in the Irish telecommunications 
market, it is appropriate that the regulation of the sector be seen to be 
independent from the Minister’s shareholder and sectoral development 
functions. This separation is also a feature of telecommunications 
development in most of our EU partners and a requirement of pending 
EU legislation’ (Dáil debates, ibid) 
 
Although at the time of the Dáil Debate there was no obligation in European 
directives to have a separate regulatory authority, the European Commission 
proposals were clear and drafts of directives were being discussed by officials 
and Ministers in the Telecom Council from the mid-1990s. The European 
Commission’s objective was to create separate agencies particularly in cases 
where the government retained a shareholding in a regulated entity. The 
provisions of the 1997 Directive dealing with the competitive environment in 
telecommunications indicate the kind of independent regulator envisaged by the 
European Commission. Desmond O’Malley TD, during the Dáil Debate on 1996 
Act, also supports the timing of the creation of the regulator as driven by EU 
requirements: 
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‘The establishment of an independent office for the regulation of the 
telecommunications industry is a significant departure from traditional 
policy and as such I welcome it, even if it forced on us against the wishes 
of, presumably, the Government and the Department by European 
requirements’ (Dáil debates,26/9/96) 
 
Departmental officials involved in the drafting of the 1996 Act were asked if an 
independent regulator would have been created irrespective of developments in 
the European Commission and obligations in the liberalisation directives. All 
responded that the directives were important in terms of timing; however, they 
argue it is clear that a regulatory regime and the opening of the market had been 
anticipated under several Ministers45. Regina Finn argued that the European 
directives and liberalising agenda were the ‘tail wagging the dog’ but argued that 
the main driver was to privatise Telecom Éireann. She argued there was a need to 
bring external, commercial management expertise in Telecom Éireann in order to 
help it succeed as a private entity. The developments in Europe were a secondary 
pressure.  
 
An argument advanced by one interviewee was that the attention given to the 
European directives in the Dáil Debates was a political decision to allow the 
                                                 
45 Interviews specifically with Brendan Touhy, Regina Finn and Eamonn Molloy 
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Labour party, a member of the Rainbow coalition, to bring along their supporters 
who at the time were questioning the merits of opening the telecommunications 
market. The interviewee argued that this was particularly the case in drafting the 
Minister’s opening remarks, quoted earlier, on the importance of Europe in the 
debate. The government is arguing almost that they had no choice but to open the 
market and introduce a regulatory regime.46 It appears from the evidence that the 
European dimension was important in terms of timing of the Act and to some 
extent the leverage given by extending the derogation helped to bring along those 
who may not have supported the liberalisation agenda on its own merits. 
 
Prior to the publication of the 1996 Act the Government had conducted one 
major piece of strategic research into the future of the telecommunications sector 
that recommended an independent regulator should be created on the basis of 
arguments supporting credibility theories, complexity and, in the case of radio 
spectrum, expertise. There is clear evidence linking the timing of the creation of 
the regulator with market opening policies, however, there is also clear evidence 
that the European developments and gradual opening of telecommunications 
markets contributed at least to the triggering of the legislation. One interviewee 
confirmed that the Department had looked at a number of regulatory models as 
                                                 
46 Interview with Brendan Touhy 
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part of its planning for the regulatory regime47 which supports the isomorphic 
arguments also presented in the theory. The DTEC documents reviewed also 
show that it was the intention of the Department to propose a much larger agency 
covering the regulation of other sectors. Due to the urgency of the 
telecommunications issues the Department pressed ahead with the ODTR but it is 
clear there were proposals for a ‘super regulator’ to encompass energy regulation 
too. 
 
The issue remains, however, that the 1996 Act created a very independent 
regulator with functions that were clearly designed to mirror the functions of the 
regulatory division of its parent Department. The administrators in the 
Department were keen to remove political oversight on market-based regulation 
and this was also clearly an objective.  
 
 
Blame Shifting and other factors influencing the independence of the ODTR 
 
 
A motivation argued in the literature for the creation of independent agencies has 
been blame shifting, where policy actors may wish to delegate authority to 
                                                 
47 Interview Brendan Touhy and Regina Finn, a report was prepared on regulatory models evident in other 
member countries 
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agencies in order to avoid blame for unpopular decisions. Fiorina (1977) argues 
that politicians will delegate unpopular decisions to independent agencies. At the 
time of the drafting of the 1996 Act for example, the radio spectrum powers were 
scrutinised on the issue of deflectors and on the controversial award of the second 
mobile phone licence. It could be argued, particularly in relation to the deflector 
issue, that the policy actors were guilty of blame shifting, especially in ensuring 
that the ODTR assumed, via their responsibility for radio spectrum management, 
the control and management of the deflector issue. 
 
Television signal deflector was a major political issue in the 1997 General 
Election. In the 1997 General Election deflector campaigners supported a number 
of independent candidates. Tom Gildea was elected in Donegal on the issue of 
deflectors. 
 
Deflectors are illegal retransmissions of broadcast TV signals, generally 
community based systems, which allow local residents to have multi-channel 
viewing in areas where the only available TV broadcasting were the national 
terrestrial channels. Deflectors raised a knotty legal issue for the Rainbow 
coalition as cable operators had been awarded the exclusive franchise for multi 
channel TV distribution by the previous Fianna Fáil Minister, Ray Burke TD. In 
1995 the growing importance of deflectors in supplying multi-channel TV, 
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particularly in rural areas, was highlighted in the Carrigaline case. Carrigaline 
Television, trading as South Coast Community Television, had brought the 
Minister to the High Court, challenging the decision made by a former Minister 
for Communications, Ray Burke TD, to award to certain cable companies 
exclusive licences to broadcast multi-channel television. The deflector company 
lost the case and the cable companies were therefore legally entitled to exclusive 
contracts. However, the deflector companies carried on without a licence, 
contrary to section 6 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 1926, and thus infringing 
copyright legislation.  
 
The Taoiseach, John Bruton TD, in May 1996, during a by-election campaign in 
Cork had committed his administration to bring in legislation to legalise 
deflectors. In the final stages of the adoption of the Miscellaneous Provisions 
(Telecommunications) (1996) Act, there is a note on the DTEC files which is 
from the Department of the Taoiseach: 
 
‘The Taoiseach on reviewing the draft memo for Government commented 
that ‘the Cork television issue’ should be sorted before the Bill is brought 
forward’48 
 
                                                 
48 DTEC TR5/5, vol5 
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The political sensitivity of this issue was demonstrated in the Dáil debates on the 
1996 Act.  Deputy P.J. Morley argued: 
 
‘During the last Cork by-election the Taoiseach (John Bruton) gave a 
commitment to the people of Cork that one of the first things he would do 
would be to have the (deflector) system licensed. I have gone into this in 
detail because I fear that appointing a regulator is a way of ducking what 
is clearly the government obligation to this matter’ (Dáil debates, 
6/11/96) 
 
The licensing of radio spectrum deflectors delegated to the independent regulator 
could be argued as blame shifting. The Minister of State, Emmet Stagg TD, 
debating this issue seems to accept this accusation: 
 
‘The biggest issue raised was deflectors systems. Under the bill, the 
Ministers current powers will be transferred to the regulator. There is an 
understandable concern that this represents a washing of hands by the 
Government’ (Dáil debates, 6/11/96) 
 
The contributions from several Deputies and Senators allude to the fact that the 
powers being transferred would allow the Minister to pass the responsibility for 
 273 
 
 
deflectors to the regulator. Fianna Fáil proposed an amendment to the 1996 Act 
which proposed: 
 
‘before transferring to the Director any functions relating to television 
retransmission services or matters connected herewith, introduce 
regulations providing for the continuance in operation of the deflector 
systems of television transmission’49 
 
The amendment was not successful and the Minister of State tried to assure the 
Dáil that within the period prior to the creation of the regulator the government 
would endeavor to bring forward regulations to resolve the problem. Interviews 
with departmental officials and politicians at the time confirm however that the 
transfer of radio spectrum functions to the ODTR which included the licensing of 
retransmission deflector systems was seen as a key advantage of the Act. From 
the point of view of the officials it was a clear motivation for the politicians to 
ensure that the 1996 Act was on the statue books50. Regulations were brought 
forward, on the instruction of the Taoiseach, to licence the deflectors in the final 
months of the Rainbow coalition and the Minister, Alan Dukes TD, confirmed in 
interview that the coalition did try to resolve the issue before leaving office.  The 
                                                 
49 Dáil debates, Amendment filed by Deputy Seamus Brennan TD, 6.11.96 
50 Specifically in interview with Alan Dukes, Minister of Communications who succeeded Michael Lowry in 
December 1996 
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regulations were withdrawn prior to the final Rainbow coalition cabinet. Two 
interviewees, Ruairi Quinn TD and Alan Dukes TD, members of the Rainbow 
coalition Cabinet, confirmed that the legal advice was that the Government 
would be acting illegally in licensing such systems when cable operators had 
been awarded exclusive licences for retransmission. Following the election the 
new Minister for Public Enterprise in the new Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat 
government, Mary O’Rourke TD, confirmed that she was glad that the ODTR 
had the powers to deal with the deflector issue as this was the first crisis she 
faced as Minister and could easily argue the matter was for the ODTR. 
 
The deflector debate highlights the growing importance of radio spectrum in the 
commercial activities of the country. The licensing power being delegated was 
considered by the Fianna Fáil-Progressive Democrat government, assuming 
office after the creation of the ODTR, a case of blame shifting. The deflector 
issue for the Rainbow coalition was more problematic as they had committed to 
solving the problem before leaving office. The creation of the ODTR, although 
helping to ensure these issues were not on the agenda of the next government, did 
not resolve the problem in the short term. 
 
Another issue which appeared to have helped the passage of the 1996 Act and the 
delegation of radio spectrum powers was the growing allegations around the 
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awarding of the second mobile phone licence. Scandals have been discussed as a 
non-functional factor in the creation of independent agencies. The accusation of 
political interference in the awarding of the licence to Esat Digifone and the 
subsequent tribunals investigating the award have focused on the government’s 
role and specifically the role of the Minister Michael Lowry in issuing these 
commercial licences to private entities; although the award of the second mobile 
phone licence and the third mobile phone licence, which was conducted by the 
ODTR, were carried out by expert consultants and officials. The accusation of 
Ministerial interference would always remain if the powers were retained within 
the Department. The justification for keeping the allocation of radio spectrum 
away from politicians was only re-enforced by these scandals. 
 
Unlike the deflectors’ issue the award of the second mobile phone licence did not 
have the ‘taint’ of political interference which it acquired as the subsequent 
tribunals unfolded. A number of interviewees were involved in the project team 
awarding the second mobile licence. They argued that the award of the second 
licence was not a major issue in the lead up to the 1996 Act. It was confirmed by 
the officials, as discussed elsewhere, that a decision of this nature should be taken 
independent of Ministerial oversight. Irrespective of the subsequent controversy 
on the awarding of the second mobile licence, the power to licence would have 
been transferred to the independent regulator. 
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A final issue which needs to be addressed is whether the Department at any time 
in the policy thinking, framing or drafting of the 1996 Act considered the 
introduction of a separate radio spectrum agency. Such an agency was evident in 
the UK case study and had existed in the UK since 1990. It was highlighted 
earlier in this chapter that the technical division had a wide brief to advise on 
spectrum issues not just to the DTEC but also on broadcasting issues to the 
Department of Arts and Culture. An argument had been made in the early 1990s 
that this remit and additional resources would merit the technical division being 
considered as an independent unit advising Government. The proposal made by 
the Civil and Public Service Union (CPSU), following a reorganisation in 1992, 
was not taken forward. It does not appear from departmental records or reports 
that the option of creating a separate agency for radio spectrum was ever 
considered. Early drafts of the 1996 Act refer to the transfer of functions 
performed by the Minister under the Wireless Telegraphy Act (1926), so it was 
an early intention to delegate these functions to the regulator. Interviews with 
departmental officials involved in drafting the 1996 and 2002 legislation, 
specifically Brendan Touhy, who was promoted to Secretary-General of the 
Department of Public Enterprise following the 1996 Act, argue that a country of 
Ireland’s size could not justify the creation of a separate radio spectrum agency. 
It does seem reasonable to conclude that a separate agency was not justified for a 
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small country. However, one can also conclude that the fact that the policy was 
not extensively discussed in the Department is indicative of the level of scrutiny 
radio spectrum was given prior to delegation. 
  
The issue of converged or individual regulators is relevant here also. As a small 
country, consideration was given to the Utilities Regulatory Commission which 
was discussed by the Rainbow coalition and the successive Fianna Fáil-
Progressive Democrat coalition. The 1996 Act was prepared on the assumption 
that a multi-sector regulator would be created in the near future. In the UK at the 
same time many commentators were discussing the concept of a converged 
regulator. The proposed creation of Ofcom, bringing together various 
communications regulators, was an early proposal of the first Labour 
government. The Irish government’s policy document in 2002 (Department of 
Public Enterprise, 2000) discusses the appropriate level of regulation and argues: 
 
‘At present, it seems that regulation at the sectoral level is probably the 
most appropriate for the utilities in Ireland. This level of regulation 
allows for an approach focused on the particular circumstances of the 
various markets while comprehending the competition/complementarity 
between industries operating (or potentially operating) in the same 
market. As markets develop the justification for detailed sectoral 
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regulatory intervention may diminish over time. The question of a supra-
sectoral regulatory authority might, therefore, be more relevant in that 
context and the issue could be re-examined at a future date, in the context 
of dealing with residual regulatory functions across the various sectors 
and achieving synergies’ (Department of Public Enterprise, 2000, p. 10) 
 
This view is consistent with the activities of the Fianna-Fail-Progressive 
Democrat government where new sector regulators were created for electricity 
and aviation, and where existing regulators like the ODTR were given regulation 
of the postal sector, which although a separate industry, was considered to be part 
of the communications sector. 
 
The Utilities Regulatory Commission appeared to be relevant up to early 1997. 
DTEC documents discussing the job description and the functions of the new 
Director are annotated with reference to the ‘super regulator’ specifically in 
relation to the Director’s office and position having to be subsumed into a larger 
regulator. There is no documentation or Dáil discussion on the demise of this 
concept and the Utilities Regulatory Commission was never created. Interviews 
with politicians and officials suggest that with the creation of the ODTR the 
pressing regulatory and market issues, which had been behind the super regulator 
solution, disappeared. Issues such as the strategic alliance, deflectors, and 
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disputes between service operators in the communications’ sector were all 
resolved in early 1997 by transferring these issues to the ODTR. The politicians 
interviewed, specifically Alan Dukes TD, the responsible Minister who was 
appointed in December 1996, following the resignation of Michael Lowry, said 
that the reason the Utilities Regulatory Commission did not get going was that 
officials and politicians realised what a powerful creation they would have in a 
‘super regulator’. He argued in interviews that the super regulator would be a 
‘behemoth’ for a country like Ireland. The view could also be taken that the 
super-regulator legislation was unlikely to be completed in time for the election 
in mid-1997 and the Rainbow coalition just ran out of time. The new Minister, 
Mary O’Rourke TD, had accepted the idea of a super-regulator; however, her 
proposal was a super-regulator regulating the regulators. The issue for the new 
government appeared to be more in relation to accountability. The Minister is 
quoted as follows: 
 
‘The question ultimately is, who regulates the regulators and how can 
that work be to the consumer benefit’51 
 
The policy maker’s choices in Ireland were initially to favour a super regulator. 
The creation of smaller agencies, like a radio spectrum agency, was rejected 
                                                 
51 Irish Independent, August 17th 1999 
 280 
 
 
based on the scale of the Irish economy. However, in 1999 the policy makers in 
the Department of Public Enterprise created a separate energy regulator, the 
Commission for Energy Regulation (CER), which had different governance 
criteria. Specifically, it was led by a Commission of three people as opposed to 
the ODTR model of one Director. The policy makers had moved on from the 
creation of the ODTR in 1996 to raise issues of accountability and process in 
2000. A number of events, including the dispute with the Minister for Finance on 
third generation licences, had woken up the Department up to the true 
independence of the ODTR and very soon after the creation of the ODTR they 
started to draft amendments which would limit the institutional power of the 
ODTR. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
It is clear from the evidence reviewed above that the creation of independent 
regulation was driven in part by a policy of liberalisation and market opening. 
The decision to create a regulator was principally for reasons discussed in earlier 
chapters around the issues of credibility and complexity. However, the lack of a 
policy discussion of the functions and structure of the regulator led initially to the 
creation of a regulator which was more independent than was seen as appropriate 
by policy makers. Subsequent legislation has addressed this issue by introducing 
a greater degree of accountability. The timing of these events was dictated by 
European Commission demands and to that extent isomorphism arguments 
discussed in earlier chapters also need to be considered. 
 
The Dáil Debates at the time of the 1996 Act show clear support for an 
independent agency free from Ministerial interference. But equally, it is clear that 
the focus of Parliamentary debates during the 1996 Act was on the sale of a 
government stake in Telecom Éireann. The Fianna Fáil opposition view 
concentrated on the strategic alliance which formed the second part of the debate. 
Deputy Brendan Daly TD argued: 
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‘Fianna Fáil is opposing the bill mainly on the grounds that the sale of a 
percentage shareholding in Telecom Éireann was a bad deal. Apart from 
that, we would agree with most of what the Minister said’ (Dáil debates, 
14/11/96)  
 
The widespread acceptance of the need for an independent regulator meant that 
there was little discussion about the powers of the regulator. Specifically, when 
examining the operational delegation of powers in relation to radio spectrum it is 
clear that the decision to delegate functions in terms of the management of the 
radio spectrum was completed without a fundamental review of radio spectrum 
policy or legislation. It was delegated on the basis of the existing regulatory 
responsibilities in relation to radio spectrum which resided in the Department of 
Transport, Energy and Communications (DTEC).  
 
The Telecommunications (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act in 1996 was the first 
major piece of legislation to delegate significant powers to an independent 
agency in Ireland. The agency created is accepted to be a very independent 
regulator by EU criteria. The concern, following a review of the documents and 
the interviews, is whether the ODTR operational and institutional independence 
was created by accident or design. 
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The Department’s clear intention was to create an independent regulator. The 
Telecommunications Strategy Review group cited very good reasons for creating 
such a regulator, many of which support the credibility theories and policy 
complexity arguments put forward in previous chapters. The constant refrain 
from officials involved in the process was the clear desire to remove Ministerial 
involvement in day-to-day market-based regulation. The creation of the 
regulatory division within the Department was an early commitment to further 
delegation and the division responsible for the legislation, as discussed above, 
was a clear advocate for independence. However, the Act creating the regulator 
was less clear on the independence of the ODTR. The Act was based on the 
legislation which created the Director of Consumer Affairs, an office which was 
staffed by civil servants. Interviewees argued it was difficult to find another 
suitable model in Ireland. The early drafts of the Act envisaged a Director with 
civil service staff, responsible to the Department. It is also clear that it was the 
intention to retain civil service staff in the ODTR and to constrain the Director 
from hiring people outside the civil service or from having a more active input 
into the organisation of the regulator. This is particularly evident in 1999 when 
Etain Doyle, the first Director, attempted to change the status of civil servants by 
urging them to leave the civil service. 52 Etain Doyle in interviews argued that 
there was a strongly held view that her staff should be civil servants. She argued 
                                                 
52 Irish Independent, 19/10/99 
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that following her decision to offer key staff private contracts outside the civil 
service she was ‘star chambered’ by senior level civil servants to encourage her 
to retain her civil service staff. The ability of the ODTR to hire staff with the 
appropriate skills for the operational responsibility it had is a key indicator of 
independence. Although legislatively the ODTR was independent there were 
informal constraints and norms which applied to limit this independence.  
 
There is also the evolution of the drafting of the Act against the backdrop of the 
larger Utility Commission proposal being enacted later and this, combined with 
the urgency created by the strategic alliance with KPN-Telia, led to an Act which 
can be interpreted as creating a very independent regulator, but without the 
conviction that this was the political intention of the Act.  
 
In relation to radio spectrum functions there were concerns at official level 
around the relative responsibilities of the Minister and the regulator. The Act 
does delegate wide powers to the regulator with some justifiable oversight by the 
Minister in terms of policy. However, the powers to allocate, plan and collect 
fees for radio spectrum are clearly delegated and it was the clear intention of the 
regulatory division to ensure these powers were delegated. The documentation 
from the Department shows a clear desire to remove Ministerial influence on 
radio spectrum allocations which had been an issue certainly in terms of state 
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commercial companies such as Telecom Éireann and Radio Telefís Éireann 
(RTÉ) lobbying against radio spectrum allocation for services in the past. 
However, there is a lack of documentation or strategy on radio spectrum which 
suggests that little discussion seemed to take place on the actual functions to be 
delegated and there are only brief exchanges in relation to the licensing regime 
for radio spectrum. The issue of deflectors certainly helped the progress of the 
Bill and once enacted, Ministers could effectively argue that deflectors were an 
issue for the ODTR. 
 
The impact of European directives is important in terms of the timing and 
impetus to create an independent agency. The progressive liberalisation of the 
market in the early 1990s and the insistence by European directives of structural 
separation of the regulator from the political process was a key driver of the 
project in the Department. Equally the European directives served as a 
framework for the officials in drafting the legislation, as many of the functions in 
terms of market opening and licensing were being debated and laid out in 
directives leading up to the creation of the ODTR. There is no doubt, based on 
the early internal departmental reports and the globalisation of communications 
markets, that Telecom Éireann would have been privatised. Therefore, the need 
for a credible regulatory framework would have led to the creation of an 
independent regulator. The pace of this change, however, was driven by the 
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European directives which accelerated liberalisation, privatisation and the 
strategic alliance.   
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CHAPTER 6: TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION IN THE 
NETHERLANDS: THE NON-DELEGATION OF RADIO SPECTRUM 
INTRODUCTION 
The introduction of telecommunications regulation in the Netherlands has many 
parallels with the previous case studies. Many of the legislative and institutional 
changes were timed to coincide with legislative changes in Europe. The 
progressive liberalisation of the telecoms market and the privatisation of the 
telecom operator, which was noted in the Irish case study, also occurred in the 
Netherlands. The main telecommunications operator was privatised in the 1990s 
and the telecommunications regulator was created via legislation in 1996. 
However, although Ireland, UK and Netherlands worked within a common 
European regulatory framework, the Netherlands chose to deal, at a national 
level, with the institutional challenges in a different way to the cases we have 
looked at so far. 
 
The Netherlands was the only member state not to delegate radio spectrum 
responsibilities to a separate or converged independent telecommunications 
regulator. In the UK a Ministerial agency was created in 1990 and later was 
merged in 2003 within an independent converged regulator. In Ireland, the 
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responsibility for radio spectrum was delegated to the independent 
telecommunications regulator under legislation in 1996. In the Netherlands the 
radio spectrum authority is a separate agency under the control of the Ministry 
and has remained separate from the telecommunications regulator despite several 
debates in the Netherlands on the institutional arrangements for the liberalised 
telecommunications market. 
 
This case study will examine the key decisions of the Netherland’s 
administrations as they liberalised their market. Firstly, the case study will 
examine the history of telecommunications regulation and specifically the 
regulation of radio spectrum. Secondly, the legislative decisions creating the 
independent regulator, particularly the Interim (1996) Act will be examined. The 
key drivers and influencers of policy makers leading up to the enactment of the 
Interim (1996) Act will be assessed. Finally, the case will examine the non-
functional factors, particularly political leadership, and whether there is evidence 
that delegation of authority or otherwise was the product of political leadership or 
tradition.  
 
The sources in this case differ to the previous two cases. This is mainly due to the 
fact that Parliamentary debates are not in English. Therefore, interviews have 
been conducted with key politicians active at the time of the legislation. Unlike 
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the other cases however there is very little legislative and Parliamentary activity. 
The Dutch political system places a strong reliance on the role of the Minister 
and his or her accountability to Parliament. There is only one piece of legislation 
to be considered, so key ministers and key officials in the Ministries have been 
interviewed. It was also important to discuss the role of the separate radio 
spectrum agency with both agency officials and Ministry officials. Finally, as 
with other cases, there are common personalities who have made the transition 
from Ministry to independent agencies and these individuals are key to an 
understanding of the process of institutional change in the Netherlands. A useful 
source to complement the interviews is a number of OECD and academic studies 
which have reviewed the Netherlands telecommunications market and its 
regulatory framework. 
 
Table 14: List of interviewees for 
Netherlands case study 
Name Title & Key Responsibility Role in creation of OPTA  
Annemarie Jorritsma Minister for Transport and 
Economic Affairs from 1994-
2002 and deputy prime minister 
from 1997-2002. 
Minister who was responsible 
for Legislation and senior 
member of VVD party 
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John Derkson Radio communications agency Involved in both Ministry and 
radio communications agency. 
A liaison official with OPTA 
Hans Houdjink Radio communications agency A senior director in the Radio 
Communications Agency 
Hans Bakker Officer in Ministry of transport, 
general manager of OPTA and 
consultant 
Key official in Ministry drafting 
legislation and senior member 
of regulator until 2002 
Jens Arnbak First chairman of OPTA 1997-
2004 
 
Chris Fonteijn Current chairman of OPTA  
Jos Huigen Official in Ministry of 
Economic Affairs 
Senior official in Ministry of 
Economic affairs and in the 
regulator 
Mark Frequin Director of Telecom Section : 
Ministry of Economic Affairs 
 
Lauren van Brinkhorst Minister for Economic Affairs 
2003-2006 
Mr. van Brinkhorst was the 
Minister for Economic Affairs 
in the second cabinet of Jan 
Peter Balkenende of the 
Netherlands formed on May 27, 
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2003.  
Marjet van Zuijlen Partner/Director at Deloitte 
Netherlands 
Labour spokesperson and 
member of Parliament during 
passing of telecommunications 
act 
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THE HISTORY OF RADIO SPECTRUM REGULATION IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
Telecommunication regulation and policy remained unchanged for most of the 
20th century in the Netherlands. The process of radio spectrum regulation is 
common in the Netherlands with the experience in the other cases. In most 
European countries the management of radio spectrum was a matter for 
government civil servants. The Telephone Act (1904) created a state enterprise, 
PTT Nederland (Post Telegraph and Telephone), which was a division of the 
Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. Similar to other 
cases the treatment of radio and broadcast was different. The Radio Broadcasting 
Transmitter Act (1935) removed the responsibility of radio and television 
broadcasting from PTT Nederland and it has remained separate ever since. 
 
In 1989, PTT Nederland was transformed into a state-owned private limited 
corporation, again a process which mirrored developments in the UK in 1984 
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with the creation of British Telecom and in Ireland in 1983 with the creation of 
Telecom Éireann. The new entity was called Koninklijke PTT Nederland 
(‘KPN’). KPN would be progressively privatised in the 1990s. The legislation 
creating KPN, in Dutch ‘Wet op de telecommunicatievoorzieningen’, abbreviated 
to the Wtv Act, also created a monopoly concession for KPN which was 
gradually reduced by various amendments to the Wtv Act in the 1990s, reflecting 
changes in EU directives. The monopoly concession was similar to the UK 
progressive introduction of competition from 1984 until the early 1990s. The 
market was completely liberalised by the Competition Act (1998) which enacted 
the ONP (Open Network Provision) Directives. 
 
During this period, regulation of all telecommunications services and radio 
spectrum was reorganised in the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management. From 1989 to 1995 the new division of communications and post 
(hereinafter in Dutch HDTP) was split into a policy affairs directorate and a 
Functional affairs directorate. However, by 1995 the policy affairs directorate 
could not adequately regulate and supervise the parties operating in the market. 
According to Eijsvoogel there was also an issue with operating as most important 
shareholder of KPN and at the same time managing an increasingly liberalised 
market (Eijsvoogel, 1997). 
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The supervision and regulation of the market was transferred to the newly 
created, Directorate Supervision of Networks and Services (hereinafter TND) and 
the Functional affairs directorate was replaced by the Radio Communications 
Agency (hereinafter RDR). Eijsvoogel (1997) argues these agencies were 
designed to be future independent agencies but in 1995 were still under direct 
Ministerial control. The respective remits of these agencies at this time is 
important to consider. TND was essentially the regulator responsible for issuing 
licences and permits. TND also monitored compliance with licence conditions 
and regulations. Finally, TND had responsibility for the dispute resolution and 
interconnection between parties operating in the liberalised market. The RDR, 
like its UK counterpart, the Radio Communications Agency, had responsibility 
for radio spectrum including issuing licences and monitoring interference. 
 
In many ways this mirrors the evolution of regulatory responsibilities in Ireland 
and to a lesser extent in the UK. The UK at this time had a separate non-
governmental agency, Oftel, dealing with the telecommunications sector. The 
RDR in the Netherlands was no different to the Radio Communications Agency. 
In fact there are many parallels. The regulation of radio spectrum remained the 
responsibility of the Ministry. Interviewees argued that the RDR remained under 
the Ministry and remained in the north east city of Groningen for regional and 
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historical reasons53. This is similar to the arguments made by interviewees in the 
UK where the distinct geographic location of the Radio Communications agency 
in London’s Docklands was highlighted as a reason for its separation from the 
Ministry. The radio spectrum responsibilities, which had been the responsibility 
of KPN, were carried out by a unit based in Groningen. When these tasks were 
passed to the Ministry it was logical to keep the same staff and offices in 
Groningen. Over the subsequent years, interviewees confirmed that proposals to 
bring the agency to The Hague, or to merge it with the independent telecom 
regulator, were resisted by local politicians who argued that Groningen needed 
the jobs54. Officials from the RDR agreed with the historical reasoning for having 
the agency in Groningen but argued that there were specific spectrum issues 
related to interference which meant that Groningen was an appropriate location.55 
 
Interviewees from both the agency and others involved in the political process at 
the time argued that its technical expertise was also a factor in keeping the 
technical spectrum experts from KPN in Groningen and not losing that expertise. 
There are further parallels here with the Radio Communications Agency in the 
UK. Both were Ministerial agencies historically located outside their Ministries 
                                                 
53 This was specifically mentioned by RDR interviewees but also by Jens Arnbak 
54 Specifically interviews with Jens Arnbak and Hans Bakker 
55 Interviews with John Derkson and Hans Houdijk. Groningen geographically had been the location for a 
number of unlicenced radio stations and the agency were located in this area to tackle such illegal broadcasting 
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and both remained distinct units because of the perceived expertise and autonomy 
of the units prior to their creation as separate agencies. 
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TELECOMS REGULATION IN NETHERLANDS 
 
This section will examine the creation of the telecoms regulator, its powers, its 
remit and the legislation in 1996. As discussed earlier, the reorganisation of the 
Ministry of Public Transport led to the spilt between radio spectrum matters 
which were managed by the RDR and telecommunications regulatory functions, 
managed by TND. Telecommunication privatisation policies began in 1982. The 
initial policies adopted were essentially public sector reform. The aim of these 
policies was initially aimed at reducing the size of government by transferring 
activities to the private sector, or by contracting out non-core activities to 
agencies. The reforms were driven by a number of key members of the 
government and senior civil servants. According to Yesilkagit and De Vries the 
agenda was stated clearly:  
 
‘…next to deregulation and decentralisation, privatisation forms a 
crucial part of government policy: achievement of budgetary savings, the 
improvement of administrative control, and the strengthening of the 
market sector’ (Yesilkagit & De Vries, 2004 , p. 965) 
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The ability to drive this agenda was helped by agreement with private sector 
unions and employers. The second Lubbers coalition also had agreements with 
the public sector unions where pensions and jobs were protected. Jens Arnbak 
argues that the political leadership shown by these coalitions in the 1980s was 
driven by changes in the market elsewhere, like the UK. Jens Arnbak was 
appointed by Mrs Smit-Kroes, the Minister for Transport, in 1989 to research the 
future regulatory models and privatisation options. He agreed that their report 
emphasised particularly the developments in the UK56. The report of the ‘three 
wise men’ recommended the privatisation of the telecom company and the 
creation of an independent regulator along similar models to the UK. In relation 
to radio spectrum it did not make any special recommendations but did recognise 
the importance of radio spectrum in the future development of the market.57 
 
From 1991 the emphasis was placed on the creation of agencies. Yesilkagt and 
De Vries (2004) describe these agencies as ‘Agentschappen’. They are defined 
as:  
‘…independent in terms of financial and personnel management but 
remain part of the Department’ (Yesilkagit and De Vries, 2004 , p. 959) 
 
                                                 
56 Interview Jens Arnbak 
57 Interview Jens Arnbak 
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The reforms initiated by the first Lubbers coalition and subsequent coalitions in 
the 1980s and early 1990s were achieved without much resistance from the 
polity. Despite several changes of government, the drive towards privatisations 
was continued. In these coalitions the Christian Democratic Party (Cda) was the 
key part. One of its Ministers, and the key driver of the agenda for privatization, 
was Mrs. Neelie Smit-Kroes, the current competition commissioner in the 
European Commission. Jens Arnbak, the first head of the regulator and an expert 
advisor to Mrs Smit-Kroes, argued that the privatisation agenda particularly in 
telecoms was driven by her58.  
 
In 1994, Annemarie Jorritsma, the opposition spokesperson on 
telecommunications for the Volkspartij voor Vrijheid (VVD) or People’s Party 
for Freedom and Democracy, tabled a motion calling for the establishment of an 
independent regulator.  The VVD is the most vociferous supporter of private 
enterprise in the Netherlands and months later as Minister, Mrs. Jorritsma, was 
obliged to support her own motion and start the process of writing legislation to 
create the independent regulator.  
 
She created a small team to draft the legislation and also created a Commission to 
advise her on policy. The Commission’s advice had to be followed by the 
                                                 
58 Interview Jens Arnbak 
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Minister and, if it wasn’t, the Minister had to explain her decision, to differ from 
the advice, to Parliament. In 1997 when the regulator was created all of those 
employees in the TND were moved to the Onafhankelijke Post en 
Telecommunicatie Autoriteit (OPTA), the independent regulator. The RDR’s 
status, however, remained unchanged at this time and was considered an 
‘Agentchappen’, a distinct agency within the Ministry. It is important to note that 
there is no legislative basis for the RDR. Similar to the UK’s Radio 
Communications Agency, created in 1990, the creation of the agency was an 
executive decision.  
 
It is important to examine the creation of the telecom regulator and then examine 
the role of the RDR and finally examine the importance of EU policies on the 
institutional changes. 
 
The Creation of the Regulator, OPTA and the Telecommunications Act 1996 
 
The drafting of legislation to create the independent regulator was initially 
directed by a staff of five people in the TND. Hans Bakker, the head of the unit, 
said that the process was slow. Although there was Ministerial support for the 
measure and consensus in Parliament, the civil service in the Netherlands was 
cautious towards the creation of an independent agency outside of the Ministry. 
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Bakker recalls that at a conference of civil servants to discuss the proposed 
institutional changes, a civil servant suggested that the regulator should be like a 
Greek temple with an impressive façade, but with nothing to support it. Bakker 
had difficulties with a number of Ministries trying to get the legislation finalised 
because, he argued, the proposal, although accepted by civil servants, they 
wished to minimise the influence of the agency59. 
 
Within the Ministry of Transport, the drafting of the legislation was delayed by 
capacity issues as the senior civil servants argued that there were not sufficient 
resources available to draft the legislation. The Ministry of Economic Affairs 
resisted the legislation as they were in the process of creating a Dutch 
competition authority, the Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit (NMa), and in 
their view the regulator should be part of the Competition Authority not a 
separate institution. The Home Office was concerned at the concept of 
independent regulation. It resisted every power proposed by the draft legislation. 
They argued against giving the regulator the power to fine and said this should 
only be done by a Minister. They resisted the legal status of the regulator, arguing 
that it should be an agency of the Ministry.  Each of these issues was addressed, 
either by a combination of Ministerial will or negotiation. The outcome, however, 
was a slower process of drafting. Chris Fonteijn, the current chairman of OPTA, 
                                                 
59 Interview with Hans Bakker 
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although not involved at the time, can attest to the difficulties raised by some 
Ministries to the creation of OPTA. He commented that outside his office in 
OPTA is a framed letter from the Minister of Interior Affairs to the Minister for 
Transport, Mrs. Jorritsma, Minister for Transport which, paraphrasing Mr. 
Fonteijn, says you can have your OPTA60. 
 
The resistance continued even when the legislation had been agreed by 
government and was before Parliament. In the final discussions in Parliament, the 
Minister for Economic Affairs proposed an amendment which would refer all 
decisions of the regulator for prior approval by the competition authority. Hans 
Bakker argued that throughout this process, he needed to get supportive members 
of Parliament to question the Minister and to push the agenda forward. He 
explained that although Mrs. Jorritisma was a Minister and a member of 
government she needed broad cross party support for the creation of OPTA.61 
This is confirmed by Mrs. van Zuijlen, who was a member of Parliament for the 
Labour party. If Hans Bakker had a difficulty with the civil service or political 
difficulties from other Ministries, Hans Bakker would contact Mrs. van Zuijlen to 
get her to raise the issue in the Dutch Parliament. The Minister, who was equally 
frustrated by other Ministers and Ministries, would welcome the question. She 
                                                 
60 Interview Chris Fonteijn 
61 Interview  Hans Bakker 
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would return to her Ministry arguing the Parliament wanted such a change in the 
legislation.  
 
The use by civil servants of the Parliament in this fashion is unusual. There is a 
risk that Hans Bakker, as an interviewee, may be overstating his role. However, 
other interviewees have confirmed his account of events. Mrs. van Zuijlen 
confirmed she had asked questions given to her by Hans Bakker, and Jens 
Arnbak confirmed that Hans Bakker continued the practice when he joined 
OPTA. The Minister for Economic Affairs from 2003-2006, Lauren van 
Brinkhorst, confirmed also that Hans Bakker’s tactics in the lead up to the 
legislation, and during his time in OPTA, annoyed many people in the Ministry, 
and Mr. van Brinkhorst. In interviews Mr. van Brinkhorst said one of his first 
duties as Minister was to ask Jens Arnbak to sack Hans Bakker from OPTA 
because of his divisive relationship with the Ministry. 
 
Mansell, Davies and Hulsink (1996) reflect on the general confusion and lack of 
clear strategy in the Ministry at the time: 
 
‘From 1993 until the summer of 1995 preparations were made for new 
telecommunications legislation. The intention was to establish an 
infrastructure ‘duopoly’ whereby PTT Telecom would compete with a 
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second fixed infrastructure licencee. However the duopoly policy 
appeared to be abandoned in the summer of 1995. Draft legislation 
called for a ‘double duopoly’ comprised of a consortium of trunk/national 
and local/regional operators and a licensing regime giving separate 
licences to local/regional and trunk/national operators. In June 1995 the 
draft legislation was rejected by Parliament for its complexity’ (Mansell, 
Davies, & Hulsink, 1996 ) 
 
The Interim Act (1996) which created OPTA did make the regulator explicitly 
independent. The regulator was to be run by a full time Chairman supported by 
two part time members of a board. All the members of the board were appointed 
by the Minister. The law does not specify any specific expertise however one of 
the board members is a lawyer and the other is an industrialist. A number of 
interviewees have said that the appointment of Jens Arnbak as the first chairman 
of OPTA was apolitical. The appointment, according to Mrs. Annemarie 
Jorritsma, was not political. Mrs. Jorritsma also argued that the appointment of 
Jens Arnbak was important because the appointment needed to be credible. She 
pointed out that Professor Jens Arnbak was not a member of her political party 
but a member of the Labour Party. Other interviewees have argued that 
consideration was given to former senior industry figures as potential chairmen, 
but Mrs. Jorritsma was keen to give the agency credibility from its inception and 
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therefore appointed an academic and former advisor as opposed to an industry 
figurehead. 
 
The Act allowed OPTA to operate free from interference. The staff of TND was 
moved to OPTA and the offices physically relocated away from the Ministry. 
Funding for OPTA came from an industry levy with some funds from the 
Ministry for advice. The Ministry, however, did approve the budget of OPTA and 
can therefore indirectly influence the activities of the regulator. One interviewee, 
Hans Bakker, the first general manager of OPTA, argued that this influence was 
never more than bluster from the Minister as the Ministry could not really 
propose changes. He argued that there were many meetings in the early years 
where the Ministry complained of the cost of the regulator but OPTA was never 
compromised on funding. Ministry officials however, disagree with this and 
believe that the power to approve the OPTA budget is a strong leverage over the 
activities of the regulator. They argue that they have managed to reduce the 
OPTA budget. From either perspective it is a clear diminution of independence. 
 
OPTA is accountable to the Minister but not officially to Parliament. The role of 
Parliament in the Netherlands is important. Interviewees from the Ministry and 
former ministers rejected the view that OPTA had any accountability to the 
Parliament. The Ministry always advised OPTA not to appear before Parliament. 
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Mr. van Brinkhorst, a former Minister, confirmed that one of his first acts as 
Minister was to write to all agencies under his remit, including OPTA, explaining 
that his remit was to explain policy and he had, therefore, political responsibility 
to Parliament as such agencies did not have political responsibilities.62 OPTA did 
appear before Parliament, normally as Jens Arnbak described, to explain their 
decisions only. This separates OPTA from the many other Ministerial agencies 
created at this time in the Netherlands. 
 
The view of the government was that once the European directives had been 
agreed, the Netherlands should liberalise their telecoms market as quickly as 
possible. Mrs. Jorritsma argued that the Netherlands looked to the experience of 
the UK and saw, as a first mover, how their industry was developing, so the 
decision was to open the markets and create the regulator as quickly as possible. 
Mrs. Jorritsma’s view was that the market should be left to function without 
regulation if not needed. This is important as it defined the relationship between 
the Minister and the first regulator, Jens Arnbak, who at times disagreed with the 
views of the Minister on what was the role of the regulator.63 
 
                                                 
62 Interview Mr. van Brinkhorst.  
63 Interviews with Mrs. Jorritsma and Mr. Jens Arnbak.  
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Mrs. Jorritsma argued that her preference, and that of her party, was for the 
regulator to be a department of the NMa (Dutch Competition Authority) and the 
debate around the Interim Act (1996) and subsequent establishment of the NMa 
in 1998 was whether institutionally the agencies would merge. Following the re-
election in 1998 of the ‘Purple coalition’, Mrs. Jorritsma assumed the role of 
Minister for Economic Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister. She transferred the 
responsibilities for OPTA and the Radio Communications Agency into the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs. The move was recognition that these agencies 
needed to work more closely together. Interviewees have remarked that the 
Ministry of Transport was an infrastructure department dealing with waterways 
and it seemed appropriate for the telecommunications activities, now part of a 
liberalised market, to be under one economic Ministry.64 
 
It is clear from interviews and previous discussion of the political culture that the 
creation of OPTA was a fiercely resisted proposal. The regulator created is not 
very independent. Although nominally in terms of staffing and funding it is 
independent, the budget and major appointments require Ministerial approval. It 
is also significant that the remit of OPTA at inception was limited with both radio 
spectrum and numbering not delegated. The next section will look at the 
                                                 
64 Interview with Hans Bakker and Mrs. Jorritsma 
 308 
 
 
regulation of radio spectrum and the developments of the Radio Communications 
Agency. 
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THE REGULATION OF RADIO SPECTRUM IN THE NETHERLANDS: 
THE RADIO COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY 
 
 
The Interim Act (1996) led to the creation of OPTA, which was officially 
established in August 1997. The Act however makes it clear that the Minister 
retains large areas of responsibility, one of which is granting licences for the use 
of radio spectrum. The creation of OPTA did not lead to a legislative solution for 
radio spectrum. Although, as mentioned above, the reorganisation of the Ministry 
of Transport was designed to create two agencies, only OPTA, under the Interim 
Act (1996), was created. One interviewee, involved in the drafting of the Interim 
Act, argued that there was very little contact with the Radio Spectrum Agency 
(RDR) and very little discussion of radio spectrum being part of the regulator’s 
remit.65 The Interim Act was designed to create the institution but not necessarily 
address the remit of the regulator. An example of this was the issue of 
numbering. The national numbering range is a core task delegated to all 
                                                 
65 Interview Hans Bakker 
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regulators (see earlier chapters). However, this task was not delegated via 
legislation to OPTA in 1996. It was retained by the incumbent operator KPN 
until 1998. 
 
Interviewees argued that the creation of the regulator represented the allocation of 
new powers required for a liberalised market not a transfer of existing powers. 
Considering the issues raised above, and the resistance to an independent 
institution, the argument that the delegated powers were new powers is a strong 
argument and explains to some extent the view that there was no appetite to 
tackle the issue of radio spectrum.66Also, Mrs. Van Zuijlen argued, from the 
perspective of the Parliament, that issues raised by the creation of OPTA were the 
main concern of members of Parliament. Radio spectrum responsibilities were 
not discussed, and the remit of the regulator was not an issue in the Parliamentary 
debates. 
 
The attitude of industry is also interesting. Despite the views expressed in earlier 
chapters that the creation of an independent regulator, without Ministerial 
interference, would promote investment, one interviewee argued that those 
operators already in possession of radio spectrum wanted to maintain the status 
quo and they tended to be the larger operators. The political feeling therefore was 
                                                 
66 Interview Hans Bakker 
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that creating the independent regulator was enough. All interviewees agreed that 
investors did not ask at the time, or subsequently, for a delegation of radio 
spectrum activities to OPTA or any other agency.  
 
There was a consensus view from all interviewees that radio spectrum was 
considered in the Netherlands as a scarce resource and therefore was more 
political. The Netherlands is a densely populated country so interference and 
radio spectrum usage would be of more concern than possibly in previous case 
studies in Ireland and the UK. A further issue, also raised in the context of the 
UK case, was the growing importance of radio spectrum and the increasing 
commercialisation of parts of the radio spectrum and the potential revenue to the 
government. Similar to the UK in the draft of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 
(1998), the ‘purple coalition’ in the Netherlands and Mrs. Jorritsma recognised 
the potential value of radio spectrum. When asked why she did not consider 
including radio spectrum in the remit of the independent regulator she replied that 
the decision was influenced by the Minister for Finance. They both wanted to 
ensure control of the allocation of key parts of the radio spectrum, particularly 
through auctions.67 
 
                                                 
67 Interview Mrs. Jorritsma 
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Mrs. Jorritsma and interviewees from the RDR agreed that there were a number 
of other factors which may have influenced the decision to keep the radio 
spectrum agency part of the Ministry and not move it to the independent 
regulator. There was a long history of disputes over radio frequencies, 
particularly pirate use of frequencies and interference. John Derkson argued that 
because of the high profile of radio frequencies, particularly in relation to 
broadcasting, it was considered important to keep an agency that could look at 
the Netherlands strategically and address interference issues. Equally Parliament 
did not raise the issue of radio spectrum management at the time of the debate on 
OPTA.68 
 
The agency is organisationally independent of the Ministry, but procedures 
between the Ministry and the agency are not covered by legislation, so any 
existing rules of engagement are subject to change by the Minister. All 
employees of the radio spectrum agency are employees of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs. The level of contact, however, with the Ministry is informal. 
Interviewees from the agency pointed to their geographical distance from the 
Ministry, which is located in The Hague. The agency can advise the Minister on 
policy issues and has a role to comment to the Minister on proposals by the 
regulator, OPTA. The agency’s funding is mainly from licence fees with 
                                                 
68 Interview with member of Parliament Mrs. van Zuijlen 
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approximately 20% coming from a number of other sources including funds from 
the Ministry to compensate them for the costs of offering advice and funds from 
public sector broadcasters for their use of radio spectrum.  
 
The institutional relationship between the Ministry, the radio spectrum agency 
and the independent regulator was criticised by the OECD (OECD, 1999a). The 
OECD argued that despite the legal separation from the Ministry and KPN, the 
independent regulator was closely related to the Ministry, particularly in areas 
related to numbering and interconnection. They argued: 
 
‘…retaining these functions within the Ministry reduces transparency and 
enhances the possibility of conflict between the different roles of the 
government as a regulator and a shareholder.’ (OECD, 1999a, p. 12) 
 
The OECD specifically mentioned radio spectrum as an area of concern and an 
area where they recommended further delegation of responsibility to OPTA: 
 
‘…the granting of spectrum licences should be carried out in as 
transparent and independent manner as possible. Although responsibility 
for establishing the overall frequency plan could be retained within the 
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Ministry, responsibility for granting licences should be devolved to 
OPTA’ (OECD, 1999a, p. 12) 
 
The Implementation Reports69 published by the European Commission advise on 
the effectiveness of the implementation of the telecommunications liberalisation 
directives and normally comment on institutional issues where there is an 
implementation problem, however, for the Netherlands, the issue of separation of 
institutional responsibility between OPTA and the Radio Communications 
Agency is not referred to in the reports. The reports note that OPTA had 
exercised its independence and notes in the 6th report that OPTA’s advice on the 
number of licences to be used for 3G (UMTS) Radio Spectrum was not taken by 
the Ministry. Despite this, they have not commented. Interviews with European 
Commission officials involved in the process suggest that this reflected the 
interpretation of the directives by the European Commission, which, although 
requiring an independent regulator where the Ministry retains a shareholding in 
the principal operator, does not prescribe views on the remit of the regulator and 
on obligations to include radio spectrum as part of the responsibility of the 
regulator. The European Commission argues this is a matter for states to decide.70 
It is hard not to conclude that in relation to the creation of the independent 
                                                 
69 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/implementation_enforcement/annualreports/ 
70 Interview Peter Scott. Peter Scott is listed as an interviewee in the Irish case study but he was interviewed in 
relation to the implementation reports in both countries. 
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regulator the Minister proposed the minimum level of delegation required by EU 
directives. This was a compromise solution against fierce resistance from the 
civil servants in a number of Ministries.  
 
Before assessing the role of the non-functional factors, like the impact of the 
European directives, on the decision to create OPTA, it would be appropriate to 
view the evolution of the institutional arrangements following the Interim Act in 
1996. 
 
Evolution of Telecommunications Regulation, specifically Radio Spectrum 
 
Unlike the other cases studies, there has been no institutional evolution in the 
Netherlands. The Interim Act 1996 is still the principal piece of legislation 
covering OPTA. Interviewees confirmed that some debate had taken place 
around the status of the competition authority (NMa) and OPTA. For example, at 
the end of 2002 OPTA started discussions with the NMa, the competition 
authority, to discuss bringing the agencies closer together. Jens Arnbak and Hans 
Bakker both confirmed this was in many ways self-preservation as politicians and 
Ministers had discussed moving the regulator into the Competition Authority. 
Mrs. Jorritsma had expressed the view, in interviews, that she would prefer such 
a solution. The regulator thought that by pre-empting the discussion they could 
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try to maintain some influence over any future institution, or achieve a consensus 
with the NMa which would ensure some survival for the regulator. These views 
were based on a perception that OPTA was a temporary institution. The 
philosophy of the government was summed up in a view of the OECD on the 
1998 Act: 
 
‘The Act foresees the government (including the independent regulator’s 
agency) remaining as a key player in the market until it can be shown that 
the market or specific segments of the market are sufficiently competitive 
to allow the Government to forebear from regulation’ (OECD, 1999a, p. 
7) 
 
This temporary status influenced the views of many in Parliament and the 
agencies. For example, the Radio Communications Agency interviewees argued 
it could not be merged with the OPTA as its role was strategic and could not be 
associated with a ‘temporary’ organisation.71 
 
The proposal to merge OPTA and the NMa was discussed by the two agencies 
and an agreement reached. According to one interviewee, the proposal was 
                                                 
71 Interviews John Derksen & Hans Houinj. During interviews there is a general air of dismissivness towards 
OPTA, seeing OPTA as the petulant child who should know its place. 
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greeted in the Ministry of Economic Affairs with ‘some surprise’, the Minister, 
retorting that he was not interested in institutional issues72. Mr van Brinkhorst 
explained that he was concerned at that time with relationships between the 
regulator and KPN, and the relationship with the regulator and the Ministry 
officials, both of which were difficult. He argued that it was not the right time to 
consider merging. He was particularly concerned that some personalities in 
OPTA, specifically Hans Bakker, were seen as the root of disagreement with 
KPN and with the Ministry. The Minister was concerned individuals may have 
more influence in a larger merged entity.   
 
The role and status of the Radio Communications Agency was reconsidered in 
2003 by the Minister for Economic Affairs. The Minister established the Radio 
Spectrum Policy Commission under the chair of Gerrit Jan Wolffensperger. The 
review was initiated, as described in the 2005 Policy memorandum as a result of: 
 
‘A combination of technological developments, market developments and 
a changing outlook on spectrum utilization prompted the Government to 
evaluate its radio spectrum policy’ (Ministry for Economic Affairs 
Netherlands, 2005, p. 4) 
 
                                                 
72 Interview Hans Bakker 
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The Commission’s recommendation related more to the future of radio spectrum 
usage and the allocation methodologies. The Commission recognised the 
growing importance of the market and made similar observations to the Professor 
Cave report referred to in the UK case study. However, the Commission, unlike 
the Cave report, recommends: 
 
‘…the Minister of Economic Affairs should bear ultimate responsibility 
for integral radio spectrum policy’ (Ministry for Economic Affairs 
Netherlands, 2005, p. 5) 
 
Following the work of the Commission, the Minister for Economic Affairs 
published the new memorandum on Radio Spectrum policy. The Minister makes 
it clear, unlike the other case studies, that the government has a role beyond just 
setting policy: 
 
‘As far as the radio spectrum policy is concerned, the government’s role 
has planning, allocative and supervisory aspects, because frequencies for 
specific applications are scarce and because the use of frequencies may 
result in interference affecting other users, both within and outside the 
borders of this country and because it is important to safe guard 
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applications of a public interest’ (Ministry for Economic Affairs 
Netherlands, 2005, p. 7) 
 
 
The responsibilities are clearly stated later in the memorandum: 
 
‘Under the new more transparent system, tasks and powers will be 
entrusted to a single Minister, which means that the Minister who takes 
the decision on whether to grant a licence’ (Ministry for Economic 
Affairs Netherlands, 2005, p. 7) 
 
Interviews with senior officials in the Radio Communications Agency argued 
that part of the reason for the report’s findings was a perception that the agency 
was doing well. They argued that they do not receive complaints from industry or 
others, about the agency being part of the Ministry. John Derkson argued that 
what investors want is certainty and transparency. He argued that clear allocation 
procedures were the main demand of those acquiring radio spectrum.73 This view 
is supported by the 2005 Radio Spectrum policy memorandum which argues: 
 
                                                 
73 Interview John Derkson 
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‘…it has been found that users, with the exception of commercial 
broadcasters, are generally satisfied with the radio spectrum policy 
pursued’ (Ministry for Economic Affairs Netherlands, 2005, p. 4) 
 
The Radio Spectrum policy memorandum in 2005 restated the view that the role 
of radio spectrum management is strategic and therefore a part of government. 
There is currently no consideration of including radio spectrum management as 
part of the regulator. However, interviews confirmed that the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs is considering how to address changes in the market place and 
assess the success of the Ofcom model. The Dutch government, according to one 
interviewee, is concerned that independence may not be required in future 
institutional regimes74. The market is competitive and therefore the need for an 
independent regulator is less important, and the role of the Competition Authority 
is therefore more important. However, the Competition Authority as currently 
constituted under the 1998 Dutch legislation is not independent of the Ministry. 
The Commission which heads this agency is semi-independent but the staff and 
resources are all Ministry staff.  
 
                                                 
74 Interview Jos Huigen 
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The debate, according to one interviewee in the Netherlands, is focused on the 
accountability of the Minister to Parliament and not agencies75. OPTA reports 
directly to the Minister and unlike the other case studies the regulator should not 
report to Parliament. This is designed to ensure that Ministers are accountable. 
The argument made for creating independent agencies in earlier chapters was that 
credibility was a key factor. Decisions in liberalised markets should be non-
political. To a large extent because, particularly in the Netherlands, the markets 
are competitive and less politicised, the issue of political interference does not 
exist. The formerly state-run enterprises are in private hands and the only 
concerns are policy related.76 
 
The lack of legislative changes and the limited remit of the independent regulator 
suggest that the Netherlands differs from the other cases as the creation of OPTA 
is considered an isolated incident. The decision to create an independent regulator 
for telecommunications has not been followed in other sectors where for example 
the preference is for regulators to be part of a semi-independent competition 
authority. The approach in the Netherlands reflects their historical consensus 
approach to policy formation. The OECD called for the NMa to be made more 
                                                 
75 Interview Hans Bakker 
76 Interview Jos Huigen 
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independent in 1999 but according to interviewees it is likely the pendulum has 
swung back to more direct Ministerial oversight. 
 
The next section will examine the non-functional factors mentioned in the 
literature, as factors explaining the creation of independent agencies, and will 
consider whether there is evidence of these factors being important in the 
Netherlands.  
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NON-FUNCTIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF DELEGATION IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 
 
The decision to create a telecommunications regulator may, as discussed in 
previous chapters, be influenced by a number of the non-functional factors, some 
of which may be external to the telecommunications sector. They reflect issues 
related to policy tradition, political leadership or new public management reform 
which drives the creation of regulatory agencies as institutional solutions 
(Thatcher, 2002b). There are also factors such as blame shifting and the 
isomorphic effect of the European Union. This section will examine whether 
these factors were drivers of the reforms in the Netherlands and whether they can 
explain the institutional decisions taken by policy actors in the 
telecommunications sector. 
 
Independent Regulation in the Netherlands 
 
In each case study we have examined whether there existed in the country a 
political tradition or political leadership which influenced the decision to 
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delegate. The OECD has commented on the culture of cooperation which existed 
in the Netherlands until the market reforms of the 1990s: 
 
‘Achieving a balance between necessary regulation and desirable 
competition will be a particular challenge in the Netherlands, because of 
the country’s long tradition of self-regulatory structures’ (OECD, 1999a, 
p. 8) 
 
The OECD argued that prior to the 1990s the Dutch approach to competition had 
been lax with a culture of private agreements between companies. It was 
perceived that the benefits of EU policies to promote international competition 
and the benefits for economic prosperity were more important for the 
Netherlands to pursue. For political leadership or tradition to be a factor there 
would need to be evidence of cross-sector reforms which at an institutional level 
promoted the concept of independent agencies in a number of sectors. The 
political culture in the Netherlands, throughout the period of liberalisation 
promoted consensus building and was therefore a deliberate, slow process. All 
interviewees commented on this culture and argued that the concept of 
independent regulation, an agency outside the accepted established agency 
structures, was a difficult concept for the executive and the civil service to accept. 
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Christensen and Yesilkagit (2005) argue that the Netherlands has a weak 
executive dominance of Parliament and an integrated policy making structure 
which allows vested interests a strong voice in policy making. Interviewees 
confirmed this analysis, arguing that the Minister is the key individual in the 
Dutch Parliamentary process77. Irrespective of the independent nature of agencies 
where they exist, Parliament expects Dutch ministers to take responsibilities for 
such decisions. However, one interviewer from Parliament argued that at times 
resistance to delegation of authority is not from Parliament, on the issue of 
telecommunications there was a clear desire for an independent regulator.78  
 
The Parliamentary party structure in the Netherlands is not as disciplined as the 
Westminster-model. Individual Dutch members of Parliament take positions 
which may be contrary to party policy. Former Minister for Economic Affairs, 
Mr. Laurens van Brinkhorst, argued that it was in the Dutch political character to 
‘propose A, and propose the opposite of A at the same time’. Mrs van Zuijlen 
argued that Parliament was there to resist policies from the executive if 
Parliament were against them, irrespective of whether the Minister was from the 
same political party. She argued that if she got together with a spokesperson from 
                                                 
77 Interviews with officials in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Mark Frequin, Wijnand Smit and Klaus Bouma 
78 Interview Marjet van Zuijlen, Labour party spokesperson 1994-2000 
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another political party and they opposed a proposed measure their collective 
arguments could ‘break a Minister’79 
 
The argument that political leadership drove the privatisation agenda which in 
turn created the need for regulators has been discussed in earlier chapters. It is 
evident from the policies adopted and their consistent, albeit slow, 
implementation in the Netherlands that there was a clear consensus towards the 
creation of an independent regulator. However, there is no clear ideological 
leadership for such a policy. For example, one interviewee disagreed with the 
view that Mrs. Smit-Kroes was the driver of privatisation and regulation in the 
Netherlands. Mrs Smit-Kroes was a key economic Minister and member of the 
government in the late 1980s which is associated with a more radical approach to 
state ownership. He argued Mrs. Smit-Kroes interests were to protect the 
incumbent operator not promote competition80. Andeweg (1994) argues 
specifically in relation to privatisation, that the driver was not ideological: 
 
‘It is important to note the roots of Dutch privatisation are neo-
corporatist/bureaucratic, not part-political, and that, other than in the 
UK, privatisation never became an ideological quest: the trumpets of 
                                                 
79 Interview Marjet van Zuijlen 
80 Interview Hans Bakker 
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‘popular capitalism’ have never been sounded in the Netherlands, and 
privatisation was merely regarded as a pragmatic solution to specific 
administrative and economic problems’ (Andeweg, 1994) 
 
For most of the last twenty years a similar composition of parties has formed the 
constituents of coalition governments in the Netherlands. Jens Arnbak, referring 
to the Dutch political party system, explained that there are many political parties 
in the Netherlands with only slight differences in policy between them.81 Further 
evidence that the privatisation agenda was more pragmatic than ideological can 
be seen in the period 1990-1994 when the composition of the coalition included 
the Labour Party and the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij, (SDAP) leader 
and Minister for Finance, Wim Kok, who redefined privatisation as 
‘autonomatisation’.  
 
In 1994, for the first time since 1945, the Christen Democratisch Appèl (CDA: 
Christian Democratic Party), was not in government and the ‘purple coalition’ 
composed of more conservative and liberal coalition parties, restated its aims for 
privatisation. Under new Minister, Annemarie Jorritsma, the privatisation of 
KPN was accelerated and legislation prepared to create the telecoms regulator. 
 
                                                 
81 Interview Jens Arnbak 
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In other sectors, despite the public reforms, political leadership did not exist in 
the Netherlands to follow an agenda which opened up markets and promoted 
independent regulators. For example the Netherlands liberalised its energy 
markets around the same time as the telecommunications market but decided to 
include energy as part of the Competition Authority. Gilardi (2003a) assessing 
the extent of delegation in seven sectors in the Netherlands concludes: 
 
‘A first sharp difference is that between the electricity and telecoms 
regulators. The former has very weakly autonomous powers, decision-
making powers but quite extensive regulatory powers, while the latter has 
fewer competencies but higher independence for the agency head and 
management board, as well as more autonomy for financial and 
organisational matters, leading to a higher overall independence score’ 
(Gilardi, 2003a, p. 12) 
 
It is notable that Gilardi considers the electricity regulator to be an independent 
regulator, despite the fact that the regulator is part of the Competition Authority. 
Interviewees confirmed the status of the Competition Authority. The Authority is 
headed by an independent commission of legal and economic experts however 
the staff and funding for the Authority comes from the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. Gilardi recognises this: 
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‘A second point is the resemblance between the competition and 
electricity, IRAs, in spite of the former’s almost null independence for 
decision makers and more extensive organizational autonomy. The 
similarity is not surprising since the electricity regulator is in fact a 
chamber of the competition authority’ (Gilardi, 2003a, p. 13) 
 
Interviewees from the Ministry of Economic Affairs did hold the view that the 
Competition Authority was independent and that it was purely administrative 
simplicity to have all the employees defined as civil servants82. Interviewees 
referred to the pendulum of Netherlands politics where at times there was an 
acceptance of independent regulators and delegation from the executive, but the 
pendulum would swing back to a desire to have all activities under the control of 
a Minister. Specifically, the pendulum in favour of independent agencies and 
delegation was at its height during the 1990s and the Ministry of Annemarie 
Jorritsma, from the liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (VVD). 
Interviewees also commented on the legacy of cooperation and consensus 
referred to earlier by the OECD83. One interviewee referred to the pyramid of 
politics in the Netherlands with the Crown at the top and political control within a 
                                                 
82 Interviews specifically with Mark Frequin the head of the Telecoms directorate in the ministry of economic 
affairs but also all others interviewed from the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
83 Interviews with Hans Bakker and Jos Huigen 
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narrow range, and subject to accountability mechanisms in the executive and 
Parliament. Independent regulators do not easily fit into that structure84. 
 
A particular institutional solution, in relation to public sector reform, has been the 
growth of ZBOs (Zelfstandige Bestuursorganen) which are agencies separate 
from the civil service, managed by boards which generally supervise areas which 
are specialised with certain technical expertise or areas where independent 
judgment is required. The Telecommunications regulator, OPTA, is considered a 
ZBO. Christensen and Yesikagit (2005) argue that many of these agencies are 
small and deal with specialised areas and in relation to the debate on delegation 
generally, the growth in agencies since the 1950s in the Netherlands shows that: 
 
‘First, policy-makers have always to some extent relied on delegation to 
non-majoritarian agencies in regulatory administration, but this has 
mostly served the purpose of integrating the political environment into 
executive administration. Second, the conclusion is that departmental 
ministers and governments have been able to secure themselves a strong 
platform when it comes to providing leadership and control to 
regulatory administration’ (Christensen & Yesilkagit, 2005) 
 
                                                 
84 Interview Hans Bakker 
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One can make the argument, however, that political tradition instead of working 
in favour of ideological ideas of small government and privatisation actually 
worked against such concepts in the Netherlands. Interviewees and commentators 
have all argued that the process of policy making which allows for a weak 
executive and the focus of authority on the Minister does not promote the idea of 
delegation in countries such as the Netherlands. Christensen and Yesilkagit 
(2005) argue that the specific corporatist approach to policy making and a weak 
executive evident in the Netherlands raises particular problems for the creation of 
independent regulatory authorities: 
 
‘Parliamentary government makes the political executive accountable to 
Parliament and with a relatively weak executive Parliament rather 
maximizes its influence on regulatory administration by insisting on 
forms of organisation that ensure hierarchical integration. With this 
form of organisation, the majority can hold departmental ministers 
accountable for any administrative detail; this is not the case if they 
allow for delegation to independent regulatory administrations’ 
(Christensen & Yesilkagit, 2005) 
 
Political tradition and leadership are therefore relevant to the factors influencing 
the creation of the independent regulator, its independence and crucially its remit. 
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All interviewees for this case study agreed that the Dutch political system does 
not like independent regulators and have created very few independent agencies. 
If, as we see above, there was no political leadership or tradition for delegating 
powers to independent regulators, the creation of OPTA in 1996 did represent the 
creation of an agency independent of the Minister, which was unique in the 
Dutch political structure. Marjet van Zuijlen argued that everyone except the 
Minister and sections of the Parliament were against it. Although there have been 
ZBOs which are independent and created under private law, their role is limited 
specifically to narrow specialised areas and although they have grown in number 
they represent a long tradition in the Netherlands which is as much about public 
sector efficiency as opposed to delegation.  
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The Impact of EU policies 
 
 
As discussed in previous chapters and in the other case studies, the EU with the 
publication of their Green Paper (Commission of the European Communities, 
1987) started the process of progressively liberalising the telecommunications 
markets. In the mid 1990s the European Commission was focused on the 
liberalisation directives which, if transposed, would require countries to establish 
independent regulators. The issue for this section is to consider how influential is 
the work of the EU, and to what extent did the inevitability of liberalisation drive 
the decision to create the regulator?  
 
In the Netherlands this issue is important as there is no obligation to create an 
independent regulator with a wide remit. Interviewees have differed slightly on 
the impact the EU had on the creation of the regulator. Hans Bakker argued that 
without the EU directives there would not have been an independent regulator 
and he cites the decisions in the early 1990s to open the markets to a limited 
number of licences with the intention, he argues, of developing a duopoly market 
which would protect KPN.   
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Mrs. Jorritsma argued that Europe was a driving force, but albeit slower in the 
Netherlands. The purple coalition was committed after 1994 to a policy of 
liberalisation that would have entailed an independent regulator. Mrs. Jorritsma’s 
preference however was for a strong competition authority. Jens Arnbak would 
agree also that the Netherlands had been liberalising in their ‘own Dutch way’, 
starting with Mrs. Smit-Kroes in the 1980s and the European directives forced 
the government to make decisions in the 1990s which they may have delayed 
otherwise. 
 
It is clear from the interviewees, and from the slow progress towards 
liberalisation that the Dutch governments, although seeing the benefits of 
competitive markets, did not have a culture of independent regulation and the 
Interim Act in 1996 represented the least they had to do to comply with the 
directives. Former Minister, Mr. van Brinkhorst, argued that the Dutch culture is 
to resist change and this would have an impact on the implementation of EU 
directives. The Dutch he argues have a superior view of themselves compared to 
their neighbours. He argued that the Calvinist tradition in the Netherlands is 
strong and can be summarised as a perception, ‘thank you my lord, I am a bit 
better than my neighbour.’85 
 
                                                 
85 Interview Mr. van Brinkhorst 
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The role of Europe in the creation of the independent regulator is therefore 
crucial to understanding why the Netherlands created their agency. Unlike the 
other case studies, the Dutch struggled with the concept of independence. It is 
important to consider here whether Gilardi’s (2001) argument that veto players 
are a ‘functional equivalent’ of delegation led to the view that what was needed 
was a minimalist approach to independence. The Parliament’s main concern was 
the risk that the incumbent KPN was close to the Ministry and without a regulator 
the essential separation of authority in a liberalised market would not have been 
realised86. The need to have an agency regulating an open market seems to be 
accepted. However, the status of the agency as an independent agency was a 
concept not accepted by the Dutch. The decisions of the governments, subsequent 
to the passing of the Interim Act in 1996 and the establishment of the regulator in 
1997, are therefore important to get a better understanding of the political culture 
following liberalisation. 
 
Blame Shifting and other factors influencing the independence of the 
Regulator 
 
 
In other case studies it has been clear that other factors identified in the literature 
played some role in the decision to create an independent regulator. It is clear 
                                                 
86 Interviews Hans Bakker & Marjet van Zuijlen 
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from the Netherlands case that the narrow range of factors which led to the 
creation of the independent regulator was driven as much by Europe as any other 
single issue. However, were other factors important to the decision? 
 
One issue, examined in other case studies, is blame shifting which argues that 
policy makers will delegate responsibility for unpopular decisions to avoid 
blame. In the Netherlands all interviewees, when asked for examples of blame 
shifting, said it was not an issue. Mrs. Jorritsma was clear that in her view she 
was accountable for policy and what she was not accountable for was apolitical 
and she did not interfere or shift blame to the regulator. This is despite the fact 
that OPTA in its opening years as regulator rebalanced prices and there was 
adverse publicity, Mrs. Jorritsma did not hide behind the legislation. Mr. van 
Brinkhorst when asked about the benefits of blame shifting from a political 
perspective did not see any occasion when it was considered appropriate. In fact 
his role on occasions was to support the regulator in relation to price changes and 
interventions.87 The only reference to blame shifting, which is slight, was made 
by one interviewee who recounted that the most senior civil servant in the 
Ministry of Transport, when the final Dutch name of the regulator was being 
discussed, insisted that the first nominee include the word ‘independent’, so the 
agency would not be associated with the Ministry. 
                                                 
87 Interview Mr. van Brinkhorst 
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 Non-functional factors are important in the Netherlands. The role of Europe and 
the political traditions in the Netherlands played against each other to ensure the 
slow drafting of legislation to create OPTA. The Netherlands significantly have 
not reviewed the legal basis of OPTA. In the UK and in Ireland in 2003 there 
were reviews and changes to the institutional arrangements. European 
telecommunications directives passed in 2002 were a catalyst for the reviews and 
were a reason to return to the primary legislation. In the Netherlands, however, 
the directives did not change the institutional arrangements. The opportunity to 
update the 1996 Act passed. Again, the pressures evident in the political culture 
reinforce the view that having created OPTA there was no appetite for more 
institutional change. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the Netherlands it appears there has been limited real institutional change. The 
independent regulator has been created, as much to comply with the European 
directives as to create organisationally distinct agencies. In comparison with the 
other cases discussed there are both similarities and differences. The Dutch and 
Irish followed a similar privatisation and legislative agenda although the Irish 
regulator had a wider remit from the beginning. The radio spectrum agencies in 
the UK and the Netherlands were institutionally the same and the views of 
Ministers and civil servants in both jurisdictions were similar in relation to 
delegating authority to independent agencies. The Netherlands however, differs 
from the other cases in limiting the remit of independent regulation and not 
evolving the institutional landscape in the ten years since the creation of the 
regulator. 
 
Officials surveyed at the time the interim legislation creating OPTA was being 
drafted suggested that the existing political process was: 
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‘…not regarded as being satisfactory. For example, it was said to be slow 
and lacking in transparency’ (Mansell, Davies, & Hulsink, 1996 ) 
 
Mansell, Davies and Hulsink continue in relation to the creation of the 
independent regulator which suggests little strategic thinking on the role of the 
regulator: 
 
‘There was a wide range of views on the need for an Independent 
regulatory agency, which is advocated by the European Commission as a 
measure to address these problems. When the interviewees in this study 
recommended the establishment of an independent regulatory they did not 
have specific views as to how this should be accomplished’ (Mansell, 
Davies, & Hulsink, 1996 , p. 287)        
 
A key feature of the Dutch institutional response to privatisation was the legacy 
of co-operation and consensus building which predicates legislative change in the 
Netherlands. Chris Fonteijn described this system as the ‘Polder Model’, which is 
a Dutch word for a piece of land under the water level surrounded by dykes. The 
model tries to explain Dutch decision making. Dutch policy making is governed 
by the Polder and the view that if you are sinking underwater you will work 
harder to gain a consensus to get you above water. This decision making model 
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explains the unique circumstances in the Netherlands and the view that leadership 
on policy is not often evident if consensus can be achieved. Bruff (2003) argues 
that despite the dramatic decline in the traditional religious pillars of Dutch 
society over the past 35 years, the Netherlands has become more, rather than less, 
fragmented. Policy uncertainty is not an issue as policy moves ahead at a slow 
agreed pace and the role of veto players becomes more important. Therefore, you 
can argue for the Netherlands that delegation for functional reasons are not as 
applicable to this political system as they have been in the other case studies. Yet 
the fact that there was delegation reinforces the view that the non-functional 
factors, such as the role of the EU, are important to the creation of independent 
agencies. Indirectly you can argue that the EU in directing member states to 
functionally separate from their Ministries the regulatory activities into  
independent agencies, were promoting credibility arguments. Mansell, Davies 
and Hulsink (1996) argue that the policy makers wanted to: 
 
‘Design a policy and regulatory framework in the Netherlands that builds 
on the strengths of the consensus style of political decision-making, 
incorporates both the social and economic objectives, and sends clear 
signals concerning the behaviour of the players in the dominant market’ 
(Mansell, Davies, & Hulsink, 1996 , p. 288) 
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They argue that the positive effects of this consensus style of decision making 
could be replicated in the decision making of the independent regulator. There 
was little need for the independent agent model if there were no principal-agent 
differences and no credibility issues for the agent to address in the liberalised 
market. 
 
The Dutch approach to telecom regulation and the creation of the regulator was 
influenced primarily by EU directives and, as the directives did not specify a 
remit, the remit for OPTA was narrow. The political tradition argument discussed 
above, and by Thatcher in the literature, is a feature in this case. In the literature 
the arguments for political traditions or leadership support the view that 
institutional changes and delegation happen as a result of ideological reasons. In 
the Netherlands one can argue that political tradition had the opposite effect. 
Political tradition in the Netherlands promoted consensus-based decisions within 
the framework of Ministers accountable to Parliament. Independent regulatory 
authorities, delegating authority away from the centre, was not part of the culture. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has examined the non-functional factors explaining the growth of 
delegation to independent agencies. The delegation of responsibilities to 
independent agencies has been growing in recent decades and in some sectors 
regulatory functions previously carried out by Ministries and state 
administrations are being performed by agencies independent of government.  
 
The literature argues that delegation is more prevalent in economic sectors, 
specifically sectors subject to market opening. The independence of these 
agencies is explained principally by functional reasons based on the principal-
agent theories which argue that policy actors will delegate to independent 
agencies to credibly commit to certain policies, such as market liberalisation.  
 
However, despite the importance of credibility as a factor explaining delegation 
to independent agencies, there are still wide variations in the level of 
independence between countries and sectors. This suggests that the non-
functional factors do influence the level of independence. It is critical therefore to 
our understanding of the process of delegation to have a clearer understanding of 
the non-functional factors influencing policy actors in their decision to delegate 
to independent agencies. 
 343 
 
 
 
To concentrate on the non-functional factors this thesis has controlled for the 
functional factors in delegation in two ways. Firstly, by choosing 
telecommunications, which is an economic sector subject to pressures of market 
opening, and secondly by choosing countries in the European union where the 
market opening legislative framework was developed through common directives 
of the EU. By choosing this sector one can argue variations in the level of 
independence must be due to non-functional reasons. Additionally, choosing case 
studies on the basis of not only of legislative independence criteria but also using 
more operational criteria the analysis gives a deeper understanding of the 
delegation process.  
 
The literature on the non-functional factors has not looked at the reasons behind 
the operational remit of independent agencies. A review of the operational remit 
allows us to consider the constraints placed on the independent agency. One of 
the constraints placed on independent agencies are ex-ante controls. These 
controls have the effect of ensuring that policy actors’ preferences are allied to 
the agencies. In telecommunications one of the key responsibilities identified for 
independent agencies in newly liberalised markets is the management of radio 
spectrum. This specific operational responsibility has been delegated erratically 
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in the EU. This thesis has therefore selected cases also on the basis of the 
institutional approach to delegation of the management of radio spectrum. 
 
The case studies examined the process of delegation in the UK, Ireland and the 
Netherlands. The case studies examined the initial decision to delegate to an 
independent agency and the evolution of the delegation decision through 
subsequent legislation. They specifically examined the treatment of radio 
spectrum management as an operational responsibility. The conclusions, across 
all cases, are that despite the common framework in the telecommunications 
sectors, the institutional response of the three countries selected differed.  
 
In terms of the non-functional explanations for delegation each case highlighted 
national factors which influenced the approach to delegation. For example, in 
Ireland the decision to include in the same piece of legislation the sale of shares 
in Telecom Éireann and the creation of the independent telecommunications 
agency, had the effect of concentrating policy makers’ time on the sale of shares 
not on the agency being created. It also had the effect of focusing the civil 
servants on the provisions around the sale of shares and it is clear from the Irish 
case study that the design of the ODTR emerged from a small group of civil 
servants. National factors are also important in terms of political traditions and 
political leadership. It is clear from the UK case study that the UK did exhibit 
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evidence that the institutional changes were provoked by the political leadership 
of the Margaret Thatcher governments and the privatisation agenda. The 
argument that state traditions influence the decision to delegate is also clear in the 
Netherlands case study. The consensus, referred to by many interviewees as a 
Calvinistic approach to political decision making, is evident in the 
telecommunications sector where nearly all interviewees expressed the view that 
the Dutch have a tradition of not wishing to delegate responsibilities away from 
the executive. The need for the Minister to account to Parliament for all activities 
makes the decision to create agencies, totally independent of government, very 
difficult. The Dutch case highlights that political traditions can work both for and 
against the creation of an agency. 
 
The role of the EU in mandating the creation of an independent agency was also 
a key factor in cases where there was no previous delegation of responsibilities. 
From the evidence of interviews it would appear coercive isomorphism of the EU 
was an important factor. Many interviewees in the Netherlands argued that 
without the stick from Brussels they would not have created an independent 
regulatory agency. The additional support for this argument is the fact that the 
Netherlands have not changed their legislation and the current regulatory 
authority is considered a temporary solution. In Ireland the influence of the EU 
was important in the timing of legislation. Interviewees argued that Ireland was 
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moving along the road of creating an independent agency for telecommunications 
but were pushed faster as a result of EU directives. 
  
What is clear across all the cases is that the non-functional factors differ from 
case to case. There is little evidence that blame shifting was a consideration in the 
Netherlands. In Ireland there is little evidence to support the view that there was 
any political tradition which influenced the decision to create the independent 
agency. In the UK the isomorphism evident in the other cases was not a factor 
mainly because an institutional solution was already in place. We can conclude, 
therefore, that non-functional factors are vital to our understanding of delegation. 
In cases where functional reasons should pre-dominate there remain national 
factors which influence the delegation process. 
 
The treatment of radio spectrum management highlights the importance of the 
non-functional factors as it is central to the operational responsibility of an 
independent telecommunications agency. In Ireland there was very little scrutiny 
of the delegation of these powers and consequently the powers delegated were 
broad. The evidence from the Irish case study shows the problems of delegating 
for policy actors without ex-ante controls. In Ireland the management of radio 
spectrum was delegated, with only a consenting role for the Minister of Finance 
over the level of fee for radio spectrum licences, yet the allocation and licensing 
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was the responsibility of the independent telecommunications agency. In this 
case the conflicting preferences led to a standoff between the agency who had 
allocated the radio spectrum, and the Minister who held the view that the 
proposed revenue from the radio spectrum licences would not maximise the 
revenue potential for the government. The standoff led to a delay in the awarding 
of the radio spectrum licence, but crucially it ultimately led to changes in 
legislation which imposed more ex-ante controls on the re instituted agency. If 
political actors are delegating key national resources, such as radio spectrum, 
they need to ensure the preferences of the agent cannot conflict with the 
expectations of the policy actor. In the UK, for example, a senior official argued 
that the Secretary of State retain the right, albeit limited, to allocate and charge 
for specific types of radio spectrum. The official argued that to delegate this 
responsibility to an independent agency could expose the secretary of state to 
criticism for not being able to raise the revenue from this specific piece of radio 
spectrum. In the Netherlands, the political tradition mitigated against delegation. 
However, this need to maintain operational control over the key national 
resources of radio spectrum meant that no delegation occurred.  In radio spectrum 
management therefore, the conclusion is that policy actors will not delegate 
complete responsibility and will retain ex-ante controls, where the policy actor 
believes there is financial reward to the government from retaining control. 
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In all cases the evolution of the initial delegation decision is a valuable 
contribution to our understanding the delegation process. In the Irish case the 
regulatory unit within the Department was responsible for drafting the legislation 
and had a major influence on the format of the legislation which created a very 
independent agency. However, the preferences of the policy actors were in 
conflict with the preferences of the agents and the subsequent legislation attempts 
to constraint the agent through changes to the agency’s leadership structure and 
clear provisions for the Minister to intervene. In the Netherlands the reluctance to 
delegate was evident in the interviews with Ministry officials. There was a clear 
reluctance to delegate radio spectrum management. The role of the EU was 
important therefore in forcing the Dutch to delegate. The evolution of this 
decision reinforces this as the Dutch have not changed their legislation and still 
consider the agency, a temporary solution.  
 
More research is needed on the evolution of delegation.  There is a clear trend, 
based on principle-agent motivations, for aspects of social and economic 
government oversight to be delegated to independent agencies. This does not 
hide the tensions which may exist between the policy actors and the agents. For 
policy actors such independent agencies are useful for blame shifting reasons and 
from a functional perspective they can be a solution to managing complex policy 
areas. However, the need for policy actors to ensure agents reflect their 
 349 
 
 
preferences will be shown in the ex-ante and ex-post controls on agencies and 
more importantly on the evolution of the delegation decision.  
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